Israeli Surveillance of the Future Hijackers and FBI Suspects in the September 11 Attacks and Their Failure to Give Us Adequate Warning:
The Need for a Public Inquiry

September 15, 2004



1.  General Preliminary Conclusions ......................................  2

2.  Imperatives and Priorities ......................................................  4

3.  The DEA Report ..............................................................................................  5

4.  The Israeli DEA Groups ....................................................................  6

a. Backgrounds in Intelligence, Electronic
   Intercept and Communications Units ...................  6

b. Connections to Israeli Wiretapping and
   Telecommunications Companies .......................................  9

c. Israeli Surveillance of U.S. Government
   Offices, Laboratories and Residences
   and Other U.S. Strategic Areas ................................  10

d. Spying on the United States ..........................................  11

e. Israeli Surveillance of Arab Groups,
   the Future Hijackers and FBI Suspects ........  13

f. Hollywood, Florida: The Operating Base of
   The Israeli DEA Groups ..........................................................  14

5.  The Future Hijackers and FBI Suspects .................  15

a. Operations in Hollywood, Florida .........................  15

b. Timing of Operations of Both Groups
   in the Hollywood Area ..............................................................  17

i.   Hijacker Timelines ......................................................  17

ii.  Israeli DEA Groups ......................................................  18

iii. Future Hijackers ............................................................  18

c. Activities of Both Groups in Oklahoma ........  20

d. Dallas: A Probable Training Area for the
   Israeli DEA Groups ........................................................................  23


6.  Reports Concerning the Surveillance
    Activities of the Israeli DEA Groups .....................  25

7.  Northeastern New Jersey -- Another Vital
    Center of Operations for Both Sides ........................  26

a. Hudson and Bergen Counties: The Operating
   Base of the Israeli New Jersey Group ............  26

b. The Leader of the Israeli New Jersey
   Group Flees to Israel and becomes an
   FBI Suspect ...............................................................................................  29

c. Hudson and Bergen Counties: The Staging
   Ground for the Future Hijackers of the
   Pentagon Plane .....................................................................................  30

d. The FBI’s Conclusion: The Israeli New
   Jersey Group were Mossad Intelligence
   Operatives Spying on Local Arabs in
   Hudson and Bergen Counties .............................................  31

8.  Inadequate Israeli Warnings in August 2001 .  32

9.  The Watchlisting of Khaled al Mihdhar and
    Nawaf al Hazmi in August 2001 ............................................  36

a. “John”, “Mary”, “Jane” and “Alice” ..................  38

b. The Uncertain, Untranslated, Unwitnessed,
   Unremembered and Erroneous Identification
   of Khallad ..................................................................................................  39

c. William (of Ockham) ....................................................................  42

10.  Why the Israeli Groups? ............................................................  43

11.  The CIA’s Role and Responsibilities ....................  45

12.  Detailed Summary ...................................................................................  49


EXHIBIT A — The DEA Report

EXHIBIT B — Members of Israeli Groups and Future
Hijackers and FBI Suspects in Key Towns and Areas


EXHIBIT C — The October 2001 FBI Suspect List

EXHIBIT D — The May 2002 FBI Suspect List

EXHIBIT E — Mossad Warnings -- A Tabular Comparison

MAP 1 — Hollywood, Florida Area: Central Area of
Operations of Future Hijackers of the World
Trade Center Planes and Pennsylvania Plane,
and the Israeli DEA Groups, December 2000
to September 2001

MAP 2 — Hollywood, Florida: Core of Operations of
the Future Hijackers of the World Trade
Center Planes and the Pennsylvania Plane
and the Israeli DEA Groups, December 2000
to September 2001

MAP 3 — Hudson and Bergen Counties, NJ, New York
City Metropolitan Area: Center of
Operations of the Future Hijackers of the
Pentagon Plane and the Israeli New Jersey
Group, March to September 2001

MAP 4 — United States, Mid-2000 through August,



September 15, 2004




Israeli Surveillance of the Future Hijackers and FBI Suspects in the September 11 Attacks and Their Failure to Give Us Adequate Warning:
The Need for a Public Inquiry

I am an international corporate lawyer, writing to you today about a matter of public policy that is relevant to the circumstances surrounding, and our preparedness for, the catastrophic attacks on September 11, 2001. I do not know whether the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (the “Commission”) or the Senate and House Committees on Intelligence (the “Committees”) have had the opportunity to consider these issues carefully. If so, I hope this memorandum will be helpful. If not, I respectfully urge them, in accordance with the mandate of the Commission’s charter and in the exercise of the Committees’ responsibilities, to investigate the facts and resolve the questions presented.

I regret that this memorandum comes to the Commission after the publication of its Final Report this past July (the “Commission’s Final Report”). As will become evident, however, it has taken some time to assemble


the facts from the raw data and other information set forth in available governmental and other reports and relevant documents in the public record. Moreover, and in any event, the need to examine and resolve the compelling issues presented here outweighs the mere appearance of completeness by putting a permanent end to the Commission’s work.

It is far more important, to all of us, that the Commission’s work be accurate and complete or, at the very least, that the Commission urge that these questions be explored and resolved by another panel as independent, distinguished and objective as itself. Both the Senate and House Committees should endeavor to explore and resolve these issues as well.

1. General Preliminary Conclusions

This memorandum, on the basis of the information set forth below, the Exhibits hereto and the reports and other documents cited herein, comes to the following general preliminary conclusions. The confirmation or effective rebuttal of these conclusions can be arrived at only by a public inquiry and a thorough examination of all necessary and appropriate witnesses and all relevant documentary and other evidence. A detailed summary of these tentative conclusions is set forth at pages 49 to 52.

I emphasize at the outset that the purpose of this memorandum is not to accuse any individual or individuals (excluding the hijackers themselves), or any company, of any unlawful act or any other act harmful to


the United States. That will be the task of others only after, and solely if justified by, the determination of all the relevant facts in the course of the public inquiry. --

1. In the months leading up to September 11, 2001, the Israeli DEA Groups1 were spying on the United States.2 They were at the same time keeping Arab groups in our country under surveillance, including the future hijackers and other FBI suspects in the catastrophic attacks of September 11. The base of operations for both the Israeli DEA Groups and the future hijackers of the World Trade Center Planes and the Pennsylvania Plane was in and around Hollywood, Florida.

2. During the same period, the Israeli New Jersey Group was keeping under surveillance Arab groups in Bergen and Hudson Counties, New Jersey, across the Hudson River from Manhattan, including the future hijackers of the Pentagon Plane, whose center of operations was also in Bergen and Hudson Counties. The Israeli New Jersey Group appears to have been aware, before they occurred, that hijackings had been planned by Arab terrorists, as evidenced by their jubilation when the World Trade Center was first struck, by the North Tower Plane. The leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group, who has fled the United States for Israel, is included, along with the names of the hijackers and FBI suspects, on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List.

3. The Israeli Government, through its external security agency, Mossad, warned the United States in August 2001 that an impending catastrophic attack on our soil was being planned by Arab terrorist cells located in the United States. The warnings were the result of the Israeli Groups’ surveillance of the future hijackers in this country.

4. The Mossad warnings were too vague and too late to have enabled the United States to take any action to prevent the imminent attacks at unspecified locations in

1 Capitalized terms used initially in this memorandum without definition have the respective meanings later specified.
2 As shown in this memorandum, the evidence establishing this fact appears to be conclusive.


the U.S., or to detain the individuals who were planning them.

5. Why the Israeli government decided not to share with us all the critical information they had, and the extent of that information, is a subject for the public inquiry. They may have thought some sort of warning prudent in the event their surveillance activities later became a matter of public knowledge. But any energetic Israeli effort to assist the United States in preventing the attacks would not have served their strategic interest, in view of the disastrous effect those attacks were likely to have on the relationships between the United States and the Arab world. As a leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group said when he was arrested on the afternoon of September 11, “We are Israeli. We are not your problem. Your problems are our problems.”

6. Whether and to what extent the CIA, though surely not aware of the plans of the future hijackers before the attacks, might have been aware of or condoned the Israeli Groups’ surveillance of Arab groups generally in the United States prior to September 11 is a further question that must be explored in the course of the public inquiry. The CIA’s explanation of why two future hijackers were placed on a Watchlist in August 2001, as set forth in the Commission’s Final Report, is implausible and may have been designed to conceal the Israeli warnings. This consideration, along with other important factors discussed below, opens the door to a thorough investigation of this issue as well.

2. Imperatives and Priorities

It need hardly be observed that the demands of justice and national security, and the rights of the victims and their survivors, require that our first imperative, as a nation, be to find and bring to justice Osama bin Laden and his coadjutors, as well as other members of al Qaeda, and all others who bear responsibility for the horrendous loss of life on that terrible September day. That work is of course the charge of our political,


intelligence, defense, military and defense establishments and our judiciary.

The Commission’s task is a collateral and subordinate one -- to investigate the circumstances surrounding and our preparedness for the September 11 attacks, in the hope that we can prevent one from ever happening again. This is the charge of the Committees as well. This memorandum, therefore, while it naturally stresses, for the benefit of the Commission and the Committees, the present issues relating to surveillance and disclosure, before and at about the time of the attacks, should not be mistaken as any effort to place the blame for the cause of our suffering on anyone but al Qaeda and its members, or to weaken the resolve of our country in finding, capturing and punishing those who have brought so much misery to so many of us.

3. The DEA Report

In June 2001, the Office of Security of the Drug Enforcement Administration (the “DEA”) issued a long report (the “DEA Report”) describing in precise detail the attempts of approximately 125 or more nationals of a foreign country, most posing as art students, “to penetrate several DEA Field Offices in the continental United States.” Many of these individuals also visited the residences of numerous DEA officials and “other agencies’ facilities and the residences of their employees.” The DEA Report states that “these incidents have occurred since at least the beginning of 2000, and have continued to the


present.” They were ongoing activities in the summer of 2001. A copy of the DEA Report is attached as Exhibit A.

4. The Israeli DEA Groups

Virtually all of the scores of individuals questioned or detained by the DEA and other federal and local law enforcement authorities were citizens of the State of Israel. They were generally organized in groups of eight to 10 people, with a single team leader (the “Israeli DEA Groups”). They usually worked, individually or in pairs, carrying makeshift art portfolios. They visited scores of DEA offices, laboratories and houses or apartments, ostensibly to offer or show the paintings or prints in the portfolios for sale or promotion to DEA personnel.

a. Backgrounds in Intelligence, Electronic Intercept and Communications Units

While Israel has compulsory military service, many of those questioned by U.S. authorities had served in the military intelligence services or in electronic or communications units of the Israeli army. Thus, for example, Lior Baram3 of Plantation (near Hollywood), Florida, questioned by the DEA on January 22, 2001, had served two years in Israeli intelligence working with classified information; Dilka Borenstein,4 questioned by INS at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (“DFW Airport”) on March 27, 2001, was a “recently discharged” military

3 DEA Report, paragraph 69, p. 20; paragraph 5, p. 48. (the Indexing Section of the DEA Report beginning on p. 48 is separately numbered).
4 DEA Report, paragraph 46, p. 13; paragraph 104, p. 56.


intelligence officer; Marina Glikman,5 questioned at DFW Airport on or about May 1, 2001, worked for an Israeli software company with expertise in hand-held computer technology and had served as an Israeli military intelligence officer; Tomer Ben Dor, also questioned at DFW Airport on that day,6 worked for an Israeli wiretapping company and had served in an Israeli military unit that was “responsible for” Patriot missile defense.

The DEA’s Office of Security concluded that the Israelis “may well be engaged in organized intelligence gathering.”7 A spokesman for the Immigration & Naturalization Service (the “INS”) stated that dozens of these Israelis were expelled from the United States (from California, the Midwest, Florida and other states). “No one has tallied the total,” he said.8 The expulsions were usually for visa violations.

The leaders of the Israeli DEA Groups included Itay Simon (arrested on April 14, 2001 in Irving, Texas), recently discharged from the Israeli army where he had done classified work for the Israeli military.9 Mr. Simon coordinated recruiting for the groups and served as an intermediary between five individuals in Israel and the U.S. operation.10 Another leader was Michael Calmanovic (also arrested in Irving on that day), who rented a number

5 DEA Report, paragraph 53-56, pp. 16-17; paragraph 120, p. 57.
6 Ibid. Mr. Ben Dor was apparently not an “art salesmen”, but possessed a document relating to these groups. Ms. Glikman was an associate of Mr. Ben Dor (see below).
7 DEA Report, p. 1.
8 Government Tracks Israeli Art Students by Connie Cass (AP), March 9, 2002.
9 DEA Report, paragraph 50, p.14; paragraph 107, p. 56.
10 DEA Report, paragraph 48, p. 12.


of apartments in Irving, Texas occupied by 25 Israelis.11 Mr. Calmanovic was a recently discharged electronic intercept operator for the Israeli military.12 As stated in the DEA Report, traveling about the U.S. to sell paintings “seem[ed] not to fit [the] background”13 of many of the individuals in question.

A third principal was Hanan Serfaty (or Sarfati), a team leader residing in Hollywood, Florida. When questioned by the DEA in Tampa, Florida, on March 1, 2001, he had in his possession bank deposit slips amounting to more than $100,000 from December 2000 through the first quarter of 2001, and withdrawal slips for slightly less than that amount during the period. Mr. Serfaty served in the Israeli military between the ages of 18 and 21, but refused to disclose to the DEA his activities between the ages of 21 and 24, including his activities since his U.S. arrival at age 23 in 2000.14 Another was Peer Segalovitz of Tamarac, Florida (about 20 miles west of Hollywood -- see MAP 1), an active officer in an Israeli special forces battalion who commanded 80 men in the Golan Heights. He was detained in Orlando on May 3, 2001.15

11 DEA Report, paragraph 49, p 12; paragraph 106, p. 56.
12 DEA Report, paragraph 50, Pages 14-15. As stated in paragraph 50, Mr. Calmanovic also had an address and telephone number in Studio City, California, related to other DEA case files.
13 DEA Report, p. 2.
14 DEA Report, paragraphs 80-81, pp. 24-25; paragraph 39, P. 50.
15 DEA Report, paragraphs 96-100, pp. 29-30; paragraph 66, p. 53. Paragraph 66 of the Indexing Section lists Segalovitz as a former officer in the Israeli Special Forces. Paragraph 97 in the body of the text states that he “has the rank of Lieutenant” and specifies his military ID number.


b. Connections to Israeli Wiretapping and Telecommunications Companies

Tomer Ben Dor (mentioned above), another Israeli of interest to the DEA, was an employee of Nice-Systems Ltd., an Israeli company specializing in systems and solutions for detecting, locating, monitoring, evaluating and analyzing voice communications and other transmissions from a variety of sources -- activities commonly known as wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. Nice-Systems’ U.S. subsidiary, Nice Systems Inc., is located in Rutherford, New Jersey,16 adjacent to East Rutherford where five members of the Israeli New Jersey group were arrested on September 11. When Mr. Ben Dor was interrogated by the INS at the DFW Airport in May 2001, an inspection of his bags revealed a printout containing a reference to a file entitled “DEA Groups.”17

One member of the Israeli DEA Groups, Michal Gal, who was arrested in Irving, Texas,18 was released on a $10,000 cash bond posted by Ophir Baer, an employee of Amdocs, Inc. an Israeli telecommunications firm with operations in the United States. The Amdocs employee described Mr. Gal as a “relative”.

Messrs. Calmanovic and Simon (above) were arrested by the INS for their role in the Israelis’ art-selling activities without the necessary visas. They were

16 Annual Report on Form 20-F of Nice-Systems Ltd., as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 24, 2002.
17 DEA Report, paragraph 54, pp. 16-17.
18 Mr. Gal told the DEA he would be staying in Edgewater, New Jersey, which is near the center of operations of the Israeli New Jersey Group (see MAP 3).


held on $50,000 bond,19 which was subsequently posted, though the DEA Report does not say by whom. Six members of the Israeli DEA Groups appear to have been using cell telephones that were purchased by a former Israeli vice consul in the United States.20

c. Israeli Surveillance of U.S. Government Offices, Laboratories and Residences and Other Strategic Areas

During the first five months of 2001 (and including a few calls in 2000), the Israeli DEA Groups went to a total of about 57 DEA locations (28 offices and 29 residences), primarily in the southern United States,21 ostensibly offering to sell or solicit an interest in paintings. These included 25 DEA offices and three laboratories: the DEA’s Southwest Laboratory near San Diego (and the residence of its Director),22 the DEA’s Southeast Laboratory in Miami (and the residences of three of its chemists),23 and the DEA’S South Central Laboratory (or property adjacent to it), as well as the residences of one of its chemists and another employee.24 One Israeli asked to visit the house of a DEA employee “to match the frame to his furnishing,” an offer the employee declined.

Members of the Israeli DEA Groups were also discovered taking photographs of a DEA office building and

19 DEA Report, paragraph 50, p. 14.
20 Un Réseau d’Espionnage Israélien a été Démantelé aux Etats-Unis, by Sylvain Cypel, Le Monde, March 2, 2002.
21 The DEA facilities and residences were located in 15 states: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Virginia, and in Washington, D.C.
22 DEA Report, paragraphs 153-54, p. 41.
23 DEA Report, paragraphs 160-64, pages 42-43.
24 DEA Report, paragraphs 165-67, 169, pages 44-45.


parking lot in Orlando, Florida,25 and on an active runway of the Volk Field Air National Guard Base at Camp Douglas, Wisconsin.26 An Air Force alert was issued from Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City concerning possible Israeli intelligence gathering at the base.27 Israeli personnel were also found taking a photograph of the house of a special agent of the Environmental Protection Agency in Denver, Colorado,28 and “diagramming” the inside of an office building of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in Lexington, Kentucky.29

d. Spying on the United States

The Israeli DEA Groups were clearly spying on the Drug Enforcement Agency, and thus upon the United States. Many individuals in the DEA Groups may have been trying to do no more than sell paintings (albeit in violation of their visa status and thus unlawfully), but the total number of visits to DEA offices, laboratories and residences precludes any characterization of these efforts as a commonplace sales endeavor.30 The DEA Report

25 DEA Report, paragraph 95, p. 28.
26 DEA Report, paragraph 178, p. 47.
27 DEA Report, paragraph 175, p. 46.
28 DEA Report, paragraph 172, p. 46.
29 DEA Report, paragraph 71, p. 21.
30 I do recall that a student (though in fact, none of the Israelis was a student, as established in the DEA Report) can make a good deal of money selling things on foot. During the summer following my sophomore year at Yale I sold encyclopedias door to door with Maynard Jackson, who drove the “van” in our operation, his black Pontiac convertible. Maynard was at B.U. Law School at the time. Each day I spoke to about 30 people at their doors and managed to make all or part of a sales presentation to about four families. So during the period (about 65 working days over a total of 10 weeks) I spoke to about 1,950 people at the door, made a presentation to about 260 families, and sold 25 to 30 sets. Not once, however, did I make a sale to any federal governmental official, nor, to the best of my recollection (a) did any of our groups, nor (b) did we ever make even a presentation to any such {cont. next page footnotes}


speculates that the spying by the Israeli DEA Groups was related to an ongoing ecstasy investigation.31 In the course of an earlier ecstasy investigation, the DEA feared its communications systems had been compromised.32

One of the difficulties in analyzing the DEA Report is that it is reactive. The bulk of it records the activities of the Israeli DEA Groups when they call upon or attempt to infiltrate DEA offices, laboratories or residences. The DEA did not generally seek them out, keep them under surveillance, or otherwise try to find out what they were doing, other than making calls on and photographing or diagramming the facilities of the DEA and other governmental agencies.

When the DEA Report was prepared, however, the DEA and the INS were of course unaware of the extensive activities and operations in the United States of the future September 11 hijackers and their suspected collaborators, whom the Israeli DEA Groups appear to have had in their sites as well. Why the Israeli DEA Groups would be engaged in both activities, where their spying on the DEA would clearly raise suspicions among U.S. law enforcement authorities, is unclear. It may well have been an effective distraction of others from or “cover” for their primary objective. This question is discussed further below at p. 43.

{cont. from previous page footnotes} official. Nor, of course, did we ever call upon any federal offices, laboratories or military air bases, or photograph anything at all, not even, to my present dismay, Maynard himself.
31 See DEA Report, p. 1. Peer Segalovitz was asked about and confirmed that he “was aware of Israeli Organized Crime involvement in drug smuggling and weapons smuggling.” DEA Report, paragraph 98, p. 29.
32 Transcript of Fox News Telecast, December 14, 2001.


e. Israeli Surveillance of Arab Groups, the Future Hijackers and FBI Suspects

Israel’s Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks, commonly known as Mossad, is the Israeli agency responsible for its external security. A few days after September 11, Israeli intelligence officials reported that two senior experts of Mossad had warned the United States in August 2001 that large-scale terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland were imminent. They also informed U.S. officials of the existence of a cell of as many as 200 terrorists preparing the operation.33

One highly placed investigator stated later that fall that there was evidence linking the Israeli DEA Groups to the gathering of intelligence about the September 11 attacks. He refused to disclose the evidence, however, since it was classified. A highly regarded American journal that broadly covers Israeli affairs reported in December 2001 that the Israeli DEA Groups were spying on Islamic networks in the United States linked to Middle East Terrorism.34

There was no implication in these reports that the Israelis were involved in planning for or carrying out the September 11 attacks. Rather, it was suspected that the Israelis gathered advance information about the attacks and decided not to share it. “What investigators are saying is that that warning from Mossad was nonspecific

33 The October 3, 2001 FBI Suspect List (the “October 2001 FBI Suspect List” (Exhibit C), contains the names of about 350 suspects.
34 For a fuller account and analysis of these reports, see p. 32.


and general.”35

f. Hollywood, Florida: The Operating Base of the Israeli DEA Groups

The locus of the most important operations of the Israeli DEA Groups was the area in and around Hollywood, Florida:

“The majority of the incidents have occurred in the southern half of the continental U.S. with the most activity reported in the state of Florida. . . . Hollywood . . . seems to be a central point for these individuals with several having addresses in this area.”36 [Emphasis supplied.]

At the very time the DEA was setting down these words, in June 2001, just two or three months before the September 11 hijackings, 15 of the 19 future hijackers were also living in Hollywood, nine in the town itself and six in surrounding towns (see Exhibit B and MAPS 1 and 2). Hollywood, for months, had been and would continue to be the staging ground for the hijacking of the World Trade Center Planes and the Pennsylvania Plane. Among the Israeli groups, more than 30 lived in the Hollywood area, 10 in Hollywood itself. They were not only spying on the DEA but, in all likelihood, were keeping the future hijackers under surveillance as well. This appears to be the tragic riddle the DEA, unaware of the future hijackers’ existence, was unable to solve.

Hanan Serfaty, stopped and questioned by the DEA as noted above on March 1, 2001, lived in Hollywood.

35 Transcript of Fox Television News telecast, December 12, 2001.
36 DEA Report, p. 1.


Another leader, Legum Yochai, lived in Miami. One of the five members of the Israeli New Jersey Group arrested on September 11 (see below) lived in Miami Beach. Lior Barram, the former Israeli intelligence officer, though stopped at a DEA facility in Houston (Texas may have been a DEA-Group training area as noted below) lived in Plantation, Florida, about 10 miles west of Hollywood. Peer Segalovitz, the Israeli special forces lieutenant, and his brother lived in Tamarac, just north of Fort Lauderdale. Akyuz Sagiv, a former bodyguard to the Israeli army’s top-ranking general, appears to have lived in Hollywood or in Coral Springs. For the precise location of the relevant towns in the Hollywood area, see MAP 1.

5. The Future Hijackers and FBI Suspects

a. Operations in Hollywood, Florida

It is clear that Hollywood was the core of operations for the future hijackers and their collaborators. All of the hijackers of three of the four aircraft that were commandeered on September 11 lived in Hollywood or its immediate environs in the months leading up to the hijackings.37 These included all of the hijackers of American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston, which crashed into the World Trade Center’s North Tower (the “North Tower Plane”), who lived in Hollywood itself. They were Mohamed

37 The hijackers of the fourth plane, which crashed into the Pentagon, were based in New Jersey (see p. 26 below).


Atta (the pilot), Abdulaziz al Omari, Waleed al Shehri, Wail al Shehri and Satam al Suqami.38

Two of the four hijackers of United Airlines Flight 93 from Newark, which crashed in Pennsylvania (the “Pennsylvania Plane”), Ziad Jarrah (the pilot) and Ahmed al Nami, also lived in Hollywood. Two of the five hijackers of United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston, which crashed into the World Trade Center’s South Tower (the “South Tower Plane” and, collectively with the North Tower Plane, the “World Trade Center Planes”), Marwan al Shehhi (the pilot) and Mohand al Shehri, lived in Hollywood as well. The two remaining hijackers on those planes, Fayez Banihammad and Hamza al Ghamdi on the South Tower Plane, and Saeed al Ghamdi and Ahmed al Haznawi in the Pennsylvania plane, lived in Delray Beach.

Khaled al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, overall leaders of the hijackers and hijackers of the Pentagon Plane, had addresses in both Bergen County, New Jersey and in Hollywood and Delray Beach, respectively. Many of the above future hijackers had Hollywood addresses interspersed with or within hundreds yards of the members of the Israeli DEA Groups, as shown on MAP 2.

38 FBI Suspect List, dated May 22, 2002 (the “May 2002 FBI Suspect List”), which is attached as Exhibit D. Both FBI Suspect Lists appear to have been inadvertently released by European Exchange Control authorities, the first by the Finnish authority (Associated Press, October 12, 2001) and the second in Italy by the Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi. Wail al Shehri appears on the October 2001 FBI Suspect list but, presumably mistakenly, not on that of May 2002.


b. Timing of Operations of Both Groups in the Hollywood Area

i. Hijacker Timelines

The Commission has in its possession two “hijackers timelines” which appear to trace the future hijackers’ movements in the periods leading up to September 11. They were compiled by the FBI and are dated November 14 and December 5, 2003.39 The FBI has confirmed that it prepared, edited and declassified the hijackers timelines for the Commission, and that any decision to release them would be the Commission’s alone.40 Thus far, however, the Commission has declined to release them.

There are, nevertheless, a number of hijacker timelines, prepared by individuals or groups, that are generally available. One of those timelines, entitled the Annotated Timeline of the 9/11 Hijackers for Researchers, dated May 13, 2002 (the “Hijacker Timeline”), represents that it has been compiled from public sources and is used as a reference here. It is available at The Hijacker Timeline, though dated in a number of respects (it was issued a year and a half before the FBI’s hijackers timelines), appears generally consistent with publicly available U.S. government reports on the hijackers’ movements, including information from the FBI’s hijackers timelines to the extent discernable from citations in the

39 See the Commission’s Final Report, e.g., note 55 to Chapter 5, p. 43, and note 46 to Chapter 7, p. 519.
40 Telephone conversation with Ms. Whitney Blake of the FBI in August 2004.
41 To obtain the accurate page citations in the Hijacker Timeline, a reader may need to insert page numbers in that document.


Commission’s footnotes, the Commission’s Staff Statements, the Joint Committee Report, other governmental reports, and accounts in the established press.

ii. Israeli DEA Groups

As to the timing of the operations of the Israelis in Florida, the Israeli DEA Group led by Hanan Sarfaty was stopped in Tampa on March 1, 2001 as noted above, and at that time provided their Hollywood-area addresses to DEA agents.42 Sarfaty said that he had arrived in the United States “approximately” one year earlier but, as noted above, refused to state what he had been doing since that time (or for the two prior years since he had left the army). Another group based in the Hollywood area, led by Peer Segalovitz, was stopped on May 3, 2001, and provided their addresses. Segalovitz had arrived in the United States on January 17, 2001.43

iii. Future Hijackers

As to the hijackers, a number of them had lived in the Hollywood area or elsewhere in Florida well before 2000/2001. Hani Hanjour, the pilot of the Pentagon Plane and a member of the New Jersey hijacker group, had lived in the Hollywood area for a time in 1996 (in Miramar, a few miles southwest of Hollywood (see MAP 1).44 Saeed al Ghamdi had lived in Daytona Beach for several years in the 1990s, and Waleed al Shehri had taken flight lessons there in

42 DEA Report, paragraph 76 ff., p. 24.
43 DEA Report, paragraph 96 ff. p. 28.
44 Hijacker Timeline, p. 6.


1997.45 Mohamed Atta had also lived in Daytona Beach in the mid-1990s.

In mid-2000, the leaders of the Florida hijackers arrived in Florida to prepare for the hijackings, and were followed in 2001 by their subordinates.46 Thus, Mohamed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah arrived between May and June 2000. All of them attended flight school in Venice, Florida, not far from Fort Myers where the Hollywood Israeli DEA Groups were later found operating. Although the Israeli DEA Groups were questioned in Fort Myers by DEA agents a few months after the hijackers had left for Hollywood,47 the reactive nature of the DEA Report makes it difficult to track the timing of the Israeli Groups’ movements except when they were spying on the DEA or to the extent they disclosed their movements, as they sometimes did, to DEA or INS agents or other law enforcement authorities.48

Atta and al Shehhi were in the Hollywood area by the end of December 2000, when they took flight training courses in Opa-Locka, about 15 miles southwest of Hollywood.49 Ziad Jarrah took flight training courses the

45 Boston Globe, September 15, 2001.
46 REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 -- BY THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, S. REPT. NO. 107- 351 107TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION H. REPT. NO. 107-792, December 2002 (the “Joint Committee Report”), pp. 135ff. See generally, Daily Telegraph (London), September 20, 2001.
47 DEA Report, paragraphs 90-94, pp. 27-28. See MAP 4.
48 See, e.g. the statements of one of the Israeli DEA Groups as to their movements through Oklahoma at DEA Report, paragraph 52, p. 16.
49 Joint Committee Report, p. 136.


following month (in January 2001) in Virginia Gardens, about 20 miles south of Hollywood (see MAP 1).50 Atta and al Shehhi settled permanently on the east coast of Florida, somewhere in the Hollywood area, in mid to late February 2001.51 They procured a mailbox address on Sheridan Street in Hollywood some time early in the year.52 Ziad Jarrah returned to Hollywood from abroad in April.53 The pilots’ subordinates arrived in the area at various dates between March and June.

c. Activities of Both Groups in Oklahoma

Oklahoma City and Norman (about 15 miles south of Oklahoma City) were also an important locus of activity for the future hijackers. Mohamed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi had toured the Airman Flight School in Norman at the end of June 2000.54 Zacarias Moussaoui, a suspected potential hijacker, moved to Norman in February 2001 to take flight lessons at Airman. In May Moussaoui had considered joining the future hijackers in Hollywood and inquired about flying lessons at the Pan Am International Flight School in Miami.55 In August 2001, however, he left for the Pan Am flight school in Minnesota, where he raised suspicions and was arrested.56

50 Joint Committee Report, p. 137.
51 Hijacker Timeline, p. 20.
52 Hijacker Timeline, p. 23.
53 The Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2001.
54 Hijacker Timeline, p. 64.
55 Hijacker Timeline, p. 25.
56 Hijacker Timeline, p. 37.


Five other individuals on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List lived in Norman, including at least two roommates of Moussaoui, Hussein Alattas and Mukkaram Ali.57 Nawaf al Hazmi had also been in Oklahoma. He was, as the Commission and the Committees know, an important leader of the hijackers and an attendee at meetings in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (see below). On April 1, 2001 al Hazmi was stopped for speeding on Interstate 40 in western Oklahoma, apparently headed for Oklahoma City and Moussaoui in Norman.58

The Israeli DEA Groups were also active in Oklahoma City during the spring of 2001. On March 28, 2001, the day following a DEA midnight raid near Dallas (described further below), an Israeli DEA Group on their way to Oklahoma City arrived at DFW Airport from Frankfurt. In a scene reminiscent of the keystone cops, and under clandestine DEA and INS surveillance, they tried to avoid being detected as a group and followed. The three arriving Israelis were Yoni Engel, Yotam Dagai and Or Alroei. Alroei was an associate of Michael Calmanovic. Engel was a former Israeli company commander.

The three Israelis were traveling with an American, Eli Rabinovitz. After clearing customs they met with an unidentified woman on the curb and then temporarily split up. Rabinovitz stayed with the woman while Engel, Dagai and Alroei walked down the sidewalk to the next terminal. A van with California plates and registered in the name of a used car auction house pulled up to the curb

57 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 2,5.
58 Hijacker Timeline, pp. 22-23; Die Zeit, October 1, 2004.


and, as Dagai ducked into the second terminal, Engel and Alroei got in, and it quickly left. The van returned in a few minutes. Dagai emerged from the terminal and climbed in. The van sped away again, only to return a third time to pick up Rabinovitz before finally leaving the airport.59

On April 4, Engel, Dagai and Alroei were next questioned in St. Louis, where the headquarters of Amdocs, the Israeli communications software company, are located.60 They had visited Oklahoma City at the same time (between April 1 and April 4) Nawaf al Hazmi was there presumably to meet with Moussaoui. They told INS agents that they had traveled to Dallas from New York City and not, as the DEA and INS knew, on a flight from Frankfurt.61

On April 30, 2001, an Air Force alert was issued from Tinker Air Force Base, in Oklahoma City, concerning a “possible intelligence collection effort being conducted by Israeli Art Students.”62 On May 17, four Israelis were reported in the Midwest City area (between Oklahoma City and Norman). They stated they were there to promote Israeli art. They were charged with visa violations, and were booked into the Oklahoma City jail at the instance of the INS. Bond was initially set at $25,000 each. All four requested voluntary departure from the United States.63

59 DEA Report, paragraphs 51-2, pp. 15-16.
60 DEA Report, paragraph 43, p. 12.
61 DEA Report, paragraph 52, p. 16.
62 DEA Report, paragraph 175, p. 46.
63 DEA Report, paragraph 176, pp. 46-7.


d. Dallas: A Probable Training Area for the Israeli DEA Groups

An unusually large number of Israeli DEA Group members were located in Irving, Texas (near Dallas), an area that does not appear to have been frequented by the future hijackers or by many FBI suspects (see Exhibit B). Texas, however, and in particular Dallas and Irving, appears to have been an important staging area and training ground for the Israeli DEA Groups, given the presence there of (a) key liaisons between senior recruiting personnel in Israel and the Israeli DEA Groups in the United States, (b) DEA and INS surveillance of Israeli DEA Group arrivals at DFW Airport, (c) the considerable telecommunications sophistication and expertise of DEA Group associates in Dallas and (d) large numbers of Israeli DEA Group personnel, many of whom were expelled from the United States after a midnight raid conducted by the DEA and the INS.

As we have seen, Tomer Ben Dor, stopped by the INS and the DEA at the DFW Airport in May 2001, worked for an Israeli wiretapping company and had with him a computer program referring to “DEA Groups.” He was traveling with Marina Glikman and Zeev Miller, both computer programmers for an Israeli software company. They were both vague and inconsistent about their travel plans.64 Michal Gal, who had an address in Edgewater, New Jersey, the base of the Israeli New Jersey Group and not far from the headquarters of Mr. Ben Dor’s company, had a relationship with Amdocs, another telecommunications company.

64 DEA Report, paragraph 54-5, pp. 16-17.


Michael Calmanovic and Itay Simon, both of Dallas and Los Angeles, were the principal links between the Israeli operation in the United States and five Israeli DEA Group recruiters in Israel.65 The DEA and INS conducted a midnight raid on the Israeli DEA Groups’ apartment complex in Irving on the night of March 26-27, 2001, and expelled 13 of their members from the United States on March 31, 2001.66 Their transportation out of the country was arranged by the Israeli Embassy.67

Exhibit B lists the names of members of the Israeli DEA Groups and of the future hijackers and FBI suspects located in Hollywood, Florida (see again MAPS 1 and 2); in Hudson and Bergen Counties, New Jersey (MAP 3); in Oklahoma City/Norman, Oklahoma; in San Diego; in Los Angeles; and in Dallas; all during the period leading up to September 11. The map of the United States attached as MAP 4 shows all of these locations, and illustrates as well the presence of both groups during the period in Wichita, Kansas;68 Louisville and Lexington, Kentucky;69 Atlanta,

65 Statement of an expelled Israeli to Officer Michael L. Bush of the INS on March 31, 2001. DEA Report, paragraph 48, p. 14.
66 DEA Report, paragraphs 39-44, pp. 12-13.
67 DEA Report, paragraph 45, p. 13.
68 DEA Report, paragraph 52, p. 16. May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 9, 20.
69 DEA Report, paragraph 63, pp. 18-19; paragraph 71, p. 21. May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 7, 20 and 21.


Georgia;70 Tampa71 and Venice/Fort Myers,72 Florida, and Arlington/Fredericksburg, Virginia.73

6. Reports Concerning the Surveillance Activities of the Israeli DEA Groups

As noted above, almost immediately after September 11, credible reports emerged of Israeli warnings, in August 2001, of an imminent large-scale terrorist attack on the United States. One television network reported in a four-part series in December 2001 that --

“Investigators suspect that the Israeli [DEA Groups] may have gathered intelligence about the attacks in advance, and not shared it. A highly placed investigator said there are ‘tie-ins.’ But when asked for details, he flatly refused to describe them, saying ‘evidence linking these Israelis to 9-11 is classified. I cannot tell you about evidence that has been gathered. It’s classified information.’”74

The Forward, the highly respected American journal, at first discounted Fox’s account,75 but in an article three months later reported that --

“[F]ar from pointing to Israeli spying against U.S. government and military facilities . . . the incidents in question [the activities of the Israeli

70 DEA Report, paragraph 2, p. 3; paragraph 125, pp. 35-6; paragraph 132, p. 37. Hijacker Timeline, pp. 3, 19, 20, 33. Commission Final Report, n. 72 to Chapter 7, p. 523, referring to the (unavailable) FBI Hijackers Timeline, dated December 5, 2003.
71 DEA Report, p. 2; paragraphs 76-89, pp. 24-27. May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 6,7. Committee Joint Report, p. 143.
72 DEA Report, paragraphs 90-94, pp. 27-28. May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 7, 8, 9, 11, 16, 18.
73 DEA Report, paragraphs 138-42, pp. 38-40. May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 1, 6, 11.
74 Transcript of Telecast of Fox Television News, December 12, 2001.
75 Israel Calls Fox’s Spy Reports ‘Baseless’, by Marc Perelman, the Forward, December 21, 2001.


DEA Groups] appear to represent a case of Israelis in the United States spying on a common enemy, radical Islamic networks suspect of links to Middle East terrorism. . . . [A]llegations involved . . . Israelis claiming to be art students who had backgrounds in signal interception and ordnance.”76

It is very difficult to believe, based on the existing evidence and the location of their common central operating bases, that these Groups, who were clearly spying on the DEA and the United States, and were keeping under surveillance Islamic groups in the U.S. with links to Middle East terrorism, were not tracking the future hijackers and their collaborators as well.

7. Northeastern New Jersey -- Another Vital Center of Operations for Both Sides

a. Hudson and Bergen Counties: The Operating Base of the Israeli New Jersey Group

While the Israeli DEA groups were active in Hollywood and elsewhere in the United States, another group of Israelis (the “Israeli New Jersey Group” and, collectively with the Israeli DEA Groups, the “Israeli Groups”) was operating in Hudson and Bergen Counties in northeastern New Jersey. The Israeli New Jersey Group appears to have been unknown to federal and state law enforcement authorities until September 11, 2001.

On that day, immediately after the first aircraft, the North Tower Plane, crashed into the World Trade Center, a resident of Bergen County, New Jersey, just

76 Spy Rumors Fly on Gusts of Truth, Americans Probing Reports of Israeli Espionage, by Marc Perelman and Forward staff, the Forward March 15, 2002.


across the Hudson River from lower Manhattan, became alarmed when she saw a group of men celebrating “on the roof of a white van in the parking lot of her apartment building.”77 She wrote down the license number of the van and called the police. The police were told that the men were “posing, dancing and laughing against the background”78 of the disaster, which could be plainly seen across the river. The men were “smiling and exchanging high-fives.”79 An FBI alert was promptly issued:
“Vehicle possibly related to New York terrorist attack. White, 2000 Chevrolet van80 with New Jersey registration with ‘Urban Moving Systems’ sign on back seen . . . at the time of first impact of jetliner into World Trade Center. Three individuals with van were seen celebrating after initial impact and subsequent explosion. FBI Newark Field Office requests that, if the van is located, hold for prints and detain individuals.”81

The men were five Israeli citizens, Sivan Kurzberg (the driver of the van), Paul Kurzberg, Yaron Shmuel, Oded Ellner and Omer Marmari. The van was finally stopped in East Rutherford, New Jersey at 3:56 P.M. The driver and passengers were arrested by Sergeant Rivelli and

77 Transcript of ABC News telecast, June 21, 2002.
78 Statement of Steven N. Gordon, Esq., counsel for the five members of the group, as reported in Yediot America on November 2, 2001.
79 Ibid.
80 Vans of various makes were also, of course, the common means of transportation for the Israeli DEA Groups, and Chevrolet vans were used by Israeli DEA Groups in New York, Dallas, Chicago and San Diego. DEA Report, paragraph 113, p. 33, paragraph 26, p. 9; paragraph 21, p. 8; and paragraph 119, p. 35, respectively.
81 As quoted in the Bergen (New Jersey) Record, September 12, 2001. The men may have been witnessed celebrating twice, in separate locations, once at the time of the impact of the North Tower Plane and a second time when both towers were burning. Compare the FBI statement with the ABC transcript, supra, n. 72, and the statements of the Israelis’ counsel in Yediot America, November 2, 2001.


Officers DeCarlo and Yannacone of the East Rutherford Police Department.

The local police were soon joined by other law enforcement authorities. Sivan Kurzberg was asked several times to come out of the van but, fumbling with a black leather pouch, refused to do so. Officer DeCarlo then forcibly removed him. The FBI agents who arrived on the scene or were otherwise involved included Kevin Donovan, Daniel O’Brien and Robert F. Taylor, Jr. The FBI ultimately took control of the individuals, the evidence in the van, and the investigation.

Sources close to the investigation said they found in the van “maps of the city . . . with certain places highlighted,” adding that “it looked like . . . they knew what was going to happen.”82

Yaron Shmuel lied to the police as to where the men were at the time of the World Trade Center attacks, saying that they were on the West Side Highway in New York (not celebrating across the Hudson in New Jersey). He gave his address as 1345 Drexel Avenue in Miami Beach, Florida (not far from Hollywood). Mr. Ellner was carrying $4,700 in a sock-like sack. Sivan Kurzberg told the police at the time of his arrest --

“We are Israeli. We are not your problem. Your problems are [now?] our problems. The Palestinians are the problem.”83

82 Bergen (New Jersey) Record, September 12, 2001.
83 The question in brackets is my own. The quotation, and the above related details of the arrest of the five members of the Israeli New Jersey Group, are all as set forth in greater detail in the Preliminary {cont. next page footnotes}


All of the men were handcuffed, placed on the grass and given Miranda warnings. A sixth member of the Group, Dominik Suter of Fair Lawn, New Jersey, also an Israeli national and the owner of Urban Moving, was later questioned by the FBI at the company’s offices in Weehawken. The FBI searched Urban Moving’s premises for several hours, and removed boxes of documents and a dozen computer hard drives.84

b. The Leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group Flees to Israel and Becomes an FBI Suspect

When the FBI attempted to interview Mr. Suter once more a few days later, he had fled the United States for Israel along with his family.85 According to the New Jersey State Division of Consumer Affairs, Urban Moving’s premises were closed on September 14, 2001. On December 7, 2001 a New Jersey judge allowed the state to seize its property. Early in 2002, the New York Department of Transportation revoked Urban Moving’s license to do business in that state.86

Dominik Suter is included on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List, along with Mohamed Atta and the other hijackers and suspects, under that name and two others he has apparently used, Omit Suter and Omit Levinson.87 He is given two addresses in New Jersey, his apparent residence

and Supplemental Police Reports of the arresting officers of the East Rutherford, New Jersey Police Department, dated September 11, 2001.
84 NJ Locations Searched In Connection With Terror Attacks, Associated Press, September 14, 2001.
85 Transcript of ABC News telecast, June 21, 2002; the Forward, March 15, 2002, op. cit., note 76.
86 Ibid.
87 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pages 17 and 21.


in Fair Lawn and an address in Jersey City, very close to that of a number of other FBI suspects.88 Though he had fled, Mr. Suter’s name did not appear on the October 2001 FBI Suspect List. This may be because in early October 2001 the FBI was unaware that Urban Moving was operating in the same area as the future hijackers of the Pentagon Plane and visiting hijackers from Florida including Mohamed Atta (see below).

c. Hudson and Bergen Counties: The Staging Ground for the Future Hijackers of the Pentagon Plane

It soon became apparent, however, that Hudson and Bergen Counties were the second most important locus of the future hijackers’ U.S. operation and was the staging ground for the hijacking of the Pentagon Plane. The May 2002 FBI Suspect List shows, unlike its October 2001 predecessor, that all five future hijackers of the Pentagon Plane, Khaled al Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, Majed Moqed89 and Hani Hanjour (the pilot) lived or had mailing addresses or were otherwise active in towns closely interspersed, within about a four-mile radius, with the towns of the Israeli New Jersey Group (Weehawken, Jersey City, Fair Lawn and Rutherford). The future hijackers’ towns included Paterson,90 Fort Lee,91 Totowa,92 Hoboken93 and

88 See MAP 3.
89 No address is given on the October 2001 FBI Suspect List for Majed Moqed and his name is omitted, presumably in error, from the May 2002 FBI Suspect List. But Moqed appears to have been known by May 2002 to have lived in the hijackers’ Paterson apartment.
90 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 3, 4, 6, 7, 14. Hijacker Timeline, pp. 22, 27, 30, 41.
91 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 3, 4, 5, 7, 14. Hijacker Timeline, pp. 22, 39.
92 Hijacker Timeline, p. 41.
93 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, p. 9.


Elmwood Park.94 There were also FBI Suspects in Jersey City,95 Harrison,96 Seacaucus and Hackensack.97 See MAP 3.

Atta, al Omari, and Ahmed al Ghamdi, though based in Hollywood and (al Ghamdi) Delray Beach, Florida, were among the hijackers who had addresses in Paterson, Fort Lee and Elmwood Park as well as in South Wayne. Up to six or more of the hijackers appear to have lived on Union Avenue in Paterson at one time or another between March and August 31, 2001.98

d. The FBI’s Conclusion: The Israeli New Jersey Group were Mossad Intelligence Operatives Spying on Local Arabs in Hudson and Bergen Counties

There have been a number of press reports in the United States on the Israeli New Jersey Group, most notably in the Forward. In the same article that reported on the Israeli DEA Groups, the Forward states that the nature of the FBI’s review of the case changed after the names of two of the five Israelis appeared on a CIA-FBI database of foreign intelligence operatives. This has been confirmed by a former chief of operations for counter-terrorism with

94 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 5, 7.
95 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 10, 15, 16, 17, 19. Hijacker Timeline, p. 53.
96 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, p. 10.
97 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, p. 7.
98 Hijacker Timeline, p. 22. Commission Final Report, p. 230. The May 2002 FBI Suspect List provides a variety of Union Avenue addresses, including the address specified in the Hijacker Timeline. The Commission’s Final Report (p. 230) does not place any Pentagon Plane hijackers in Paterson until May. Other sources place them there in March, when Hanjour and Salem al Hazmi are said to have signed the lease for the Paterson apartment. Hijacker Timeline, p. 22; Connecticut Post (Bridgeport), March 6, 2002 (preparatory hijacker meeting in March in Fairfield, Connecticut just before the move to Paterson).


the CIA.99 At that point, the FBI launched a foreign counter-intelligence investigation. All five of the men underwent polygraph tests, one of them seven times. At the end of that investigation, the FBI concluded that the Israeli New Jersey Group had been conducting a surveillance mission for Mossad, and that Urban Moving served as a Mossad front.100 They further concluded that the Israelis were “spying on local Arabs.”101

8. Inadequate Israeli Warnings in August 2001

As noted above, almost immediately after September 11, reports emerged of Israeli warnings, in August, that major terrorist attacks were imminent. On September 16, 2001 the Daily Telegraph (London) reported that Israeli intelligence officials said that they --

“warned their counterparts in the United States last month that large-scale terrorist attacks on highly visible targets on the American mainland were imminent. . . .

99 See transcript of ABC News telecast, June 21, 2002.
100 Marc Perelman, op. cit., March 15, 2002. The Forward’s source was a former American intelligence official who said he was regularly briefed on the investigation by two law enforcement officials acting independently.
101 The Forward’s source in the March article also said the five men were released (Suter had fled to Israel) because “they did not know anything about 9/11.” But this statement needs to be weighed in the light of the men’s demeanor and statements, and the statements of local law enforcement officials, on September 11, 2001, the inclusion of Mr. Suter on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List, and the revelations on that List that Hudson and Bergen Counties were a critical center of operations for the future hijackers and FBI suspects as noted above. The FBI was also under pressure from U.S. political figures to release the members of the Israeli New Jersey Group, including Richard Armitage of the State Department and two New York Congressmen. Senior U.S. Officials Join Effort To Free 5 Israelis Held in Brooklyn, Ha’aretz News, October 29, 2001.


. . . (T)wo senior experts with Mossad, the Israeli military intelligence service, were sent to Washington in August to alert the CIA and FBI to the existence of a cell of as many of 200 terrorists said to be preparing a big operation.

They had no specific information about what was being planned but linked the plot to Osama bin Laden and told the Americans that there were strong grounds for suspecting Iraqi involvement.”102

The Los Angeles Times reported on September 20, 2001 that a “high-ranking U.S. law enforcement official” confirmed that --

“FBI and CIA officials were advised in August that as many as 200 terrorists were slipping into the United States and planning ‘a major assault on the United States. . . .’

The advisory was passed on by the Mossad. . . . It cautioned that it had picked up indications of a ‘large-scale target’ in the United States and that Americans would be ‘very vulnerable’, the official said.

It is not known whether US authorities thought the warning to be credible, or whether it contained enough details to allow counter-terrorism teams to come up with a response. But the official said the advisory linked the information ‘back to Afghanistan and [exiled Saudi militant] Osama bin Laden.’”103

102 Israeli security issues urgent warning to CIA of large-scale terror attacks, by David Wastell in Washington and Philip Jacobson in Jerusalem, Daily Telegraph, September 16, 2001.
103 Officials Told of ‘Major Assault’ Plans, By Richard A. Serrano and John-Thor Dahlburg, Los Angeles Times, September 20, 2001. The L.A. Times retracted its story the next day, reporting that the CIA (not the source of the story) later flatly denied the statements, and that the Times’s source, the “high-ranking law enforcement official,” had based his account solely on what he read in the newspapers! The L.A. Times retraction referred to a “British newspaper account,” presumably the Daily Telegraph article. The U.S. law enforcement official’s account, however, as quoted above, said that Mossad had warned of a single “large-scale target” and had warned that the Americans would be “very {cont. next page footnotes}


Fox News also reported on May 17, 2002 (and apparently also on September 14, 2001)104 that --

“based on its own intelligence, the Israeli government provided ‘general’ information to the United States in the second week of August that an al Qaeda attack was imminent.”

Neither the Commission in its Final Report or in its Staff Statements nor the Joint Committee Report specifically mentions any such warning from the Israeli government. These Statements and Reports do, however, defer to our intelligence community’s desire to safeguard and maintain the secrecy of its “sources and methods”. These are likely to have included Israeli warnings and the Israelis’ own sources. But in view of the dramatic questions raised by the Israeli Groups’ activities in the United States in the months leading up to September 11, these sources and methods now need to be disclosed.

As shown in the tabular comparison in Exhibit E, the accounts of Mossad’s warnings in August bear the unmistakable imprints of authenticity. Mossad’s warnings were reported by the Daily Telegraph and others right after September 11, well over two years before the Joint Committee’s report and the publication of the Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) of August 6, 2001. Yet they bear a

vulnerable.” Neither statement was included in the Daily Telegraph article. The U.S. official’s account also made no specific mention of an “imminent” attack, and none at all of any “strong grounds for suspecting Iraqi involvement,” both reported by the Daily Telegraph.
104 Fox did not specify its source, and I have not been able to locate its piece of the “14th” to which Fox referred in a telecast of December 12, 2001.


remarkable similarity to both the Joint Committee’s description of “all-source reporting” and the PDB’s account of “clandestine, foreign government and media reports and recent FBI information.” The key differences, as shown in Exhibit E, are Mossad’s warning that (a) the attacks were imminent, (b) they were to take place on the U.S. mainland, and (c) 200 terrorists were in the United States to carry them out. Mossad also alone warned of “suspected Iraqi involvement,” though this of course has never been established and is generally considered to be untrue.

That we did receive warnings of this general nature from Mossad seems more than likely. But the real issue, again, is, given the extensive surveillance by the Israeli Groups of U.S. Arab groups and, in all likelihood, of the future hijackers in their central bases of operation and elsewhere in the United States, were not the Israeli Groups, or some of their members, aware of what was going to happen in advance? Is this not dramatically shown by the behavior of the Israeli New Jersey Group the morning of September 11? And if so, did the Israeli government decide not to provide us with enough information to stop them?

As noted in the next section, the Israelis may have given us warning in late August 2001 of the presence in the United States of Khaled al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, resulting in the CIA’s having them placed on the State Department’s Tipoff Watchlist.105 Or this may have been part of the Israeli warnings earlier in August. In

105 As the Commission has noted, this would not in any event have prevented Mihdhar and Hazmi from flying, but would have precluded them from obtaining visas, which they already had (they were both here). Staff Statement No. 2, p. 8.


either case, the CIA’s and the Commission’s explanation of how these two future hijackers came to be Watchlisted, which makes no mention of Israeli warnings, is highly confusing and, as we shall see, in the end difficult to believe. Even so, the Israeli warning as to the two men would have come too late, for we now know that they were then or soon hiding in an obscure motel in Maryland, from which they did not emerge until September 11.106

One television documentary cited above (which did not have access to or study in any detail the documents, lists, reports and other information set forth herein, or even any knowledge of the existence of the Israeli New Jersey Group), has put the relevant question bluntly, in the form of a question, an answer and a rhetorical question

“What about this question of advanced knowledge of what was going to happen on September 11? How clear are investigators that some Israeli agents may have known something?”

“It’s very explosive information, obviously, and there’s a great deal of evidence that they say they have collected none of it necessarily conclusive. It’s more when they put it all together. A bigger question, they say, is how could they not have known?” [Emphasis supplied.]107

9. The Watchlisting of Khaled al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi in August 2001

There was yet another press report of Mossad warnings in August 2001, which appeared in Die Zeit in October 2002. The report stated that the names of Mihdhar

106 Hijacker Timeline, pp. 38-9.
107 Transcript of dialogue between Brit Hume and Carl Cameron, Fox Television News, December 12, 2002.


and Hazmi were given to the CIA by Mossad on August 23, resulting in their Watchlisting on August 24.108 Although the report is based upon unspecified “documents obtained by Die Zeit”, it is interesting given the contemporaneous (just after September 11) and credible reports of August Mossad warnings cited above. Collectively the reported warnings appear to offer the most likely reason for the Watchlisting of these two future hijackers in August 2001.

The Commission and its Staff, however, make no mention of any Israeli warnings, and take the position, undoubtedly adopting the CIA’s public stance, that it was solely a series of reviews beginning in May 2001 that led to the Watchlisting. But as we shall see, this account is both difficult to follow and hard to believe. In any event it shows that no real action was taken to Watchlist Mihdhar or Hazmi until late August, after the Israeli warnings appear to have been received.

The issue is important because any downplaying of Israeli warnings, whether done in order to conceal their or our “sources and methods” or for other reasons, draws attention away from the major question of the adequacy of the Mossad warnings and the surveillance role the Israeli Groups played in the United States in the months leading up to September 11. I shall try to restate the Commission’s and its Staff’s (and the CIA’s official) explanation of the Watchlisting here.

108 Deadly Mistakes by Oliver Schrömm, Die Zeit, October 1, 2002.


a. “John”, “Mary”, “Jane” and “Alice”

In the spring of 2001 there were reported threats of terrorist attacks on U.S. interests abroad as noted more particularly in the first column of Exhibit E. According to the Commission’s Staff, in May of that year, a CIA officer called only “John” (to protect his identity) in Staff Statement No. 10 and in the Commission’s Final Report “wondered where the attacks might occur.”109 John’s spontaneous interest was said to have been prompted by his recollection that Mihdhar and Hazmi had been present at a Kuala Lumpur meeting in January 2000. It was suspected the attack on the U.S. vessel Cole in October 2000 had been planned at that meeting.

So in the month of May 2001, the story continues, John and a woman at the CIA (whom we shall call “Alice” here), reviewed the CIA’s cable traffic concerning the Kuala Lumpur meeting. Alice reportedly discovered that the CIA had learned, in March 2000 (though they had never shared this information with the FBI), that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa and that Hazmi had come to Los Angeles shortly after the Kuala Lumpur meeting. John did nothing at all, however.

Two months later, at a time when the focus was still on threats to U.S. interests outside the United States)110 in late July or some time in August, John asked

109 Commission Staff Statement No. 10, p. 7; Commission Final Report, p. 267.
110 Commission Staff Statement No. 10, at p. 4: “On July 2 [,2001] the FBI Counterterrorism Division sent a message to federal agencies and state and local law enforcement agencies that . . . stated, ‘the FBI [cont. next page footnotes]


“Mary”, an FBI agent detailed to the CIA, to review the cable traffic one more time. It is unclear what inspired John to resume that work. He is said to have recalled or discovered that Khallad, a dangerous al Qaeda operative, had been identified as one of those who attended the Kuala Lumpur meeting. But John was not particularly concerned, and told Mary to do the work in her spare time.111

On August 21, 2001, Mary is said to have discovered a bit more than Alice supposedly had in May: Hazmi had come to Los Angeles, as was known, but Mihdhar had used his visa to come as well, along with Hazmi, in January 2000. Working with Jane, an FBI agent assigned to the CIA, Mary also discovered that Mihdhar had left the United States later in 2000, but had just returned, on July 4, 2001. Because of Mary’s discoveries, Mihdhar and Hazmi were placed on the Watchlist.

b. The Uncertain, Untranslated, Unwitnessed, Unremembered and Erroneous Identification of Khallad

As the Commission’s Staff has said of this route to the Watchlist, “the details are complex.”112 They are

has no information indicating a credible threat of terrorist attack in the United States.’”
111 The Commission’s Staff and its Final Report say only that John spontaneously asked Mary to pick up Alice’s work in late July. But it was not until late August, at about the time of the reported Mossad warnings, that Mary supposedly discovered on her own that Mihdhar was in the United States. Staff Statement No. 10, p. 8; Commission Final Report, p. 270. The Joint Committee Report (p. 151) states that John’s interest was rekindled in July by his discovery of a cable indicating that Khallad had been present at the Kuala Lumpur meeting, but neither the Commission’s Staff nor its Final Report mentions such a cable. The discovery of the cable apparently prompted John to call Khallad a “major league killer” though the Commission (p. 268) suggests that this remark exhibited John’s concerns in May. Whatever John wrote, he wasn’t worried in July, as shown by what he is said to have told Mary.
112 Staff Statement No. 10, p. 5.


also serendipitous to the point of undermining their credibility.

In the first place, John is said to have recalled or discovered that Khallad had been identified from a photograph in January 2001, by a joint FBI/CIA source, as an attendee of the Kuala Lumpur meeting in January 2000. The FBI agent said to have been present at the January 2001 meeting, however, was unaware, apparently because of language problems, that any such identification had ever been made.113 Moreover, “the CIA officer [himself -- who supposedly conducted the interview] does not recall this particular identification [at all] and thus cannot say why it was not shared with his FBI colleague.”114 As we have seen, Alice, who was said to have “reviewed the cables” in

113 Commission Staff Statement No. 10, p. 6: “This is an example of how day-to-day gaps in information sharing can emerge even in a situation of goodwill on all sides. The information was from a joint FBI/CIA source. The source spoke essentially no English. The FBI person on the scene overseas [i.e., the agent who is said to have attended the meeting] did not speak the languages the source spoke. Due to travel and security issues, the amount of time spent with the source was necessarily kept short. As a result, the CIA officer usually did not simultaneously translate either the questions or the answers for his accompanying FBI colleague, and friend.”
114 Commission Staff Statement No. 10, p. 7; Commission Final Report, p. 267. The Commission itself in its Final Report, almost hilariously (because it does not explain why the CIA agent had no recollection of this event), has added to the speculative litany of reasons why the FBI agent did not recall any identification of Khallad. “The FBI agent also may have been absent from the room when the identification was made. The source had brought a sheaf of documents with him that the FBI agent left the room to copy while the interview of the witness continued. Because of the circumstances of the interview site, the agent would have been absent for a significant period of time. In addition, the case officer was frequently given photographs from a broad range of CIA stations to show to this particular witness. He did not focus on the purpose of showing the photographs; he was only concerned with whether the source recognized the individuals.” Commission Final Report, p. 537, n. 62. The CIA officer who also has no recollection of any identification of Khallad, is, of course, said (a) to have spoken the source’s language, (b) not to have left the room, and (c) to have known why he was seeking the identification{.}


May, “took no action regarding these cables.” Neither did John. Indeed, the Commission’s Staff noted that Alice “cannot [even] recall this work.”115 The Commission deleted the words regarding Alice’s loss of memory from its Final Report without explanation.116

This untranslated, unwitnessed and forgotten identification that so inspired John to return later in the summer to the work forgotten by Alice seems to have been just as elusive. The joint source had been said in (someone’s) report to be less than certain (or “ninety percent certain”)117 that the man in the photograph shown him was Khallad. And indeed, although both the Commission’s Final Report and its Staff Statements fail to tell us so, the purported identification itself later proved to be false. The man was not Khallad.118 So Khallad had not been identified, and until after September 11 his everyday appearance remained as much a mystery as the purported meeting with the joint source that supposedly so inspired John on his way to the Watchlist before the Mossad warnings in August.

115 Ibid. Perhaps to bolster the hapless Alice, the Commission’s Final Report gives a name to another agent, “Dave”, who was mentioned but unnamed in Staff Statement No. 10. Dave seems to have done little more than try to find out whether another Cole suspect, Fahd al Quso, attended the Kuala Lumpur meeting.
116 Compare Staff Statement No. 10, p. 7, third full paragraph, lines 1 and 2, with Commission Final Report, p. 267, last line.
117 Commission Staff Statement No. 10, p. 6; Commission Final Report, p. 266.
118 Joint Committee Report, p. 154: “In the days following the September 11 attacks [t]he Bureau . . . learned that the January 2001 photo identification of Khallad by the joint FBI/CIA asset had been mistaken. The person thought to be Khallad was actually Nawaf al Hazmi.” Khallad is now said to have finally been identified, but only after September 11, from another photograph taken at the meeting.


As noted above, when Alice’s “work” was effectively taken up late in August, the U.S. presence (or likely presence) of Mihdhar and Hazmi was again discovered and, on August 24, 2001, both men were placed on the Watchlist. As noted above, they were then safely secluded and never found.

c. William (of Ockham)  {“d.” in original}

John, Mary, Jane and Alice may all have been hard at work in Washington, and made a contribution,119 but Occam’s razor120 leads us a far straighter course to the Watchlist by way of the Mossad warnings in August, the likely result of the surveillance activities of the Israeli Groups and their (inadequate) warnings. Both Mihdhar and Hazmi, hijackers of the Pentagon Plane and leaders of the entire hijacker group, would easily have fallen under the surveillance of the Israeli New Jersey Group in Hudson and Bergen Counties, and of the Israeli DEA Groups in San Diego and (in the case of Hazmi) in the Hollywood area and possibly in Oklahoma. And it was only after the Mossad warnings were received that the CIA, finally, on August 27, 2001, told the FBI that Mihdhar and Hazmi were in the United States.121

119 For example, both Khallad (under an alias -- though he was presumably already Watchlisted) and another attendee at Kuala Lumpur were also Watchlisted on August 24. Commission Final Report, Chapter 8, note 76, p. 538.
120Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate” or “Don’t posit a plurality of reasons unless it’s necessary” are the words of the medieval English philosopher William of Ockham (or Occam) (ca. 1285-1349). Occam’s razor, or his principle of parsimony, or unnecessary plurality, may be said to hold that, when confronted with several implausible explanations and a more probable and simpler one, one should choose the latter.
121 Hijacker Timeline, p. 40.


10. Why the Israeli Groups?

It is not necessary at this early stage of inquiry into these events to speculate on the original rationale for the U.S. activities of the two Israeli Groups. A study of that question will best be undertaken in the course of the public inquiry. But a few thoughts may lend some perspective to the question.

It may be that originally the Israeli DEA Groups did little more than sell art (though illegally and in violation of their visas). Once the need or usefulness of keeping Arab groups under surveillance in the United States became apparent to the Israeli government, it may have viewed these art salesmen and their vans as ideal groups and vehicles into which to insert sophisticated agents with telecommunications, wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping equipment and intelligence expertise.

The vans in the operations of both Israeli Groups122 were able to move about neighborhoods without raising undue concern. The “art students” in the Israeli DEA Groups were using their vans as sometime door-to-door salesmen. The personnel of Urban Moving Systems, the Mossad front, were ostensibly driving about northeastern New Jersey towns in their van (or vans) to help people move -- a familiar suburban sight.

122 Only one van, that stopped on September 11, has been identified as used by the Israeli New Jersey Group. We do not yet know (a) whether Urban Moving Systems had a number of vans, (b) how many of its employees worked in vans beyond the five arrested on September 11, or (c) whether any of its employees fled to Israel along with Dominik Suter.


With ample room for personnel and electronic equipment, the vans were ideal vehicles for electronic eavesdropping.123 The extent to which Nice Systems, the Israeli wiretapping company for which Tomer Ben Dor worked (the Israeli with the reference to “DEA Groups” in his computer files) will be a matter for the public inquiry. Nice Systems was ideally suited to provide equipment and expertise to the Israeli New Jersey Group because its U.S. headquarters were located in Rutherford, New Jersey, near the center of the Group’s operations (MAP 3).

The future hijackers were frequent users of land lines and cell telephones and thus were ideal subjects for electronic surveillance. Mihdhar regularly telephoned a terrorist facility in the Middle East from the United States.124 Both Mihdhar and Hazmi were “constantly on their cell phones.”125 Mohamed Atta made calls to Madrid from Coral Springs126 and used his cell phone to call lodging establishments in Florida.127 Ramzi Binalshibh, a plot leader based in Hamburg, frequently called Atta,128 Shehhi129 and Moussaoui130 from Hamburg. Jarrah made hundreds of phone calls from Florida131 and Hanjour, Hazmi and other hijackers made 75 calls in two days132 to locate apartments,

123 As we have seen, both Israeli Groups used Chevrolet vans. The Israeli DEA Groups’ vans (to the extent identified) also included a GMC Safari van, a GMC full-size custom van, a Ford van, a Dodge mini-van, and unspecified panel vans. See generally the DEA Report.
124 Joint Committee Report, p. 17.
125 Hijacker Timeline, p. 10.
126 Hijacker Timeline, p. 28.
127 Commission Final Report, p. 228.
128 Commission Final Report, p. 245.
129 Commission Final Report, p. 244.
130 Ibid.
131 Commission Final Report, p. 225.
132 Joint Committee Report, p. 187.


flight schools and car rental agencies for the New Jersey hijackers (of the Pentagon Plane).

As to the Israeli DEA Groups’ surveillance of the DEA, it is difficult if not impossible to learn from the public record, at this time, the precise nature of the information they were seeking from that agency. The DEA itself was not sure then, and it may not know to this day. The DEA had its own concerns about the Israeli DEA Groups relating to previous drug investigations, as noted above. Perhaps these concerns were well-founded. Perhaps the Israelis were using these units in part as a training ground (on our soil) for future agents, or were interested in learning the DEA’s methods for tracking drug traffickers and their money, a potential source of funding for terrorist groups.

But in all likelihood the selling of art and (though far riskier) the DEA spying were covers for their more important work of keeping Arab groups under surveillance in the United States. This activity appears ultimately to have led the Israelis to the future hijackers, and forced upon them unwelcome decisions as to how much, and when, they should tell the United States of what they had learned.

11. The CIA’s Role and Responsibilities

Finally, it is possible that the CIA was aware that the two Israeli Groups were tracking suspected Arab groups on our soil, but remained unaware until after September 11 that they had come across the future


hijackers. There is presently little evidence of the CIA’s possible knowledge of the Israeli Groups’ activities, beyond the sheer scope and magnitude of the Israeli DEA Groups’ operations in the U.S., the CIA’s general unwillingness to share information with the FBI, as outlined in the Commission’s Final Report, and, perhaps, the brazenness of the Israeli New Jersey Group on September 11. The CIA’s clumsy reconstruction of the miraculous work of “John”, “Mary”, “Jane” and “Alice”, which appears designed to point away from the Israeli warnings, also raises legitimate questions.

The CIA was prohibited by law from engaging in field intelligence operations inside the United States. They may have been reluctant to cooperate with the FBI because of the burdensome constraints of constitutional protections benefiting potential defendants. They may also have regarded the Israelis as unusually effective because of their familiarity with Arab culture and their common understanding of the Arabic language.133

A leading Israeli newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, reported in the fall of 2002 that prior to the September 11 attacks, when members of the Israeli DEA Groups were being detained or arrested across the United States, the CIA

133 See the Joint Committee Report, p. xvii: “At home, the counterterrorism effort suffered from the lack of an effective domestic intelligence capability. The FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups operating in the United States. . . . These problems greatly exacerbated the nation’s vulnerability to an increasingly dangerous and immediate international terrorist threat inside the United States.”


“actively promoted their expulsion.”134 The implication in that article was that the CIA was simply being careless, not trying to spirit the Israelis safely out of the country. But at this point we cannot be certain. The CIA may have been eager to protect the surveillance activities of the Israeli Groups a whole in an operation that, ultimately, failed to protect us. Any delegation on the part of the CIA of its responsibilities abroad to foreign agents in the U.S. would, of course, have been unlawful. It would also have rendered our country particularly vulnerable because, as suggested above, the interests of the Israeli government and its agents are not necessarily consonant with our own.

The CIA also failed to press for the continuing detention of the members of the Israeli New Jersey Group after their arrest on September 11. After three months the men were released and returned to Israel, even though their names had appeared in our own counter-intelligence data base, at least two of them were suspected Mossad agents, and their leader had fled to Israel on or about September 14 -- only to be placed on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List a few months later.

The CIA is mentioned but once in the DEA Report, in connection with the Israeli DEA Groups’ effort to penetrate the DEA’s Southwest Laboratory near San Diego,

134 Mark Lefet in Yedioth Ahronoth, October 2, 2002, commenting on the October 1, 2002 Die Zeit article referred to in note 108. Die Zeit had said nothing of any CIA support for the expulsion of detained members of the Israeli DEA Groups.


where Mihdhar and Hazmi were living.135 What role the CIA then played does not appear. It is clear that the DEA Report was itself inspired by the DEA’s own bewilderment by the very existence of the Israeli DEA Groups, by the scope of their operations throughout much of our country, by their overwhelming numbers, and by their expertise.

The Forward article cited above states that the operations of the Israeli Groups heightened tensions between Washington and Israel --

“not because of the operations’ [Arab] targets but because Israel reportedly violated a secret gentlemen’s agreement between the two countries under which espionage on each other’s soil is to be coordinated in advance.”136
The real question today, however, appears to be whether the “gentlemen’s agreement” did indeed prevail here and, because we lacked adequate warning from our surrogates who were keeping the Arabs under surveillance, helped bring us to disaster.

The tragedy of the DEA Report becomes evident only after sifting through all the twists and turns of its raw data, often dull, sometimes disquieting, and reading for one last time the struggle of its authors to find a rational explanation in the introductory paragraphs. Today

135 DEA Report, paragraph 119, pages 34-35: “The San Diego Division is currently working with the FBI, Department of State, and CIA personnel on advancing this investigation. Five names were retrieved from DEA and FBI sources and [run] through INS. There were hits on three Israeli individuals who entered the U.S. on non-immigrant tourist visas.”
136 The Forward, op. cit., March 15, 2002.


in retrospect, the DEA Report, written in June 2001, seems in effect a cry for help.

The public inquiry into these events must include an examination into whether the CIA may have been aware of, or promoted or condoned, the surveillance by the Israeli Groups of suspect Arab groups in the U.S.

12. Detailed Summary

Set forth below is a detailed summary of the tentative conclusions reached in this memorandum, which amply illustrate the urgent need for a public inquiry into the activities of the Israeli DEA Groups and the Israeli New Jersey Group. The inquiry must include, without limitation, the examination of members of the Israel Groups and related persons; officials of the Israeli government and certain of its agencies, including Mossad; FBI suspects, agents of the DEA, the INS and the FBI; certain local law enforcement officials; agents of the CIA (in camera to the extent required); other intelligence sources cited by the public press to the extent possible; the boxes of documents and computer hard drives (referred on page 29) seized by the FBI from the Israeli New Jersey Group; and of all other relevant documents, reports, communiqués and information. --

  1. The Israeli DEA Groups were spying on the Drug Enforcement Agency and thus upon the United States. The DEA itself has concluded that they were probably engaged in organized intelligence gathering on our soil.


  2. A highly regarded American journal knowledgeable about Israeli affairs, has concluded (a) based on its own sources, that the Israeli DEA Groups were spying on radical Islamic networks suspected of links to Middle East terrorism, and (b) based on the representations of a former American intelligence official regularly briefed on these matters by law enforcement officials, that (i) at least two members of the Israeli New Jersey Group were Mossad operatives, (ii) Urban Moving, the company used by the Israeli New Jersey Group, was a front for Mossad and its operatives, and (iii) the Israeli New Jersey Group was spying on local Arabs.

  3. The intelligence sources of a substantial American television network report that the Israeli DEA Groups may have gathered information about the September 11 attacks in advance, and not shared it with the United States. One investigator said that evidence linking the Israeli DEA Groups to such intelligence gathering was classified and could not be disclosed.

  4. The Israeli DEA Groups were comprised of 125 or more Israelis operating on our soil. Their leaders and apparent associates included military commanders and experts with military backgrounds in intelligence, electronic intercepts and telecommunications.

  5. The wiretapping and intelligence expertise of members of both Israeli Groups, and the use of vans in local neighborhoods where the future hijackers were planning the attacks, and the extensive use by the hijackers of cell phones and land lines, made the Israeli Groups ideally suited to gather information regarding the hijackers’ plans.

  6. The principal operation of the Israeli DEA Groups was located in and around Hollywood, Florida, the central training and staging ground for the hijacking of North and South Tower Planes and the Pennsylvania Plane. The addresses and places of residence of the members of the Israeli DEA


    Groups in Hollywood itself were within hundreds of yards those of the future hijackers.

  7. The operations of both the Israeli New Jersey Group and the hijackers of the Pentagon Plane were centered in Hudson and Bergen Counties in New Jersey, within a common radius of about six miles.

  8. All five celebrating members of the Israeli New Jersey Group arrested on September 11 were aware, when the North Tower Plane struck the World Trade Center, based on their immediate reaction to the attack and the information said to be contained in their van, that the attack had been planned and carried out by Arab terrorists.

  9. After being questioned by the FBI on September 11, the leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group immediately fled the United States to Israel. His name and aliases appear, along with those of the hijackers and other FBI suspects, on the May 2002 FBI Suspect list.

  10. Israeli intelligence officials have reported that two senior officials of Mossad warned the United States in August 2001 that as many as 200 terrorists on American soil were planning an imminent large-scale attack on high visibility targets on the American mainland. One press report states that in August Mossad provided the CIA with the names of future hijackers Khaled al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi.

  11. The CIA’s explanation of how Mihdhar’s and Hazmi’s names were placed on the Watchlist through the spontaneous efforts of CIA and FBI agents is not only difficult to follow but, as the sole reason for the Watchlisting, hardly credible.

  12. Mossad’s own information appears to have come from its sources inside the United States. All of the facts and circumstances set forth in this memorandum appear to show that Mossad’s two likely sources of information were: (a) the Israeli DEA Groups, comparable in number to that


    of the Arab suspects and who appear to have tracked the future hijackers in their central places of operation and in other states, and (b) the Israeli New Jersey Group, operating through their Mossad front in another principal locus of operations of the future hijackers, two of whom were Mossad agents, and five of whom appeared immediately aware of the origin of the attacks on September 11.

  13. While little direct evidence supports the contention that the CIA was aware of or condoned the Israeli Groups’ tracking of Arab terrorist groups in the United States prior to September 11, the CIA’s pressing for the expulsion of members of the Israeli DEA Groups when they were detained before September 11, their failure to cooperate with the FBI, their circuitous explanation of how the above two hijackers were placed on the Watchlist, and other relevant considerations require that the issue be taken up as a part of the public inquiry into these painful events.

Gerald Shea


Suspicious Activities Involving Israeli Art Students at DEA Facilities

Drug Enforcement Administration Office of Security

June, 2001


In January, 2001, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Office of Security Programs (IS), began to receive reports of Israeli art students attempting to penetrate several DEA Field Offices in the continental United States. Additionally, there have been reports of Israeli art students visiting the homes of numerous DEA employees. These incidents have occurred since at least the beginning of 2000, and have continued to the present. The number of reported incidents increased in November/December 2000, and has continued to date. These incidents have involved several other law enforcement and Department of Defense agencies, with contacts made at other agencies’ facilities and the residences of their employees. Geographically, these incidents are very widespread, ranging from California to Florida. The majority of the incidents have occurred in the southern half of the continental U.S. with the most activity reported in the state of Florida. Since April 2001, the number of reported incidents has declined, however, the geographic spread of the incidents has increased to Wisconsin, Oklahoma, and Los Angeles.

The activities of these Israeli art students raised the suspicion of IS and other field offices when attempts were made to circumvent the access control systems at DEA offices, and when these individuals began to solicit their paintings at the homes of DEA employees. The nature of the individuals’ conduct, combined with intelligence information and historical information regarding past incidents involving Israeli Organized Crime, leads IS to believe the incidents may well be an organized intelligence gathering activity. It is believed by IS that these incidents should not be the basis for any immediate concern for the safety and security of DEA personnel, however, employees should continue to exercise due caution in safeguarding information relating to DEA investigations, or activities.

DEA Orlando has developed the first drug nexus to this group. Telephone numbers obtained from an Israel Art Student encountered at the Orlando D.O. have been linked to several ongoing DEA MDMA (Ecstasy) investigations in Florida, California, Texas, and New York. The Orlando D.O. has opened an investigation that is being coordinated with DEA HQs.

In general, these individuals appear to be organized in teams of 8 to 10 people, with one person described as the “Team Leader”. They are usually encountered in pairs or individually carrying a makeshift art portfolio. Several times, they have, been seen or


admitted to being dropped off in an area by the Team Leader, who returns later to pick them up. The females are usually described as very attractive, and all are generally in their early to mid-20s. Most admit to having served in the Israeli Military. This is not surprising given the mandatory military service require{ment} in Israel, however, a majority of those questioned has stated they served in military intelligence, electronic signal intercept, or explosive ordinance units. Some have been linked to high-ranking officials in the Israeli military. One was the son of a two-star general, one served as the bodyguard to the head of the Israeli Army, one served in a Patriot missile unit. That these people are now traveling in the U.S. selling art seems not to fit their background.

Their stories are remarkable only in their consistency. At first, they will state that they are art students, either from the University of Jerusalem, or the Bezalel Academy of Arts in Jerusalem. Other times they will purport to be promoting a new art studio in the area. When pressed for details as to the location of the art studio or why they are selling the paintings, they become evasive. Some claim to be the artist who painted the artwork, others claim they {are} promoting the work of others or of Israel. Information has been received which indicates the art is actually produced in China. When told that they cannot solicit on federal facilities, they will claim that the paintings are not for sale, but that they are soliciting interest in the paintings, either for an art studio or for a future art sale.

An incident report by DEA Tampa has revealed much information relating to these individuals. DEA Agents at the Tampa District Office questioned the Team Leader of a group of 9 individuals at length. The Team Leader stated he purchases the paintings for $8 to $10 dollars from an individual in the Hollywood/Ft. Lauderdale, Florida area. The paintings are then sold for $50 to $80 dollars. (Other offices have reported the paintings selling for $150-$200 dollars.) The individuals come to the U.S. on tourist visas, and finance their stay here by selling the paintings. The Hollywood, Florida area seems to be a central point for these individuals with several having addresses in this area.

There have been incidents where criminal and/or suspicious activity has been associated with these individuals. Two were arrested by FPS in Plantation, FL with counterfeit Social Security Cards. Baton Rouge, LA discovered a small amount (personal use amount) of marijuana in the residence of one group, and some of the individuals interviewed by DEA/Tampa admitted to smoking marijuana. Criminal records checks have revealed some arrest history on persons associated with these groups. Passport irregularities have been reported. A review of their passports shows travel to several other countries, to include Thailand, Laos, India, Kenya, Central and South America, Australia, Germany, Amsterdam, and Canada. One individual presented a Canadian citizenship card along with his Israeli passport. A report from EPA/Denver involved a female art student going to the house of an EPA Special Agent to sell art, and returning later to photograph the house. There is a report of one of these individuals being seen diagramming the layout of a federal facility. This information has not been directly reported to DEA, and has not been confirmed by first-hand observation.

When encountered at residences, some of these individuals are persistent in trying to get inside the home. Some have asked to use the telephone when leaving. Some employees


have reported that they came only to their house, while others have reported that the students approached the entire neighborhood.

IS requested that all DEA Field Divisions canvas their employees to determine if these activities have occurred in their area. Additionally, information has been received from several other federal law enforcement agencies. The following is a summary, by DEA Division Offices, of the events that have taken place:

Atlanta Division

1. Sometime in July or August 2000, a woman claiming to be a student from a foreign country attempted to enter the Chattanooga, Tennessee Resident Office. The woman was attempting to sell homemade pins that she hand painted and put together herself. An Office Assistant advised the woman that she was on Federal Property and solicitation was prohibited. The Office Assistant claimed the woman was from the Middle East, but cannot recall the exact location.

2. In mid to late December 2000, a male and female subject described as being in their mid-twenties arrived at the residence of a Special Agent. The male subject spoke fluent English, however the female subject had a heavy accent. Both subjects claimed to be Israeli art students. The Special Agent examined some of the artwork, but became suspicious when the students would not provide him with a contact telephone number in case he should decide to buy something. Subsequently, the Special Agent saw some of the exact same artwork for sale at kiosk in the Mall of Georgia. The Special Agent questioned the salesperson about the origin of the artwork, but the salesperson was uncooperative.

3. During the first week of January 2001, an individual identifying himself as an Israeli art student attempted to bring artwork into the Columbus, Georgia Resident Office. The individual was not permitted to enter the office.

4. The following was received by the Montgomery, Alabama District Office:

On 3/27/2001, approximately 1:45 p.m., Montgomery District Office Group Supervisor John W. Wall was exiting the elevator on the first floor of our building enroute to a meeting. Our building is a small two-story office building that also contains the offices of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Geological Survey, Dyncorp and a small investment company (Newman Investments). As G/S Wall got out of the elevator, a white female was getting on. G/S Wall noticed she was carrying a large blue artist portfolio. GIS Wall engaged her in conversation and asked if she was in our building on government business to which the female stated that she was an art student from Austria and was promoting her work. G/S Wall asked if she was actually from Israel and the female later identified as Vanina Erika DARDIC, DOB 3/5/78, stated again that she was from Austria. DARDIC got on the elevator for the second floor and G/S Wall went to his OGV and notified me with instructions to re-interview the female.

5. Several minutes passed and DARDIC never came to our office. (Investigation later


revealed that DARDIC did not visit any of the offices in our building. Moments later an administrative assistant observed DARDIC walking through the parking lot in the direction of other buildings.

6. At that point, agents set out on foot to find DARDIC. The agents observed another white female later identified as Ester SAGES, DOB 9/30/77, walking through the office complex, also carrying a large blue portfolio. SAGES was followed on foot a short distance to a van that was parked on a side road where the agents made contact with a white male, identified as Marcelo VALANSI, DOB 11/24/77. VALANSI took SAGES’ portfolio and placed it into the van, a 1984 GMC full-size custom van bearing Florida tag T11YZX, registered to Marcelo VALANSI at 901 SE 1st Ave., #2, Gainesville, Florida.

7. The agents approached SAGES and VALANSI, identified themselves and separated the two for interviews. VALANSI stated that he was an art student at the University of Florida and stated that they were traveling around to “‘promote” the work of new artists. Information revealed that VALANSI was registered at Santa Fe Community College in 1999 and not the University of Florida. VALANSI produced an ID card from Argentina, DNI 26,316,660, card #190961, and stated that he was on spring break from the University of Florida where he has been a student for three years. VALANSI stated his passport was in his hotel room at the Governor’s House Hotel, #180. VALANSI stated that he and approximately five other students had been in Montgomery about two days and planned to stay several more.

8. Ester SAGES produced an Israeli passport, #6470399, and stated that she had been in the U.S. approximately 3 weeks (Visa type R, class B1/B2). SAGES claimed to be an artist but does not attend school anywhere. SAGES admitted to having served in the Israeli Army for two years (mandatory service). SAGES identified her father as Elyahu SAGES (deceased) and her mother as Marjalit SAGES. SAGES gave the same story as being in Montgomery to “promote” the artists work.

9. While talking to VALANSI and SAGES, Vanina DARDIC walked up and was interviewed. DARDIC, provided an ID card from Argentina (DNI 26,473,227, card #J8557), but stated that she had dual citizenship (Argentina and Israel). DARDIC stated that she was born in Argentina to an Argentine father, Mario DARDIC, and an Israeli mother, Judith COHEN (maiden name). She moved to Israel when she was 12 years of age and served in the Israeli Army, DARDIC reported that she is the girlfriend of Marcelo VALANSI. DARDIC spoke English, Hebrew and Spanish. SAGES spoke English and, Hebrew. VALANSI spoke English and Spanish.

10. VALANSI was asked if the artwork was for sale, to which he stated “not really” that they were “promoting” their work and that it is important to artists that people like their work. VALANSI was asked if, hypothetically, someone liked his work and wanted to commission him to paint something, how would someone get in contact with him? VALANSI was very hesitant to provide a means of contact. When pressed, VALANSI provided Gainesville telephone #352-378-1435 as a contact number. He was asked how their group could afford to travel around “promoting” artwork if they derive no income


from it. He stated that his parents, Roberto and Graziela VALANSI finance his travels. The parent’s address in Buenos Aires is reportedly Salguero 2468 Apartment 15.

11. Ester SAGES stated that one of their stops in Montgomery was going to be the Jewish Federation Office which is located adjacent to where their van was parked (2820 Fairlane Dr., Montgomery, telephone #334-277-5820). All of the subjects were photographed, however SAGES initially did not want her picture taken.

12. EPIC was contacted for information on their entries into the U.S. EPIC queries indicated the following:

VALANSI, Marcelo (Argentina passport #26316660)

1). Admission date: 2/01/2001
Admission Class: F1 (Student)
Port of Entry: Miami, FL
Arrival from: Tel Aviv Israel
Visa Issued: Buenos Aires (8/20/98)
Carrier: Al Israel Airlines (flt 201)
Intended address: 901 S.E. 1st Ave., Gainesville, FL

2). Admission date: 10/18/00
Admission to: 1/17/01
Admission Class: CP (Public Interest Parole)
Port of Entry: Miami, FL
Arrival from: unk (most likely Columbia)
Carrier: Avianca (flt 8)
Intended address: 901 S.E. 1st Ave., Gainesville, FL
Departure date: 12/28/00 from Miami

3). Admission date: 11/12/99
Admission Class: WT/VW (Visitor w/o Visa)
Port of Entry: Miami, FL
Arrival from: Santiago, Chile
Carrier: La Lan Chile (flt 500)
Intended address: 901 S.E. 1st Ave., Gainesville, FL
Departure date: unk

4). Admission date: 04/15/99
Port of Entry: Miami, FL
Arrival from: San Jose (Juan Santamari)
Carrier: LACSA (flt 620)
Departure date: unk

5). Admission date: 01/11/99
Admission Class: F1 (Student)
Port of Entry: Miami, FL
Arrival from: unk
Carrier: La Lan Chile (flt 500)
Intended address: 901 S.E. 1st Ave., Gainesville, FL


Departure date: unk

6). Admission date: 9/23/98
Admitted to: 12/31/98
Admission Class: Fl (Student)
Port of Entry: Miami, FL
Arrival from: unk
Carrier: A L Argentina (flt 1324)
Intended address: 617 E. University Ave., Gainesville, FL
Departure date: 12/19/98

7). Admission date: 05/04/98
Admitted to: 11/03/98
Admission Class: B2 (Visitor)
Port of Entry: Miami, FL
Arrival from: Unk
Visa issued: Buenos Aires 5/11/90
Carrier: E U Empresa Ecuatoriana (flt 800)
Intended address: 617 E. University Ave., Gainesville, FL
Departure date: 08/10/98

8). Admission date: 1/02/97
Admitted to: 7/01/98
Admission Class: B2 (Visitor)
Port of Entry: Miami, FL
Arrival from: unk
Visa issued: Buenos Aires 5/11/90
Carrier: La Lan Chile (flt 502)
Intended address: 143 6 Washington Ave., Miami, FL
Departure date: 03/13/98

13. SAGES, Ester (Israel passport 96470399)

1). Admission date: 3/03/01
Admission Class: B2 (Visitor)
Port of Entry: Newark International
Arrival from: Tel Aviv Israel
Carrier: Continental Airlines (flt 91)

2). Admission date: 12/23/99
Admitted to: 6/22/00
Admission Class: B2 (Visitor)
Port of Entry: Newark, N.J.
Arrival from: Tel Aviv Israel
Carrier: El Al Israel
Intended address: Attornet 161, New York City, New York
Departure date: 01/09/00

3). Admission date: 08/24/95


Admitted to: 2/23/96
Admission Class: B2 (Vishor)
Port of Entry: New York
Arrival from: Tel Aviv Israel
Visa issued: Buenos Aires 5/11/90
Carrier: El Al Israel
Intended address: Hotel Carlton, New York City, New York
Departure date: 9/20/95

14. DARDIC, Vanina Erika (Argentina passport #10581811)

1.) Admission date: 2/01/01
Port of Entry: Miami, FL
Arrival from: London (Gatwick Int’l)
Visa issued: Buenos Aires 5/11/90
Carrier: Virgin Atlantic Airlines (flt 5)

2). Admission date: 10/18/00
Admission Class: CP (Public Interest Parole)
Port of Entry: Miami, FL
Arrival from.: Bogota, Columbia
Visa issued: Buenos Aires 5/11/90
Carrier: Avianca (flt 8)
Intended address: 901 S.E. 1st. Ave., Gainesville, FL
Departure date: 12/25/00

3). Admission date: 12/23/99
Port of Entry: New York
Carrier: Tower Air (flt 31)
(no further info)

15. Regarding the groups story as art students, specifically VALANSI stating that he is a student at the University of Florida out on spring break, RAC Dick McEnany, Gainesville R.O. inquired as to VALANSI’s status as a student. RAC McEnany advised that VALANSI was last registered in the spring of 1999. RAC McEnany also stated that spring break was already over for this year.

16. It is noted that in addition to the three subjects contacted, another group of three alleged art students were documented working another office complex on Perry Hill Road (Interstate Park) in Montgomery on the same day (3/27/2001). This group is known to have solicited several offices in that complex which are Department of Defense contractors (Maxwell Air Force Base is in Montgomery). Montgomery FBI agents made contact with that group at their hotel (La Quinta Inn) and identified them.

17. The local FBI office was contacted and provided with this information for follow-up as necessary. The FBI POC RAC Sharon Ormsby.


Boston Division

18. There have been no reports of suspicious activities by Israeli art students occurring, at DEA facilities or at the residences of any DEA Employee under the Boston Division.

Caribbean Division

19. No response.

Chicago Division

20. On or around June 26, 2000, a male and female claiming they were Israeli art students, visited the home of a Diversion Investigator. The male was described as Caucasian, 5'8", 160 lbs., dark brown hair, clean-shaven, brown eyes, and early 20’s. The female was described as 5'6", 160 lbs., long curly dark brown hair with blonde highlights, early 20’s. The students left the residence without incident.

21. On or around June 30, 2000, a second set of Israeli art students arrived at the home of the same Diversion Investigator. These students were confrontational when asked to leave and the police were called (16th District Chicago Police Dept.). The male was described as 5'6", 150 lbs., slim build, dark skin, no facial hair, very dark hair, early 20’s. The female was described as 5'8", slim build, brown shoulder length hair, and early 20’s. They did approach other homes in the Diversion Investigator’s neighborhood. The Israeli students were seen entering a Chevy Astro van, steel gray in color, with darkened windows.

Dallas Division

22. On January 4, 2001, SPI Contract Guard William Armstrong purchased a painting for $200.00 from an Israeli art student. The transaction took place outside of the Dallas Divisional Office. Mr. Armstrong wrote a check payable to a Gal BLAIN.

23. Sometime in January 2001, a male claiming to be an Israeli art student selling paintings visited the home of a DEA Intelligence Analyst and OPR Senior Inspector. The male was described as Caucasian, in his mid twenties. The DEA employees did not purchase any artwork.

24. On February 5, 2001, Security Guard Armstrong observed an individual matching the descriptions of the Israeli art student enter an office building directly East of the Dallas Divisional Office. Mr. Armstrong notified the Federal Protective Service Officers. The FPS Officers responded to the location, located the individual, and conducted an interview. The Israeli art student claimed he was selling paintings. NADDIS EPIC, INS Soundex, and state system checks were conducted for the above individual, with negative results.

25. As of March 26, 2001, local law enforcement continued to encounter Israeli Nationals, either alone or in groups, selling artwork in the Dallas area. The Israelis appeared to be organized and structured, with the lower level consisting of the artwork


sellers while the next level consists of the drivers. The hierarchy above the drivers remains undefined. Many of the art sellers claim to be students of a Jerusalem art school, and several appear to have had prior Israeli military experience. A standard method of operation is for a driver to drop off three or four salespersons in an area, returning several hours later for pickup. Bank checks found in the possession of several of the students suggest that the artwork sells for between $50.00 and $150.00.

26. Several local law enforcement agencies have provided information to the DEA Dallas office pertaining to recent encounters. On January 2, 2001, an officer of the Euless Police Department sighted a 1995 Chevy Van, white, California plate 3HXN005, parked with back doors opened behind a small office complex that was closed due to the Christmas/New Year holidays. The officer’s initial inspection showed five persons present and that the rear of the van was filled with 40 to 50 framed artwork. Neither the frames nor the artwork appeared to be high quality, per the officer. The officer noted that the van and subjects were stopped in a non-residential area that consisted of a golf course, a chemical company and a storage facility for a defense contractor. When questioned, the subjects indicated they were selling paintings in the area, but were evasive in answering questions thereafter. For example, several subjects stated they were staying in Irving, Texas, but were not sure exactly where. The subjects were warned on the scene for selling paintings without a permit, and released. Although all five subjects possessed passports, only name and DOB information was recorded for each. All subjects were negative in law enforcement indices. The five subjects were identified as:

Gilad LIFSHITZ, W/M, DOB 09/17/1973 (Note: Lifshitz was the vehicle driver)
Betzalel YANAY, W/M, DOB 09/04/1978
Morin Miryam BITON, W/F, DOB 07/14/1980
Daria SASSON, W/F, DOB 08/10/1980
Keren TOUYZ, W/F, DOB 08/20/1978

27. At the time of the encounter Gilad LIFSHITZ, the driver of the van, was in possession of a Florida driver’s license, number L123-280-78-337-0, that showed a DOB of 09/17/1978, and an address of 19115 Collins Ave # 102, Sunny Isles Beach, F1 33160. Sunny Isles Beach is in the Miami area. Perhaps coincidentally, per DEA’s Office of Security Programs, two Israelis previously encountered in Miami were in possession of counterfeit US Social Security Cards. The cards were reportedly obtained in Miami from an unidentified person who was selling the cards near a Florida driver’s license office.

28. As previously reported, LIFSHITZ was driving a 1995 Chevy Van with California plate 3HXN005. A California registration check showed that this van, VIN 1GAHG39K5SF112662, was apparently sold to B I Auto Inc, 31861, 854 Ackerman Dr, Danville, California, circa August 30, 2000. A check of vin 1GAHG39K5SF112662 showed that it is associated with a 1995 Chev/Spt owned by Gilad LIFSHITZ of 7535 N. Beltline Rd, Apt 316, Irving, Texas 75062. (Note: this may be the Irving address referred to by the Israeli art students). (ISP Note: Michael CALMANOVIC, identified by I&NS Dallas and arrested on Marcy 28, 2001, rented at least 5 apartments in the Irving, TX area, and used a mail drop located at 3575 N. Beltline Road, Irving, TX.) Current vehicle tag is


TX/86YYF, title date is 02/10/2001, expiration date is 01/2002. The previous owner is listed as Noam TZOR. What, if any, relationship there may be between TZOR and B I Auto Inc is unknown.

29. In a separate but related matter, on March 16, 2001, the same officer from the Euless PD encountered Sharon ROTEM, aka Sharone, an Israeli art student, at a Kentucky Fried Chicken on Euless Blvd in Euless, Texas. ROTEM was described as a white male, DOB 031277, passport number 7948317, street address: 6023 Moshe Dayan, Holon, Israel. ROTEM claimed association with a Jerusalem art school and had approximately 20 paintings in his possession. The officer noted that ROTEM was an Israeli citizen who was selling “artwork” without a permit, and issued a warning. During the interview, ROTEM stated he was with two others and they were going to be picked up at 17:00 that afternoon. The pickup location was unspecified. ROTEM informed the officer that he (ROTEM) was out of the Israeli military and was doing “Good Deed” work. ROTEM also stated that he was staying in Irving, but didn’t know where or the name of the hotel, and that he was going to drive to Austin Texas, later that day. ROTEM was negative in law enforcement indices. In ROTEM’s possession were several airline tickets, as follows:

- 9th of March: Continental Flight 91 from Tel Aviv to Newark, NJ.

- 10th of March: Continental Flight 1133 from Newark, NJ to Dallas, TX. This ticket shows a return to Newark on May l4th via Continent al Flight 1138.

- Continental Flight 90 to Tel Aviv.

30. Sandwiched between the two Euless incidents was an incident in Richardson, Texas. Per a Richardson Police Department report, on March 15, 2001, officers were dispatched in reference to two females soliciting artwork. Once located, the subjects were identified via their Israeli passports as Maya MAIMON and Nofar BADIHI. Both subjects were arrested for soliciting without a city permit. Prior to being interviewed by police officers, an unidentified male called the jail to inquire about the two female subjects. The U/I male was told he could come to the station to get further information. Two subjects arrived and were identified as Gadi REGEV and Eyal ARTZI (Texas DL number 19554509). A conversation regarding bond and visitation issues ensued, after which the males left. During a search of the two female suspects’ property, several checks were found. Most were filled in with the amount and signature, but the payee blank was void. Also during the search of MAIMON’s purse a prescription of cloriazepam prescribed to Marco FERNANDEZ was found. It was determined that FERNANDEZ was MAIMON’s boyfriend. Fourteen checks, the prescription, and $130 dollars cash were placed in property as evidence. The paintings that the suspects were selling were also impounded.

31. Maya MAIMON was in possession of documentation showing her passport number as 5467894, US B1/B2 visa, DOB 26Dec1978, Nationality Israel, Issue Date: 18Oct2000, Expiration Date: 15Oct2010.

32. Nofar BADIHI was in possession of documentation showing her passport number as 5640993, DOB 21/03/1979 (sic), Place of Birth: Israel, date of issue: 05/12/1993; date of expiry (sic): 04/12/1995; US Visa B1/B2, issue date: 05Ju11996, Expiry Date: 02Jul2006.


33. Among the various documents were airline tickets reflecting the travel of Maya MAIMON and Marco MARABOTTO from DFW airport to Albuquerque, NM, via Delta flight 2238, on March 24, 2001. Each ticket also reflected Delta flight 1944 from Las Vegas to DFW on April 1, 2001.

34. Additional documents showed Marco FERNANDEZ’s to be the same as Marco Antonio FERNANDEZ De Castro Marabotto, DOB 13Apr1977, passport number 99390039611, Issuing State: Mexico; place of birth: Mexico, date of issue 16Jul1999, expiration date: 16Jul2000.

36. Gadi REGEV was described as DOB: 17Dec1975, Nationality: Israel, passport number 5454338, visa type: B1/B2, issuing post: Tel Aviv, issue date: 05Nov1998, expiration date: 04Nov2008.

37. Eyal ARTZI’s driver’s license shows DL # 19554509, DOB 05-27-1977, address: 10334 Sandra Lynn Dr., Dallas, TX 75228, and an expiration date of. 06-27-07. A commercial database shows that ARTZI is the owner of a 1993 Plymouth Acclaim, Texas plate: J75FYB, date registered 08/21/2000, expiration date: 07/31/2001.

38. Another incident involved an Israeli art student who attempted to sell paintings at the residence of S/A Michael Durr in Flower Mound, Texas, on March 25, 2001 at approximately 17:30. S/A Durr was slightly delayed and when he opened the door the art student had already departed and was approaching another house. S/A Durr called the Flower Mound police department, which responded. The art student was identified as David SUSI, W/M, DOB 01/09/1975, who was staying at an unspecified location in Irving, Texas. The student was not detained.

Role    Name             Desc  DOB             PP/DL#                 Visa   Sgtd        Nad
Driver  Gilad Lifshitz   W/M   09/17/1978      FLDL#L123-280-78-337-0        Euless      Neg
Seller  Betzalel Yanay   W/M   09/04/1978                                    Euless      Neg
Seller  Morin Miryara
        Biton            W/F   07/14/1980                                    Euless      Neg
Seller  Dana Sasson      W/F   08/10/1980                                    Euless      Neg
Seller  Keren Touyz      W/F   08/20/1978                                    Euless      Neg
Seller  Sharon Rotcrn    W/M   08/12/1977      PP#7948317                    Euless      Neg
Seller  Maya Maimon      W/F   12/26/1978      PP#5467894             Bl/B2  Richardson  Neg
Seller  Nofar Badihi     W/F   21/03/1979(sic) PP#5640993             Bl/B2  Richardson  Neg
Unk     Gadi Regev       U/M   12/17/1975      PP#5454338             Bl/B2  Richardson  Neg
Unk     Eyal Artzi       U/M   05/27/1977      TXDL#19554509                 Richardson  Neg
Unk     Marco Fernandez  U/M   04/13/1977      PP#99390039611                Richardson  Neg
 Note: Maya’s boyfriend
Seller  David Susi       W/M   01/09/1975                                    Flower Mound  Neg

Dallas I&NS Investigative Reports

(The following is information received by ISP from I&NS Special Agent George Putnam, Dallas, TX. This information is gleaned from I&NS reports, and is consolidated for this paper.)

39. On March 22, 2001, I&NS Dallas received a request from FPS Dallas S/A’s Ellison and Stokes to assist in an investigation regarding Israeli art students. On March 26, 2001, agents went to the Oak Hills Apartment Complex in Irving, Texas to conduct interviews of Israeli nationals staying at those apartments. At approximately 11:30 pm, agents arrested Dahan ELDAD, an Israeli male, and Elsa Beatriz AFRICANO-Leon, a Colombia female at apartment 4228. ELDAD and AFRICANO were proceeding toward apartment # 173, where four Israeli nationals were in custody. ELDAD and AFRICANO were found to be nonimmigrant aliens in violation of their status, and placed under arrest by S/A Martini and Olivarez. A search of their apartment revealed a small amount of marijuana and a “bong.” Additionally, checks in the amount of $150.00 (2) and $560.00, with the notation “For Paintings” were found in his possession.

40. At approximately 1:26 am on 3/27/01, S/A’s arrested Eran LIVNI, an Israeli male, Aran OFEK, and Israeli male, and Michal GAL, DOB 8/10/79, POB: Afula Israel, I&NS #A75-894-941, an Israel female in apartment 216. OFEK and GAL were recognized by FPS S/A Stokes as having been interviewed by FPS subsequent to attempting to sell paintings at the DEA Dallas F.D. on Regal Row. LIVNI admitted to the S/A’s he had engaged in attempting to sell art. Also present in apartment 216 were Noam GAVRIEL an Israeli national, and Netta Kritzman, a U.S. citizen. Personal belongings were retrieved from apartment #259 for OFEK and GAL. Three other Israeli nationals were encountered in apartment 9259, however, they were not found to be in violation of I&NS status and not arrested (nor identified in the report).

41. Aran OFEK stated that his father was a retired two-star general in the Israeli Army. (NFI). (ISP note: Israel recently launched its 5th spy satellite, identified as the OFEK 5. It is unknown if the name of the satellite and these persons is related.)

42. Michal GAL was subsequently held on a $10,000 cash bond. The bond was placed by Ophir BAER, DOB: 11-11-56, an Israeli male on a nonimmigrant H1B1 class visa. BAER was petitioned to work in the U.S. by AMDOCS, Inc. on Sept. 7, 1999, which was valid from Dec 10, 1999 to Sept 30, 2002. The visa was issued in Tel Aviv. BAER listed his address as 7845 La Cabeza Drive, Dallas, TX 75248 with telephone numbers (home) 972-392-0473 and (work) 214-576-5741, SSN: 627-70-0979. BAER also is identified with an address of 1125 East Campbell Road, Richardson, TX. BAER’s SSN is also identified with a John BAER and Annie BAER at the 7845 La Cabeza address. BAER stated he was a relative of GAL. On the bond papers, it was reflected that GAL would be staying at 22 Palisade Terrace, Edgewater, NJ 07020 Tel: 201-224-0797 / 210-310-3521. A cashier check #0001594012 from Bank of America in the amount of $ 10,000 was



43. AMDOCS is an Israeli communications software company, based in the U.S. at 1390 Timberlake Manor Parkway, Chesterfield (St. Louis), MO 63017-6041, telephone number 314-821-3242. AMDOCS is traded on the NYSE under DOX. On April 17, 2001, AMDOCS released a statement that he {sic} had signed a five-year outsourcing agreement with BellSouth. AMDOCS also lists an address of #1 Bell Plaza, St. Louis, Mo, which is the address for Bell South. AMDOCS also has a seven-year outsourcing agreement with Nextel Communications, a provider of digital wireless telecommunications services. Under this agreement, AMDOCS will provide Nextel with a comprehensive billing and customer care information software and support services. The president of AMDOC in Texas is identified as Boaz DOTAN, address: 23 Abba Hillel, St. Ranat Gan, Israel. Treasurer is listed as Beverly A.”WHITMAN, SSN: 400-88-4097. Secretary is listed as Gregory CHRISTOFFEL, SSN: 389-52-8560 at 91 Bell Plaza, St. Louis, MO.

44. Also arrested during this operation was Eran MOSHE (identified with I&NS #A75-894-459), who stated he was a former Israeli special operations soldier.

45. It is noted that following the arrests of the Israeli nationals on March 26/27th, the Israeli embassy was notified that citizens of its country had been arrested by I&NS. The Israeli embassy arranged for air transportation out of the county on March 31, 2001.

46. On March 27, 2001, at approximately 2:30 pm, three Israeli nationals arriving from Frankfurt, Germany, were admitted as non-immigrant visitors through the Dallas / Ft. Worth Airport (DFW). They were identified as Julia VAINSHTEIN, an Israeli female, DPOB: 11-12-78/Russia, Dilka BORENSTEIN, DPOB: 03-15-79/Israel, and Ofir NAVON, DPOB: 09-02-79/Israel. BORENSTEIN stated to have been recently discharged as an Israeli Military Intelligence officer. NAVON claimed to be a former Israeli Army demolition/explosive ordnance disposal specialist. The three stated they intended to tour the Dallas area for a few days, and then go to Houston, New York, and Los Angeles. They claimed not to know anyone in the Dallas area. Surveillance was maintained on the three after they left the inspection area. They were seen being picked up by an individual subsequently identified as Michael CALMANOVIC, who was driving a black Jeep bearing, Texas tags L44-CVD. This tag comes back to CALMANOVIC at 3575 N. Beltline Road, Apt 316, Irving, Texas. Subsequent investigation revealed this address to be a mailbox.

47. In December of 2000, an Israeli art student by the name of Cohen MEYTAL was observed by a DEA employee sitting on the western street curb of the Dallas Divisional Office selling artwork. The student claimed that a group of Israeli art students (about 20) would paint works of art and {sell?} them at local places of business. The employee purchased a painting and was offered to have it framed by an acquaintance of the Israeli group. The check was made out to Cohen MEYTAL and mailed to the following address:


Cohen Meytal
c/o Calmanovic
3575 N. Beltline Road
P.O. Box 316
Irving, Texas 75062

This address is identified with Michael CALMANOVIC. See report under LABORATORIES, paragraph #161.)

48. On March 31, 2001, I&NS Deportation Officer Michael L. Bush was assigned escort duties for the 13 Israelis arrested on March 26/27, 2001 in Irving, Texas. At that time, one of the Israelis (not identified in the report) stated that five individuals in Israel were responsible for recruiting Israeli nationals to come to the U.S. for the purpose of selling art door-to-door. The detainee identified “ITAY” who lives in California, (subsequently identified as Itay SIMON), as the direct link between the five persons in Israel, and the U.S. operation. The detainee stated that the Texas contact for the organization is “Michael”, who lives in the Dallas area and drives a black Jeep. The detainee stated that Michael (CALMANOVIC), is subordinate in the art-vending scheme to Itay (SIMON).

49. Based on investigative leads developed by I&NS S/A R. Marra and R. Martini, the Rochelle Plaza Apartments, located at 312 Rochelle Road, and the Hidden Ridge Apartments, located at 1103 FEdden Ridge, both in Irving, Texas, were identified as possible residences used by CALMANOVIC. On April 14, 2001, I&NS and FPS S/As interviewed Ms. Mary Stanton, Property Manager for the Rochelle Apartments. Ms. Stanton stated that CALMANOVIC had rented five (5) apartments in the complex, and that these apartments were occupied by 25 Israelis. Ms. Stanton stated that all of the Israelis left suddenly and vacated the apartments on the week of March 26/27th, (the time of the arrests of the 13 other Israelis). Ms. Stanton stated she believed CALMANOVIC was still in the Dallas area, as he had recently called regarding his security deposits. Copies of the lease agreements and copies of Israeli passports were provided by Ms. Stanton.

50. Following this, the agents went to the Hidden Ridge Apartments, and at approximately 1:00 pm encountered CALMANOVIC and Itay SIMON in apartment #3018. They were in the process of vacating that apartment at the time. CALMANOVIC was identified as an Israeli citizen, DPOB: 09-06-75/Israel. SIMON was identified as an Israeli citizen, DPOB: 02-27-78/Israel. I&NS S/A Martini positively identified CALMANOVIC as the driver of the black Jeep Cherokee that picked-up VAINSHTEIN, BORENSTEIN, and NAVON at DFW on March 27th. (See paragraph #46 above). CALMANOVIC stated he was a recently discharged electronic intercept operator for the Israeli military, and SIMON stated he was recently discharged from the Israeli Army, where he did “classified work for Israeli national security”. SIMON refused to answer further questions regarding his military service. Both CALMANOVIC and SIMON were both arrested by I&NS and held on $50,000 bond. This bond was subsequently posted.

Telephone number 214-882-5196 was identified as a possible contact number for CALMANOVIC in Dallas. This number is owned by NEXTEL Communications. Through an administrative subpoena, the subscriber was identified as Michael


CALMANOVIC, 11012 Ventura Blvd, Studio City, CA 91604, business phone number 469-446-7777, SSN 613-23-1430, CA DL # 0077480. The service was established on March 29, 2001. NOTE: 11012 Ventura Blvd, Studio City, CA is associated in MSQ with telephone number 818-980-6955, subscribed to SOTERE, Christopher C. in case file number R1-96-0160. MSQ also lists 11012 Ventura Blvd apartment #68, Studio City, CA with JACOBS, Peter, NADDIS #3539920, from case file R3-93-0098.

Prior to the service start date of March 29, 2001 for Michael CALMANOVIC, the phone number 214-882-5196 was used by N Lal MUMITH and Talal MUMITH (NADDIS Negative) DBA American Limo and Transportation (NADDIS Negative), 415 E. Airport Freeway, Suite 280, Irving, TX 75062, business phone number 972-256-0546 (all NADDIS Negative). Telephone number 214-882-5196 was changed to 214-882-8534 on February 13, 2001 and effective March 29, 2001 the phone was assigned to CALMANOVIC.

In addition to telephone number 214-882-5196, there are six (6) additional phone numbers assigned to the account (all NADDIS Negative) with the assigned users name. The following list is all the phone numbers on account number 3231266 subscribed to Michael CALMANOVIC with a users name:

Phone Number    User
214-882-5196    Gilad
214-837-3574    Roy
469-446-1248    Mosh (likely Eran MOSHE, para 944)
214-837-5996    Gil
214-876-1235    Gilad
214-837-7449    Michael
217-837-2056    Asaf

A nationwide search of available commercial databases for Michael CALMANOVIC, identified one Michael CALMANOVIC at 319 S. 177th Place 4201, Seattle, Washington 98148, home phone number 206-244-7705 (all NADDIS Negative). A search against the social security number was negative. CREF indicates that one Michael CALMANOVIC is associated with 310 S. 177th Place, Apt3 04, Seattle, WA (206) 242-3484, and 317 S. 177th Place, Apt 104, Seattle, WA (206)-277-8303. All NADDIS Negative.

51. On March 28, 2001 at approximately 2:00 pm, three-Israeli nationals arrived at DFW again from Frankfurt, Germany. They were identified as Yoni ENGEL, male, DPOB: 09-14-79/Israel, Yotam DAGA1, DPOB: 04-06-78/Israel, and Or ALROEI, DPOB 08-08-78/Israel. ENGEL identified himself as a former company commander in the Israeli Army. Arriving on this same flight was Eli RABINOVITZ, a U.S. citizen, DOB 03-27-79, U.S. Passport E3701329518. RABINOVITZ was described as a white, male, approximately 5'6" in height, 175 pounds, with brown hair in long dreadlocks and a small patch of hair beneath his bottom lip. RABINOVOTZ was seen waiting outside of the I&NS area, and seemed to be impatient. He was observed speaking to a white female who was waiting by the curb. She was not identified, but is described as being approximately 35-40 yoa, 5'6", 150 pounds, with short reddish-brown


hair. She was dressed in European style clothes, and appeared to SA Putnam to be possibly German. Once an I&NS Inspector escorted one of the above Israelis out of the I&NS area, RABINOVITZ starting speaking to the Israeli in Hebrew. Once ENGEL, DAGAI and ALROEI had collected their bags, they walked outside and spoke with RABINOVITZ, and then split into groups. During this time, ENGEL was seen to be the leader of the group, giving orders to the DAGAI and ALROEI. The unidentified white female stayed with RABINOVITZ at the curb, while ENGEL, DAGAI and ALROEI walked down the sidewalk to the next terminal. DAGAI then quickly walked into the terminal at the same time as a blue GMC Safari Van, bearing California tags 3LVA018 arrived at the curb and picked-up ENGEL and ALROEI. The van then quickly departed. DMV records indicate this van is registered to ADESA GOLDEN GATE, Address: 6700 Stevenson Blvd., Fremont, CA, transfer date 11-28-00:, receipt date: 12-11-00. In a few minutes, the van returned and stopped quickly at the curb. DAGAI then came from the terminal door-way and entered the van. The van then quickly departed. Again, the van returned to the area, and RABINOVOTZ got into the van and the unidentified female spoke to the occupants, then it again departed. S/A4 Putnam attempted to locate the van, however it could not be found. When he returned to the area, the unidentified female had also departed.

52. On April 4, 2001, four (4), and possibly six (6), Israelis were arrested in by the Ladue Missouri Police Dept. for peddling without a license. Three of these individuals were identified as Yoni ENGEL, Yotam DAGAI, and Or ALROEI. During interviews conducted by I&NS St. Louis, three of the subjects claimed to have traveled directly from New York City, NY to Dallas, TX. A fourth subject claimed to have arrived at Dallas by way of New York City, Minneapolis, and Seattle. All then claimed to have met in San Antonio, TX with a fifth subject, identified as Ben SADAN, an Israeli national approximately 24 yoa, who acted as their driver. SADAN reportedly uses a cellular telephone with number 214-562-1110. The group claimed they then traveled from San Antonio, TX to Oklahoma City, OK, Tulsa, OK, Wichita, KS, Topeka, KS, Kansas City, MO, Springfield, MO, and then to St. Louis for the purpose of “showing” art produced by art students from the University of Art at Jerusalem. All admitted opening bank accounts at various branches of Bank of America. They further stated that the money collected from the sale of any art was normally deposited into various Bank of America accounts with an unspecified amount going to the individual seller. (See paragraph #129, under St. Louis Division).

53. On an unspecified date, (but believed to be on or about May 9, 2001) three Israeli nationals arrived at DFW via Air France Flight #40 from Paris, France. Two were sent for secondary inspection and interviewed by I&NS Agents. They were identified as Tomer BEN DOR, male, Israeli, DOB: 08-24-75, Marina GLIKMAN, female, Israeli, DOB: 12-15-72. BEN DOR stated he planned on being in the Dallas, TX area for approximately two weeks and then was planning on traveling to Mexico, New York City, and Canada before returning to Israel. BEN DOR was in possession of a return ticket to Israel dated July 8, 2001 and a rental car reservation through Hertz for May 9, 2001 to June 9, 2001. BEN DOR stated he works for NICE, a software engineering company in Israel. BEN DOR stated he served in the Israeli military on a unit that was responsible for


Patriot missile defense.

54. BEN DOR stated he intended to stay at the La Quinta Inn, 14925 Landmark Blvd, Addison, TX, however a check of the hotel revealed no reservations under his name. BEN DOR was in possession of $1500 in cash and a credit card, which he stated he was going to use to help pay his expenses while in the U.S. BEN DOR stated he is a friend of GLIKMAN and traveled to the U.S. with her, but might travel throughout the U.S. alone. During a search of BEN DOR’s luggage a printout from a Windows readme file named “WinPOS-53-readme” was found that has some reference to a file named “DEA Groups”.

55. Marina GLIKMAN stated she would be visiting the U.S. for two months in the Dallas area. She originally claimed to be traveling alone, but later claimed to be traveling with BEN DOR. GLIKMAN stated that an individual named Ronen AKIVA or “HILLEL” (subsequently identified as Hillel DOR) would pick her up. GLIKMAN did not know the address of AKIVA or HILLEL, but had home and cellular telephone numbers for both, (not identified). GLIKMAN stated she did not know whom AKIVA worked for. GLIKMAN also stated she was planning on staying at the La Quinta Inn, and was in possession of $1500 in cash and a credit card. Again, a check of the hotel revealed no reservation under her name. GLIKMAN claimed to be a computer programmer for RETALIX RAANANA in Israel, and a prior intelligence officer in the Israeli military. During a search of her personal luggage, a Declaration for Personal Effects Shipping to Overseas was found which reflected she has shipped personal effects, to include furniture and clothing, to 8081 Royal Ridge Parkway, Irving, TX, the address used by RETALIX USA.

56. While GLIKMAN and BEN DOR were being processed, I&NS Inspectors went to the lobby of DFW to attempt to identify any individuals who were present to meet GLIKMAN and BEN DOR. The Inspectors identified Hillel DOR, male, Israeli, DOB: 04-06-71 and Zeev MILLER, male, Israeli, DOB: 09-04-71. MILLER had also arrived on the same flight as GLIKMAN and BEN DOR. MILLER claimed he was a student at Tel Aviv University studying software engineering while working part-time for RETALIX in Israel. MILLER stated he intended to travel to Mexico, New York, and Canada while on vacation. MILLER stated he was an explosive ordinance/combat engineer while in the Israeli military. MILLER was in possession of $1200 in cash and a Visa credit card. Hillel DOR stated he was at the airport to pick-up GLIKMAN. I&NS S/As verified that DOR had entered the U.S. in January, 2001 as an H-1B nonimmigrant, working for RETALIX USA.

57. RETALIX provides integrated, enterprise-wide software for the retail food industry. It has headquarters in the U.S. and Israel. RETALIX, USA Inc is the U.S. subsidiary of the parent company, based in Israel. It was founded in 1982 as POINT OF SALE LIMITED and changed its name in November 2000. It is trades on the NASDAQ market under RTLX. The company has over 450 employees, with subsidiary offices in the U.S. and the United Kingdom. The chairman and CEO is Barry SHAKED, who replaced Lawrence ALLMAN as the president and CEO of RETALIX USA on January 31, 2001.


Denver Division

58. Sometime in July or August 2000, on two separate occasions, a male described as Caucasian, 5'8", black hair, wearing baggy clothing, entered the reception area of the Denver Divisional Office. The unidentified male spoke with a heavy accent and was carrying a black artwork brief case. The unidentified male asked to speak with anyone interested in purchasing artwork. The unidentified male was asked to leave and did so without incident.

59. Sometime in December 2000, an unidentified white male, 20-25 years of age entered the Colorado Springs, Colorado Resident Office in an attempt to sell artwork. He was asked to leave and did so without incident.

60. Four separate incidents involving unidentified persons attempting to sell artwork at the Salt Lake City, Utah Resident Office were reported by a Receptionist. These incidents occurred during the 2000 calendar year. In each incident, all suspicious persons entered the reception area of the Salt Lake City, Utah Resident Office asking to speak to anyone interested in purchasing artwork. All subjects spoke with a heavy accent believed to be French. All subjects were asked to leave and did so without incident.

61. A second receptionist at the Salt Lake City, Utah Resident Office reported one male and two female subjects attempted to sell artwork in the reception area. The receptionist asked the male subject where he was from. Apparently, he claimed he was from Israel. The receptionist purchased a painting, for $100.00 and was not issued a receipt. This incident occurred sometime in January 2001.

Detroit Division

62. A Vehicle Technician at the Detroit Division reported that during the fall of 2000, a female appearing to be either Jewish or Arabic in her twenties visited her home in Southfield, Kentucky in an attempt to sell her artwork. The Vehicle Technician declined to purchase any paintings and the female left. The Vehicle Technician said it appeared the female was going door to door.

63. A DEA-6 Report of Investigation was received from the Louisville, Kentucky Resident Office detailing the suspicious activities of Israeli art students. On February 12, 2001, an individual who identified himself as an Israeli art student visited the residence of a Special Agent. The individual stated he was selling artwork door to door. He claimed he and other Israeli students were staying at a Motel 6 in Lexington, Kentucky. The Special Agent examined the individual’s Israeli Ministries of Transport photo ID. The ID indicated that the individual was Shabar FREIDMAN, driver’s license number 6728447 and ID number 033056433. On February 13, 2001, a Special Agent made contact with an individual outside the Lexington, Kentucky Resident Office. The individual claimed to be an Israeli art student. The individual was identified as Gerzon Ofir AVRAHAM, (DOB 08/12/77). AVRAHAM presented his Israeli passport (96315574) and a Ministries of Transport ID number 034193615. Contact was made with AVRAHAM after ATF personnel observed him walking around the property of the Lexington, Kentucky


Resident Office. During an interview with AVRAHAM he stated that he did not enter the Resident Office and that he was trying to sell his artwork to individuals in the area. AVRAHAM also stated that he and seven other Israelis were in the U.S. traveling and selling artwork. AVRAHAM claimed that he and the others go to businesses and residences in an attempt to have people buy their artwork. Apparently, the Israelis were staying at a Motel 6 located in Lexington, Kentucky and are planning to travel to Cincinnati, Ohio. AVRAHAM told the Special Agents that there are two groups of Israeli students currently in the U.S. The second group was then currently in Memphis, Tennessee and Houston, Texas. The Israelis plan to stay in the U.S. until the end of March or the beginning of April. AVRAHAM also claimed that one of the members of his group, SHAHAR (LNU), visited the residence of a police officer. SHAHAR told AVRAHAM that the police officer questioned him about the purpose of his visit.

El Paso Division

64. On February 28, 2001, at approximately 6:30 p.m. the Albuquerque District Office Duty Agent received a phone call from Patrick Dawson in Phoenix, Arizona (606) 664-5647. Dawson stated that their respective office had received a Teletype stating that a terrorist organization from the Middle East has been attempting to obtain information about the layout of different law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. According to Dawson the organization sends college students with framed paintings/prints to law enforcement buildings in an attempt to gather information about the layout of the buildings.

65. On or around January 28, 2001, a young man attempting to sell artwork approached a DEA Receptionist for the Albuquerque District Office. The Receptionist advised the young man that the District Office was a federal building and that she or anyone else was not interested. The Receptionist observed: the young man leave; however, she does not remember the description of the individual.

66. On Tuesday, March 6, 2001, a young female came to the IRS office trying to sell artwork. The woman was dressed neatly in an “American style” dress. The woman spoke very quietly and with a heavy accent, which made her very difficult to understand. She advised one of the IRS employees that she was Mongolian and that she had to sell a certain amount of artwork to get an art scholarship. She carried a small portfolio type container and produced a childish and unframed painting of some sort of animal with glitter. One of the witnesses described it as something the girl might have done herself. The girl was told that soliciting was not allowed in the building and she left the IRS office. No one apparently saw the woman leave the floor or building and no other subjects were seen. The woman described her as being in her late teens to early 20’s, plump / chunky and approximately 4'11" and light complected.

Houston Division

67. On October 20, 2000, a male Israeli art student was observed by the Security Officers entering the lobby level and enter an elevator from a secure area of the Houston, Texas


Divisional Office. Security Officers were able to apprehend the art student before he could enter a secure area on the second floor. There are no written reports of the incident nor any identification attempt made of the art student.

68. On January 16, 2001, a male Israeli art student was observed by a United States Customs Service Special Agent entering a secured parking lot area that leads into the Houston Divisional Office. The USCS Special Avent stopped the art student and turned him over to the Security Officers. The student claimed he wanted to gain access to the building to sell artwork. No personal identification information was obtained.

69. On January 22, 2001, a third Israeli art student entered the lobby of the Houston Division and asked the Security Officer if he could utilize a pay phone. The Security Officer informed the student that there was no public phone available. The Security Officer asked the student if he had any artwork to sell. The student said, “yes,” and proceeded to inform the Security Officer that another student visited the Houston Division a week ago to sell artwork. The Security Officer told the student that someone upstairs wanted to see the artwork. The Houston Division Special Agent/Security Officer S/A John Martin, Assistant Special Agent in Charge Ric Ludowig, and another Special Agent interviewed the student. The Israeli art student was carrying a Florida State Driver’s License (#B650-520-76-047-0). The information on the license was Lior BARAM, 10733 Cleary Blvd., #206, Plantation, Florida, 33324-0000, (DOB 02/07/76), 5'9", dark eyes and black hair. BARAM admitted to serving three years in the Israeli military and served his last two years in Intelligence, working with classified information. BARAM spoke fluent English with an accent. He also claimed to be an art student at Bezalel University in Jerusalem; however, he could not spell Bezalel. BARAM stated there were fifteen (15) Israeli art students in the Houston, Texas area attempting to sell their artwork. BARAM claimed to realize that the Houston Division was a Federal building and that be would not be able to sell his artwork there. BARAM was asked how he knew the Houston Division was a Federal Building. BARAM response was, “By looking around and seeing all of the cars.” BARAM also stated that after he left the military, he traveled for one year, worked at a car rental company, and studied at BEZALEL UNIVERSITY.

70. BARAM could not provide the name of address or phone number of a place he was staying. He also referred to the person heading the student affair as his “supervisor.” When BARAM pronounced the name of his supervisor it sounded like “Ori,” and that Ori could be contacted at (847) 456-6166. The telephone number was called and Ori was not available. No one at that phone number could provide any information. BARAM was allowed to use a DEA telephone to call someone to pick him up. BARAM dialed 1-800-462-3541, but did not speak to anyone. When asked, he stated he tried to call a friend in New York. BARAM was instructed to leave and never return. BARAM claimed he had visited the U.S. three times on a tourist visa, A records check from the Immigration and Naturalization Service revealed BARAM had visited the U.S. in 1997 and once in 2000 and 2001.

a) On May 10, 1997, BARAM entered the U.S., via Miami, under admission number

75957562105, on American Airlines flight #5776. He departed the U.S., via New York, on British Airways flight #0001 on May 17, 1997. His U.S. tourist visa was issued on March 18, 1997.

b) On August 25, 1997, BARAM entered the U.S. via Los Angeles, under admission number 35627816705, on El Al Israel flight #0105. At that time he was carrying an Israeli passport (#4787090) and it is presumed he may have entered the U.S. under the same U.S. tourist visa as noted above. BARAM departed the U.S. on December 13, 1997, via Miami, on Air Jamaica flight #0093.

c) On December 16, 1997, BARAM entered the U.S. via Miami, under admission number 76155245005, on Air Jamaica flight #0090. There was no date of issue for the U.S. tourist visa, however, the visa was issued in Jerusalem. BARAM departed the U.S., via Newark, NJ, on El AL Israel flight #0001 on January 3, 1998.

d) On November 22, 2000, BARAM re-entered the U.S., via New York, on El Al Israel flight #0003. He was carrying Israeli passport (#8722103) and was issued a U.S. tourist visa on November 15, 2000 in Tel Aviv. There is no departure information listed for this trip.

70. On March 1, 2001, two college students selling art visited the home of a Staff Assistant from the San Antonio, Texas District Office. The Staff Assistant’s husband answered the door and sent the students on their way. No information as to where they were from was revealed. No vehicle was seen and they were walking door to door.

71. On March 23, 2001, the Houston Division HIDTA faxed ISP a security alert that was issued from ONDCR. The security alert describes the apparent attempts by Israeli nationals to learn about government personnel and office layouts. The security alert reads:

“A Supervisory Special Agent from OTG has received information from the other OTG’s that there was an on-going “security threat” in the form of individuals who are purportedly “Israeli National Art Students” that are targeting government office selling “artwork.” The purpose of them targeting Law Enforcement is unknown. Intelligence information indicates that they are specifically targeting Law Enforcement agencies as they showed up in an ATF office in Lexington, KY, where their office is in a commercial building NOT associated with the government. When questioned by the ATF, the “students” were vague about why they were selling the artwork in that particular office. In the St. Louis area, the source thought that the students were Palestinian and they have been at the DEA office in that city. At that location, the Intel indicates that they were caught “diagramming” the inside of the building. Also in St. Louis, several of the Law Enforcement’s Officer’s homes have been visited by these folks. One DCIS agent reported two individuals, who appeared to be of Middle Eastern extraction, went to his house and tried to gain entry under the ruse of “selling art.” When he refused entry to them, they left. What was unusual is that he watched them and they did not visit any other houses in the area. Since this came from DEA, who is apparently one of the major targets, I thought it imperative to get the word out as soon as practical. DEA is attempting to build a database of the contacts in all areas. A TIGTA Special Agent reports that he was visited at his home in west Little Rock, AR approximately two months ago by a woman “selling

artwork,” and fitting this description. It is unknown HOW these folks are getting the home addresses of the agents contacted, whether via surveillance or by FOIA. requests, but it is certainly well to be aware of anyone who may fit this description and appears to be following an agent.”

Los Angeles Division

72. On March 8, 2001, at approximately 6:30 p.m., two males claiming to be art students from UCLA, visited the home of Intelligence Supervisor Lori Fernandes and ASAC John Fernandes, of the Los Angeles Division. The two males said they were attending school from Europe and were trying to sell art to support their economy. The two males looked to be in their 20’s. One male had very short black hair and the other had black hair that extended about two inches below his ears. The I/S Fernandes informed the males that she was not interested and they left the residence. The two males departed the neighborhood in a vehicle bearing a Maryland license plate #HLB785. The plate comes back to a 1991 Ford registered to Leviella MENDEL at 8377 Tamar Drive, #37, Columbia, Maryland, DOB 10/29/75, driver’s license #M-534-514-009-032, 5'7", 150 lbs. All M204 inquiries were negative. Additional inquiries revealed MENDEL has a new residential address, 4733 Haskell Ave., #46, Encino, California. Criminal checks are still pending.

73. On Wednesday April 2, 2001 at approximately 8:00 PM one of two individuals rang the doorbell of the residence of a DEA Special Agent Wayne Schmidt in Duarte, California. Upon answering the door, the S/A observed the two individuals walking away from the residence and walking toward an adjoining neighbor’s residence. Upon exiting the residence, the S/A observed that both individuals, a male and a female, were at the neighbor’s front door and stated that they were “Israeli art students”. The neighbor advised them she was not interested and both left the area walking south on foot. The S/A observed that the male spoke English with a pronounced accent and was approximately 5'10" medium build short curly dark hair and carried an artist’s portfolio. The female was approximately 5'7" with shoulder length auburn hair. The S/A was not able to obtain any further description due to the lack of available light in the area. The S/A returned to his residence and contacted by telephone the Temple Station of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASO) and requested assistance in attempting to find and identify the individuals. While awaiting the arrival of the LASO, the S/A returned to the area where he had last observed the individuals and attempted to locate their exact location without success. The S/A was contacted telephonically by LASO Sergeant Joseph B. O’Conner. Subsequently, the S/A briefed Sergeant O’Conner in person at a location away from his residence. While briefing, Sergeant O’Conner dispatched a number of marked police units into the area of the last sighting. After approximately 30 minutes of searching the area the units reported no observations. Sergeant O’Conner, along with several LASO Deputies canvases on foot the residents of several houses north and south of the S/A’s residence on the pretext of looking for door to door peddlers. Sergeant O’Conner determined that the two individuals approached the resident of 615 Royalview Street, Duarte, identified as Kathy SABGUNDJIAN (626) 358-6453 (626) 256-1027 at approximately 7:30 PM and had entered that residence and stayed for approximately 30 minutes. Ms. SABGUNJIAN had made a purchase from the


individuals. During questioning by Sergeant O’Conner Ms. SAPGUNDJIAN recalled that the two individuals would not give her their names nor did they provide her with a telephone number. When asked about framing the artwork the individuals obtained Ms. SABGUNDJIAN’s telephone numbers and said that they will be in touch with her. Sergeant O’Conner left his business card with Ms. SABGUNJIAN and requested that she contact him in the event the art students telephoned. Sergeant O’Conner also requested that Ms. SABGUNDJIAN not tell the sellers about his visit.

Miami Division

74. The Miami Division, including SouthCom, ATF, INS, FDLE, and SFISC, and the Southeast Laboratory, (for lab incidents, see Laboratories), has had at least 20 encounters with Israelis selling artwork. These encounters took place at the Divisional Office and at the residences of several employees. A Chemist made a purchase at his residence via personal check for $155.00. The check was deposited into Colonial Bank account number 067001518. A copy of the check has been furnished.

75. In a Federal Protective Service report dated February 9, 2001, a FPS Officer while on patrol at a Federal facility adjacently located to DEA, was notified by a Security Officer that there were two individuals walking around the back of the building. The subjects stated that they were there from Israel to try to sell paintings for art school. The male subject was carrying an Israeli passport, a Florida State driver’s license, and a Florida state ID card. The female subject had a Florida State driver’s license and a Florida state ID card. The female subject could not provide a passport or visa from Israel. The subjects were detained and transferred to FPS Miami Headquarters where they were interviewed. Both subjects were issued tickets for “soliciting for commercial purposes.” While interviewed, both subjects produced counterfeit social security cards. Both subjects stated they were approached by a man at the Florida State driver’s license office and paid him $100.00 for the counterfeit social security cards. Both subjects were issued tickets for “possession of a false U.S. Government document.” The male subject was identified as Ohad AHARON and the female as Yafit SEGAL. Later in the interview, SEGAL stated that they are not art students, but answered an ad in Israel to go to the U.S. to sell art. The company, which is located in Florida, is “Oil Paintings and Frames Universal Art,” and the manager’s name is ALMOG. SEGAL also stated that they had a disagreement with ALMOG, left the company, and decided to sell art on their own. The art is bought from a company in Los Angeles, California. SEGAL and AHARON were released and the case remains open with the U.S. Dept. of State.

75. [Number reused] On February 15, 2001, an off duty agent spotted two individuals believed to be identified with subjects of a security advisory posted by the Miami F.D. Surveillance was conducted and the local police approached them to obtain identification and photographs. They were both carrying passports. The female’s name was Hammutal COHEN, DOB 01/29/62, passport 416077838, Immigration departure #41060016307 (02/12/01), 5'8", 145 lbs. The male’s name was Itay RUBINSTEIN, DOB 01/17/79, U.S. visa #39127358, date of entry 12/28/00, passport #39127358, 6'0", 165 lbs. They stated they were showing artwork that was not for sale. They were promoting an art gallery that


was opening in New York. DEA Special Agents observed these two individuals in a strip mall near the DEA Orlando District Office in Heathrow, Florida. The Israelis were observed going business-to-business selling artwork they carried in a large portfolio. The agents photographed the two individuals,

76. On March 1, 2001, at approximately 3:00 p.m., SAKevin McLaughlin of the Tampa DO responded to a knock at one of the fifth floor office doors. (It should be noted that the Tampa DO occupies the fourth and fifth floors of a First Union bank Office building). The reception area is on the fourth floor, with the fifth floor doors being locked, and possessing no signs of identification.) At the door was a young female who immediately identified herself as an Israeli art student who had beautiful art to sell. She was carrying a crudely made portfolio of canvas, matted, but unframed pictures. Taking note of the posted Miami Field Division Security Alert regarding a similar incident, SA McLaughlin invited her into one of the interview rooms and SA Adrian Chindgren joined him in listening to her presentation. She had approximately 15 paintings of different styles, some copies of famous works, and others similar in style to famous artists. When asked her name, she identified herself as Bella POLLCSON, and pointed out one of the paintings was signed by that name. She then changed her story and said that the paintings were not for sale, but that she was there to promote an art show in Sarasota, FL, and asked for the agents’ business cards so that information regarding the show could be mailed to them. She was not able to say when, or where the show would take place. After this discrepancy, the agents began to question her more closely, and her responses were evasive at best. When asked whom she was with, she stated that she was dropped at this office building by her Team Leader, who knew everything and could answer more questions. The Team Leader was described as a male driving a red van, dropping off this female, with another four females and a male.

77. Tampa DO agents then began searching the area around the Tampa DO office and found the individuals described by the young female. Two of the girls were on a street corner near another busy office complex area and as agents were speaking with them, the red van pulled up. All were escorted to the Tampa DO for questioning.

78. Agents from the Tampa DO then interviewed each of the subjects. Through identification that was produced, it was revealed that the female who approached the Tampa DO and identified herself as Bella POLLCSON, was now identified as Inbal VAKSHI. The other subjects were: Sussie OSHRA, Keren KUZNITZ, Keren MATATIA, Livnat SELLA, Eli COHEN, Oshirt ZAGURI, Rachel KENDEL, and Hanan SERFATY. SERFATY, the driver of the red van, was identified as the Team Leader. All of the subjects gave ambiguous answers to the agents, but keeping to the story that they were Israeli art students.

79, VAKSHI produced an Israeli identification card, an Israeli passport, a student identification card, and a Florida driver’s license for Sarah Minna SASSOON. VAKSI stated that she had received the license from a friend of hers who was no longer living in Florida.


80. S/A David Keikin interviewed subject Hanan SERFATY. SERFATY stated that he served in the Israeli military between the ages of 18-21. He further indicated that he arrived in the U.S. approximately one year ago at the age of 23. When questioned as to what he did between the ages of 21 and 24, he refused to answer. The interviewing agent indicated that SERFATY’s command of the English language was excellent, even the utilization of slang words. SERFATY indicated that he resides in Hollywood, FL, with a phone number of (954) 478-1006. He further related that he purchases the paintings from an Anglo male, TOM (LNU) for $8.00-$15.00/piece, In turn, each piece of artwork is subsequently sold for $50-80. TOM (LNU) allegedly resides in Hollywood/Ft. Lauderdale area, and reportedly has a storage unit in south Florida where he keeps the artwork to be picked up.

81. It should be noted that in SERFATY’s possession were deposit and withdrawal slips for Washington Mutual Bank account #038300002297689, dating, from December 19, 2000 through February 21, 2001. The fifty-one (51) slips were for transactions at various banks in Dade and Broward County, FL, banks, specifically in Coral Gables, Miami, Hollywood, Aventura, and Tamarac. The deposits for the timeframe totaled $93,252,00, with withdrawals totaling $86,000. Also in SERFATY’s possession were four (4) deposit slips for First Union Bank account #1010017986436, from February 26, 2001 through March 1, 2001, totaling $14,250.

82. After being photographed, the subjects were released. G/S Mark Baughman contacted G/S James Williams, Miami Field Division SOG, andwas instructed to contact Matheson of the Federal Protective Service in Atlanta, which he did telephonically. On March 2, 2001, G/S Baughman contacted Air Force Intelligence, OSI at MacDill Air Force Base and relayed all pertinent information to Air Force Commander Joseph Lukowski. Copies of all documents were forwarded to Commander Lukowski.

83. Follow-up calls to the Tampa Police Department revealed the following information. On 2/27/01, the Tampa Police Dept. responded to two calls of suspicious persons in the Davis Island area of Tampa. Shortly after 8 PM, officers responded to the first call and encountered a male and female alleging to be selling art prints in a residential area. One of the homes they embarked upon was that of a U.S. Marshal. During the interview of the two subjects, the male claimed he was previously a police officer with the Israeli Army and was currently touring the U.S. with an associate. The male subject was identified as Assaf MARZIANO, DOB: 02-04-78. The female subject was identified as Orit BENDALAK, DOB: 10-28-78. MARZIANO stated that he had relatives in Miami, but could not recall their names. He also claimed that he was traveling to Los Angeles after leaving FL. Both subjects claimed that a NADAV (LNU) was responsible for introducing them to the idea of selling artwork while in Miami, and added that NADAV was responsible for dropping off the subjects on Davis Island to sell artwork. BENDALAK stated that she originally left Israel and traveled to Thailand and Taiwan. She also claimed that while serving in the Israeli army, she was trained as a bomb technician. At 9:15 PM, a second call brought TPD officers to another location on Davis Island, which resulted in the interview of another male and female also selling artwork. These subjects claimed to ro {sic} be promoting artwork for an organization that they could not recall the


name of. They both additionally claimed that they had been dropped off in Tampa after departing Miami on same day. These subjects are identified as Michael SIMON, DOB: 11-23-78 and Ilana HARARI, DOB: 4-29-79. TPD fingerprinted and photographed all 4 subjects. (The Tampa DO retains copies of all documentation.) These subjects all had passports in their possession reflecting travel through Czech, Warsaw, and Nepal (10/2000). It should be noted that in addition to one Deputy U.S. Marshal residing on Davis Island, also residing there is a DEA agent and his spouse who is a Deputy U.S. Marshal, a FL state representative, and a captain with the Tampa Police Dept.

84. The day before this incident, February 28, 2001, four students were observed going door-to-door in a Tampa neighborhood. They knocked on the door of a U.S. Marshal. The U.S. Marshal stated that the students were selling and promoting artwork for the Jerusalem Art Academy. The students claimed they came to the U.S. on February 21, 2001 from Israel, through New York, and then to visit friends in Miami. None of the students could provide the names of their friends. The students indicated that they had just recently traveled to Thailand and Taiwan. The students indicated that they had served in the Israeli military (which is required). One male stated he was a police officer in the military and one female stated she was trained as a bomb technician.

85. On March 6, 2001, two males and one female student attempted to sell artwork at the IRS office in Maitland, Florida. The students appeared to be from the Middle East and possibly Israeli, according to the IRS agent. Two agents encountered the students and they were asked to wait while a supervisor was contacted. The students left and were followed to the parking lot. The students were seen getting into a vehicle bearing Florida license plate number D36-TTQ. The registration belongs to Seth Thomas BURKHOLDER of 3329 Bartlett Blvd., Orlando, Florida. The vehicle is a white 1995 Nissan pickup.

86. The U.S. Marshals Service also provided information regarding similar incidents at the Federal Courthouse and Federal Building in downtown Tampa. On February 7, 2001, a female carrying a large flat package was stopped on the 17th floor of the courthouse. The female stated that she was an Israeli art student that had some photos and paintings to sell. The subject was instructed to check with the first floor Security Post to get permission. The subject then departed to the elevators. It was noted that the female had a thick accent possibly middle-eastern.

87. An inquiry at the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) in Tampa by the Marshals Service revealed that a female had visited the USAO floor of a commercial bank building where they lease space. She claimed to have pictures to see, and may also have claimed to be an Israeli art student.

88. On February 27, 2001, Deputy U.S. Marshal (DUSM)Scott Ley observed two females fitting the profile of the Israeli art student seen at the Tampa Federal courthouse, standing on a street corner in downtown Tampa. They were carrying hand-made portfolios, approximately 4-ft. by 3-ft, made up of white foam core sides with heavily taped carrying handles. One of the females was followed into a commercial bank building where she proceeded to sell her paintings. She proceeded to other buildings in the area for


the next hour, before joining a third female in the lobby of another bank building. The third female had set up her artwork in the lobby. Information obtained from the building management revealed a Florida ID card in the name of Keren KUZNITZ, and a telephone number for her “boss.” The number, (954) 478-0961 is a Voice Stream Wireless cellular phone out of Fort Lauderdale, FL. 12. DUSM Ley approached this female and inquired about the paintings. She immediately identified herself as an Israeli art student named Keren. She stated that she was one of the ten students from a class of forty that traveled to the U.S. for one month selling their own artwork as a fundraiser. DUSM Ley purchased a painting for $150.00, and obtained additional information from KUZNITZ. The name of her “Team Leader” and/or “Boss” is Hanane SARFATI, and the name of the art school is BEZALEL. The “boss” was to pick the art students up in downtown Tampa at approximately 5:00 p.m. Additional surveillance revealed a dark-colored mini van, driven by a white male with dark hair, picking up approximately six females, all carrying similar “portfolios,” in a crowded area during downtown Tampa rush hour. The Florida license plate on the van was U71 DLD, a 1991 red Dodge mini-van, registered to Hanane SARFATI, W/M, DOB 06/03/1977, 4220 Sheridan St. #303, Hollywood, FL, and 701 S. 21st Ave., Hollywood, FL. A Florida Driver’s License check revealed S613-320-77-203-0 to belong to Hinane SARFATI, 4220 Sheridan St., #303, Hollywood, FL. This license has been suspended and is not currently valid.

89. The U.S. Marshals Service subsequently found the BEZALEL ACADEMY OF ARTS AND DESIGN in Jerusalem via the Internet. The telephone number is 011-972-2589-3333; website The Tampa DO has copies of all of the above reports, photographs, and identification. For further information, please contact GS Jane Feeney or IRS Bonnie Godshall.

90. The following was received by the RAC of the Ft. Meyers resident Office:
Commonwealth Financial Center (CFC) (the DEA FTMRO is a tenant of this building) and approached several people attempting to sell artwork. The females were asked to leave by tenants on the fourth floor that then notified the FTMRO. [Note: a MFD on 15 March 2001, sometime after noontime, two white females entered the Security Alert on these Israeli art students was previously given to the non-DEA tenants of the Commonwealth Financial Center. Also, other tenants of the building reported seeing this group on a previous occasion.] SA’s Paul Mangone and Mark Strang approached the females and asked them what their business was in the building. The two females, subsequently identified as Zwaig MEIRAV and Hilda MACHBUBI, told the agents that they arrived that same day from Fort Lauderdale “by bus” and planned on returning the same day. They said they had “walked” from the bus station in downtown Fort Myers to the CFC. They said they had no identification on them. As they left the CFC, SA’s Mangone and Strang followed the two females as they walked around the neighborhood returning to the corner of New Brittany Blvd. and College Parkway after, apparently, placing a telephone call to associates.

91. A short time later, SA Mangone saw a bronze/tan Ford Aerostar XLT, bearing Florida license number T37-VTH, arrive at the northeast comer of New Brittany Blvd. and College Parkway. Two other persons occupied this vehicle. These persons were


subsequently identified as Nimrod SIMKIN and Inbal KEREN. MEIRAV and MACHBUBI then entered the vehicle. SAs Mangone and Strang followed the vehicle as it headed west on College Parkway toward the city of Cape Coral. The vehicle entered Cape Coral on Cape Coral Parkway then turned north on Del Prado Blvd. It turned into a small business center on the East Side of Del Prado Blvd and parked in the parking lot of the business.

92. SA’s Mangone and Strang then approached the vehicle and the driver, SIMKIN, who was already out of the vehicle. SA Mangone then asked the other three occupants to exit the vehicle. SA Mangone asked each to provide ID, which they did. SA Mangone asked MEIRAV why she lied to him at the CFC. She said she was afraid. SA Mangone asked SIMKIN, the vehicle driver, for permission to search the vehicle. SA Mangone saw a small Panasonic digital recorder and photographic equipment in the vehicle.

93. The following personal information was obtained from the four individuals:

Zwaig MEIRAV, w/f, thin build, short long dark hair, DOB: 2/9/76, US VISA control #20003205620012, Israeli passport #7831088

Hilda MACHBUBI, w/f, DOB: 5/4/79, US VISA control #20000397210011, Israeli passport # 6530284, FL ID # M211-320-79-664-0

Nimrod SIMKIN, w/m, over 6' tall, curly hair, DOB: 9/2/77, FL DL# S525-620-77-3220

Inbal KEREN, w/f, DOB: 7/17/79, US VISA control #20001710300009, Israeli passport #6082073

94. SIMKIN explained that they are part of a group of Israeli students who are working to earn money so that they may continue their education in Israel. All of the students travel to the United States on tourist visas and pay for their own airfare and living expenses. They remain in the U.S. for a period of four months then return to Israel. SIMKIN did not know how many students participate in this program but stated that in addition to himself and the three females currently with him there are three other students residing in Ft. Lauderdale. These students learn of this opportunity in Israel and they are put in touch with several outlets where they purchase paintings out of pocket. The students then sell the paintings and they retain any profit for themselves. SIMKIN was unable to provide names of the persons/businesses from which they purchase the paintings nor was he able to provide the name of the organization that sponsors this employment.

The following was received from the Orlando District Office:

95. On May 2, 2001 in response to that Interoffice memorandum, SA Lee Madeam noted a suspicious vehicle outside of the Orlando District Office parked in the travel lanes taking photographs of the office building and parking lots. SA Madeam attempted to get a closer look at this vehicle and possibly a license plate number, however, this vehicle


sped away before he could reach it. SA Madeam described this vehicle as a late model Mitsubishi Diamante, maroon in color. SA Madeam described the driver of this vehicle as a white male.

96. On May 3, 2001, the DEA Orlando District Office was visited by an Israeli art student at approximately 1:00 p.m. This subject was detained and identified as Peer SEGALOVITZ (DOB: 03-16-1974). SEGALOVITZ is a 27 year old male that has been in the United States since January 17, 2001. SEGALOVITZ is in the United States on a B-2 (visitation) visa which expires July 17, 2001. INS was contacted and INS requested that DEA detain SEGALOVITZ until they could arrive to take him into custody. FBI SA John Weyrauch also responded to assist with the interrogation. SEGALOVITZ was interrogated for approximately 4 hours while waiting for INS to respond. SEGALOVITZ was untruthful about his reasoning {sic} to be in the United States for approximately the first 3 hours. SEGALOVITZ finally admitted that he was one of approximately 30 Israeli art students who are currently in Florida. SEGALOVITZ would not admit what their purpose was in Florida, but did state that they were not here for legitimate means.

97. SEGALOVITZ reluctantly stated that he was an officer of the Israeli military special forces 605 battalion in Golan Heights. SEGALOVITZ has the rank of Leiutenent and his military ID number is 5087989. SEGALOVITZ stated that he commanded approximately 80 men. SEGALOVITZ stated that he had been in infantry, but as a platoon leader he and his men specialized in demolition. SEGALOVITZ then began to explain the various types of explosives that he was familiar with and stated that his main purpose was to clear mine fields for Israeli tanks and soldiers. SEGALOVITZ acknowledged he could blow up buildings, bridges, cars and anything else that he needed to. SEGALOVITZ further stated that he was very familiar with small arms and had operational knowledge of tanks and other large military machinery. SEGALOVITZ stated that the only thing he was not trained to operate was military aircraft. SEGALOVITZ admitted that he had been in two (2) military actions in Lebanon involving explosives, these missions were to eradicate members of the Hezbolah. SEGALOVITZ asked agents not to divulge this information to Israel because it would lead to his immediate arrest in Israel.

98. SEGALOVITZ stated that he was aware of Israeli Organized Crime, involvement in drug smuggling and weapons smuggling. SEGALOVITZ admitted that he was selling art and working for his brother’s company. SEGALOVITZ identified his brother as Dror SEGALOVITZ with an address of 8187 N. University Drive Apartment 129 in Tamarac, Florida. A search of Peer SEGALOVITZ and his vehicle found numerous deposit slips, paintings, receipts for art sales and art equipment. INS SA’s Nigel Jason and Bill Forester from the Orlando INS Office responded and arrested Peer SEGALOVITZ for violation of his B-2 (visitation) visa by working in the United States.

99. Following the interview of Peer SEGALOVITZ, FBI SA John Weyrauch drove to several area shopping centers looking for SEGALOVITZ’s buddy “Schlomo” as SEGALOVITZ called him. S/A Weyrauch


spotted an odd looking male (long braided pony tail) with art portfolio like SEGALOVITZ’s at a Winn Dixie, just down the street from the Orlando D.O. S/A Weyrauch approached the individual and did an interview. The subject identified himself as follows:
Akyuz Shmuel SAGIV
Israeli Passport # 8710426
DOB: 09-27-1976
POB: Maaloot, Israel
Entered US IN New York
Address unknown
PN 954-712-2126

SAGIV stated he is scheduled to leave the U.S. in May to go back to Israel. SAGIV stated he has a cousin (NFI) in Hollywood, FL, and a cousin (NFI) in Coral Springs, FL. SAGIV stated he was in the Israeli military in 1995-1996, and was the personal bodyguard of the highest ranking General in the Israeli Army. He also stated he was a demolition expert.

SAGIV stated he met Peer SEGALOVITZ one week earlier, in a pub. SAGIV stated SEGALOVITZ asked him to help set-up art in Orlando, FL. SAGIV stated he knew nothing about art, but that they drove to Orlando that day but did not stay overnight. He stated he did not go to Daytona, FL, and did not stay in the Knights Inn. (Receipts found in SEGALOVITZ’s pocket indicated they did.) SAGIV stated he did not know anyone named “AVI” and did not know that Peer SEGALOVITZ had a brother named Dror. S/A Weyrauch stated that SAGIV was evasive with answers, that SAGIV did not speak English well, and S/A Weyrauch had to continually repeat questions. Following the interview, SAGIV was released.

100. On May 3, 2001, at approximately 1:30 pm, while SEGALOVITZ was being interrogated, T/S James Wise spotted a maroon car with a while male sitting inside. This car was parked in the turn lane outside of the DEA (Orlando) office building, T/S Wise was not able to get the license plate number of the vehicle, as the driver sped away as T/S Wise approached it.

New Orleans Division

101. A female identifying herself as an Israeli art student visited the Little Rock, Arkansas Resident Office in mid January 2001. The female student was attempting to sell her artwork. She was allowed into the reception area where she displayed a cassava bag with approximately six to eight pictures to the Receptionist and a National Guard Analyst. Both employees were not interested and the female student left without incident.

102. Also in mid January 2001, a white male, approximately 25 years old, visited the Birmingham, Alabama Resident Office in an attempt to sell some artwork. A Task Force Agent at the front desk informed the unidentified male that he was not interested and the unidentified male left.

103. On March 7, 2001 at approximately 7:15 PM, the wife of the RAC of the Little Rock, Arkansas Resident Office was contacted at her residence by a male and female


attempting to sell paintings. After she turned them away, the wife informed the RAC of the encounter. The RAC exited his residence and observed the male and female knock on the door of his neighbor’s house and, after receiving no reply, walk back to the street. The RAC contacted them at this time. The male verbally identified himself as Danny SILVER. The female attempted to verbally identify herself several times but the RAC was unable to understand her as she had a very heavy accent. Both subjects were in their early twenties and, according to SILVER, were Israeli nationals. The RAC asked to see some form of identification. SILVER said that they had Israeli driver licenses and military cards but he refused to show these items to the RAC. SILVER said that he and the female were part of a group of twenty-five Israeli art students going around the area selling paintings and attempting to generate interest in a planned art gallery in St. Louis, Missouri. SILVER refused to identify the director and the location of the planned gallery. SILVER had in his possession a large case containing five or six paintings. The RAC asked SILVER how they arrived at his neighborhood. He initially said they drove but changed his story after the RAC requested to see his vehicle. SILVER then said that he and the female arrived in a taxi and would leave the same way. The RAC asked SILVER who had sent them to the neighborhood. SILVER said that their supervisor had sent them and that their supervisor makes the decisions as to where the students go to sell their art. SILVER refused to identify the supervisor and refused to provide a telephone number for him. The RAC asked SILVER for the telephone number and address of their current residence. SILVER said they were staying in a local hotel but refused to provide the name of the hotel or the telephone number. SILVER then stated that he did not want to answer any more questions and that he wanted to leave. The RAC returned to his residence and called for a Little Rock Police Department patrol unit to search the area in an attempt to locate SILVER and the female for the purpose of identifying them. The RAC also searched the area. Neither the patrol unit nor the RAC was successful in locating SILVER and the female. In a subsequent discussion with the RAC’s wife, he learned that this past summer she had been visited at their residence by a young female with an unknown accent attempting to sell paintings.

104. The following is information received by the Special Agent in Charge of the New Orleans Division:

During the period of February 16 through February 23, 2001, Group Supervisor (GS) James E. Myles, Jr. and Security Specialist (SS) Allen Davis met with members of the Federal law enforcement community in the metropolitan area of New Orleans, Louisiana to discuss matters regarding the above captioned subject. The following Federal law enforcement agencies reported negative responses: U.S. Customs Service (USCS) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).

105. The following offices reported incidents of Israeli students approaching their employees at their office or residence:

United States Secret Service New Orleans, LA

106. On Friday, February 16, 2001, S/S Allen Davis and GS James E. Myles, Jr. met with


United States Secret Service Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Michael James and Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Kent Tate in New Orleans, Louisiana. SAC stated that in December 2000, around Christmas time, two young Israeli students visited his residence with artwork. SAC James further recounted that approximately two weeks prior to his personal encounter with the Israeli students, two other young Israeli students attempted to sell artwork to his spouse at their residence. Neither SAC James nor his spouse purchased artwork from the students. Finally, SAC James disclosed that his office was in receipt of a Counter terrorism Advisory Report regarding suspicious activities around Federal buildings that related to Israeli students. SAC James provided S/S Davis with a copy of the report.

Federal Bureau of Investigation / New Orleans, LA

107. On Tuesday morning February 20 2001, SS Davis and GS Myles interviewed Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA) Gary McDaniel in his office. SA McDaniel is the designated security officer for the FBI office which is located at 2901 Leon C. Simon Boulevard, New Orleans, Louisiana. SA McDaniel stated that he was unaware of any incidents involving Israeli students. SA McDaniel assured SS Davis that he would canvass his office regarding the Israeli incidents and contact SS Davis if any significant information was discovered. Later the same evening, SA McDaniel reported to SS Davis that no Israeli students had approached FBI employees at the office or their residences. SA McDaniel queried his perimeter security officers to determine if they had been approached by anyone attempting to sell artwork with negative results.

108. On Wednesday, February 21, 2001, SA McDaniel contacted SS Davis and reported that the FBI had information that an Israeli student attempted to sell artwork to U.S. Federal Magistrate Docia Dalby and U.S. District Judge James Brady at their residences in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. SA McDaniel did not know if either Magistrate Dalby or Judge Brady purchased any of the artwork.

US. Marshals Service / New Orleans, LA

109. On Tuesday afternoon, February 20, 2001, GS Myles and SS Davis interviewed U.S. Deputy Marshal Bernie Deschamp at his office in the Hale Boggs Federal Building, 500 Camp Street, New Orleans, Louisiana. Deputy Deschamp reported that he learned about an incident that involved males who identified themselves only as Israeli students while trying to enter the DEA and FBI buildings in Houston, Texas attempting to sell paintings to building occupants. Deputy Deschamp further reported that an alert regarding the Israeli students in Houston, Texas became official when he received a Security Advisory Notice regarding suspicious activities around Federal buildings from Acting U.S. Deputy Director Louie T. McKinney.

110. Deputy Deschamp stated that on February 13, 2001, days after receiving the Security Advisory Notice, he received a telephone call from the United States Coast Guard Office, which is also located in the Hale Boggs Federal Building on the 13th floor, and was advised that an unknown male was in Room 1341 showing artwork to employees, According to Deputy Deschamp the unknown male was identified as David


DROR; White Male; 5'10" tall; 170 pounds; Date of Birth 10/04/76; citizenship: Israeli/Canadian; National Origin: Israeli (Tel Aviv); and U.S. Visa (B-1/B-2) number 7338630. Deputy Deschamp explained that DROR entered the Hale Boggs Federal Building from Magazine Street, got on the elevator and went up to the 13th floor to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. Deputy Deschamp described the item DROR was carrying when he entered the Hale Boggs Federal Building as an oversized black binder with gray duct tape wrapped around the carrying handle. DROR departed U.S. Bankruptcy Court and went to the nearby U.S. Coast Guard Office. Deputy Deschamp stated that pursuant to the telephone call received from the U.S. Coast Guard, DROR was temporarily detained and interviewed by the U.S. Marshals Service. At the same time, a Personal History Data Sheet was also completed for DROR. In addition, Deputy Deschamp stated that he contacted FBI Special Agent Pete Licata in New Orleans, Louisiana before contacting FBI Special Agent who is assigned to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in Houston, Texas. Deputy Deschamp provided SS Davis a copy of the U.S. Marshals’ Security Advisory Notice along with other related documents.

U.S. Federal Protective Service New Orleans, LA

111. On February 20, 2001, SS Davis and GSMyles met with U.S. Federal Protective Service (FPS) Supervisor Lieutenant Herbert Patterson at his office in the aforementioned Hale Boggs Federal Building. Lt. Patterson stated that his office did receive a general alert notice from the FPS’s Headquarters’ Office in Ft. Worth., Texas regarding suspicious activities around Federal buildings. No specific details regarding Israeli students were mentioned in the advisory. Lt. Patterson canvassed his office regarding suspicious activities around the Hale Boggs Federal Building and received negative responses. Lt. Patterson assured SS Davis and GS Myles that he would contact them at the DEA New Orleans Divisional Office if any information was obtained regarding the Israeli students.

112. On March 21, 2001, the DEA Little Rock, Arkansas Resident Office reported that an IRS S/A assigned to Little Rock was visited at his home on the night of March 20, 2001. The IRS S/A identified the individual as Idan UNIKOVSKY, a W/M with DOB 7-22-79. Identification was made via an Israeli passport number not obtained. UNIKOVSKY stated he was part of a group of 8 Israeli art students who are attending the University of Jerusalem. They have been in Memphis, TN and Baton Rouge, LA. He identified their “Team Leader” as Sharon RATZADY, (NFI), After the IRS S/A identified himself to UNIKOVSKY as a federal agent, UNIKOVSKY asked if he could take a picture of himself with the Agent, to show his friends that he had met a U.S. federal agent. The IRS agent refused, and sent him on his way.

New York Division

113. On September 24, 1999, a Senior Investigator of Task Force Group T-11 two suspicious Israeli Nationals parked outside the New York Divisional Office in a white Chevrolet van. The two subjects were identified as Yaniv Shem TOV (DOB 06/02/74) and Sahlev DOR (DOB 08/08/77). NADDIS and NCIC checks were negative.


Newark Division

114. No response.

Philadelphia Division

115. There have been no reports of suspicious activities by Israeli art students occurring at DEA facilities or at the residences of any DEA Employee under the Philadelphia Division.

Phoenix Division

116. On February 28, 2001, at approximately 3:15 p.m., a white male identified as Travis Wayne SMITH, (DOB 11/09/74, U.S. Citizen), went to the Asset Forfeiture Unit located on the second floor of the Phoenix Division, to sell framed painting and posters. SMITH stated he had just come from the U.S. Customs office and sold artwork to a gentleman that was re-doing his office. SMITH also stated he had visited other floors and tenants in the building and sold artwork to them. An Investigative Assistant contacted Asset Forfeiture Unit’s Task Force Agents regarding the unauthorized solicitor. The Task Force Agents asked SMITH for identification. SMITH wanted to know why he was being asked for ID and he was told because he was a suspicious person. Phoenix Police Department and Identification Bureau records revealed SMITH had two outstanding misdemeanor traffic warrants for driving on a suspended license. SMITH was booked into the Madison Street Jail. SMITH has FBI No. 530083DB8 (Assault - Domestic Violence). On the same day, the Task Force Agents checked SMITH’s residence, 615 S. Hardy, #210, Tempe, Arizona, and found that he is in fact renting that apartment. A search of SMITH’s vehicle revealed it was rented from Enterprise Rental Car in Albuquerque, New Mexico. SMITH had a Washington State driver’s license, but was born in Utah. On March 1, 2001, the Task Force Agents went to SMITH’s place of employment, Sun City Designs, 7662 Gray Rd., #105, Scottsdale, Arizona, and contacted the branch manager Ramon ESTRADA (H/M, DOB 07/26/63). ESTRADA said he has known SMITH for three years while working for the company. ESTRADA claimed that his business offers incentives for sales people to sell framed artwork to commercial businesses. ESTRADA also claimed that the business provides the artwork to the sales people and takes a percentage of the sales.

117. A NCIC triple “I” check revealed that the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Officearrested Ramon ESTRADA in December 1982 for “processing marijuana for sale”. ESTRADA was arrested in May 1995 for “transport/sell narcotics” by the Los Angeles Police Dept. and again in July 1995 by the Lake Tahoe, CA Police Dept. for “transport/sell narcotics,” and “adult giving minor narcotics.” ESTRADA was arrested in August 1995 by King County, Washington Sheriff s Office for “domestic violence.” ESTRADA’S FBI No. 76435FAO, CASID No. CA07401218 and WASID No. WA17692473.

San Diego Division

118. A number of San Diego Field Division employees, including the Southwest


Laboratory, (for incidents at the Southwest Lab see Laboratories), and the Carlsbad Resident Office, reported attempts to sell artwork by Israeli students. The description of one Israeli female is, early 20’s, 5'7", light complexion, thin build, 110 lbs. Another Israeli female is described as 5'4", dark brown hair, 130 lbs., and both are considered very attractive. There is no description for the Israeli male involved. All of the students claimed they were in the country to open their own art gallery in San Diego. ISP has not received a detailed report of the incidents.

119. The San Diego Division is currently working with the FBI, Department of State, and CIA personnel on advancing this investigation. Five names were retrieved from DEA and FBI sources and ran through INS. There were hits on three Israeli individuals who entered the U.S. on non-immigrant tourist visas. A license plate was also found belonging to a 1997 Chevy van that the students were seen in. The registration belongs to Yaniv Zacoravich GILOR. GILOR has rented hotel rooms and seems to be the leader of the group.

San Francisco Division

120. A young brown haired woman claiming to be from San Francisco College selling artwork contacted the wife of a Special Agent at home in mid January 2001. The young woman was observed contacting two of the Special Agent’s neighbors.

121. Approximately one year ago, a Group Supervisor from the Sacramento, California Resident Office purchased a painting from a female identified as Hagit GROSS (DOB 09/30/78), Israeli passport #5111696.

122. A Special Agent of the Fresno, California Resident Office was approached at his home by a female identifying herself as an Israeli art student selling artwork.

123. On January 4, 2001, two Special Agents were conducting surveillance at a shopping center in East Palo Alto, California. A brown haired female, 18-21 yoa, 5'4", 140 lbs., approached the agents. She was carrying a brown portfolio and identified herself as an Israeli exchange student selling art to earn money. The agents declined and then observed the female approach another individual in the parking lot.

Seattle Division

124. There have been no reports of suspicious activities by Israeli art students occurring at DEA facilities or at the residences of any DEA Employee under the Seattle Division.

125. On December 12, 2000, Shay ASHKENAZI, male, Israeli, DOB: 11-12-74, Israeli Passport number 6847902, arrived at the SEA TAC International Airport via Northwest Airlines flight 33 from Tel Aviv, Israel. He was referred for secondary inspection by the I&NS Inspectors. As reported by I&NS Intelligence officer Omar N. Nuri, ASHKENAZI stated he was a former Israeli intelligence officer, and was now traveling to “enjoy life”. He claimed to have been in the U.S. in April 2000, when he was involved in a car


accident in South Carolina. The purpose of this trip was to finalize the case with his attorney and to receive medical treatment. ASHKEHAZI volunteered information that a fraud scheme involving Israeli nationals was taking place in the U.S. He stated that young male and female Israelis are being recruited in Israel to enter the U.S. with B-1/B-2 tourist visas and be employed as door-to-door salesmen of paintings that are shipped to the U.S. from Israel. He claimed that one of the individuals involved in this is “Mikaeel” (sic) and is present in Texas operating this business. (See above paragraphs regarding Michael CALMANOVIC). He stated the Israelis usually operate in Texas, New York, Atlanta, Georgia, Washington, and possibly other states. ASHKEHAZI stated another person involved in this is “GERUD” (LNU), residing at 27461-150th Avenue SE, Kent, WA 98402 with telephone 253-638-8143. ASHKEHAZI was admitted into the U.S. following the inspection.

St. Louis Division

126. In early February 2001, G/S James Dunne was contacted at his home by a young woman offering to sell original watercolor paintings. The woman was approximately 25 years of age and spoke with a Middle Eastern accent. G/S Dunne informed the woman he was not interested. She left and proceeded to a neighbor’s home. G/S Dunne said this type of incident is uncommon in his neighborhood.

127. On March 1, 2001, one male and one female purporting to be Israeli art students visited the home of a Special Agent from the Kansas City District Office. This Special Agent was TDY in Pittsburgh when this incident occurred. The two subjects made contact with the Special Agent’s wife. The students were described as clean cut, 22 - 23 years of age, with a slight Middle Eastern appearance. They were carrying a large black portfolio and showed the Special Agent’s wife a painting of a church. The Special Agent’s wife told the students she was not interested and the students departed. No vehicle was observed. When the Special Agent returned on March 5, 2001, he canvassed his neighborhood and found that the students had contacted some of his neighbors. One neighbor told the agent that the students claimed they were from the University of Jerusalem. None of the Special Agents neighbors are in the law enforcement field.

128. On Wednesday April 4, 2001, an Israeli male subject entered the public lobby of the building housing the St. Louis Division Office carrying a portfolio of paintings. A DEA employee happened to be passing through the lobby at that time and asked the subject where he was going. The subject was uncertain, and was told to leave the premises. The employee then informed ASAC II of the situation and several Agents were sent to interview the subject.

129. During the interview the subject was identified as Or ALROEI, DOB 8/8/78, Israeli passport # 6679687, Israeli drivers license # 6800268. The Agents also obtained flight information from ALROEI indicating that he flew into St. Louis on 3/28/01 on Lufthansa Airlines flight number LH691. A small piece of paper in ALROEI’s wallet had a handwritten telephone number of 214-882-5196. (Note; this is one of the Nextel telephones obtained by Michael CALMANOVIC, see above.) ALROEI was very nervous


and gave several conflicting statements about showing the artwork but not selling it. ALROEI was advised not to solicit the building, and sent on his way. (See Paragraphs #51 and 52 above.) ALROEI was subsequently arrested by I&NS.

Washington D.C. Division

130. On March 5, 2001, a Richmond area ATF Agent and FBI Agent were solicited at their homes by two females claiming to be Israeli art students.

131. On March 12 2001, a Richmond, Virginia District Office Special Agent observed Bran KEDEM trying to open the north side entrance to the Richmond D.O. The Special Agent inquired as to KEDEM’s business. KEDEM told the Special Agent that he was an Israeli art student who was selling paintings. The Special Agent alerted his Acting Group Supervisor who invited KEDEM into the office where KEDEM was interviewed. KEDEM was interviewed by the S/A and A/GS and later by a Henrico County Business Inspector. KEDEM presented a Florida State driver’s license and an Israeli driver’s license. KEDEM told the agents he did not have a passport with him. KEDEM provided the following information:

132. KEDEM is an Israeli citizen who came to the United States with a group whose intention is to sell artwork. KEDEM arrived in the country during November 2000 in Miami, FL, via Mexico. KEDEM has visited several east coast cities including Miami, FL, Plantation, FL, and Atlanta, GA. KEDEM has been in Richmond, VA for about one week. KEDEM was in the company of five other Israeli nationals in the Richmond area. They are females; Limor PERLAS, Shiri ASE, Orit KEMETCH, and Shmrt MER and a male; Kobi BOUZAGLO. ASE is one of the females who solicited at the home of a local ATF Agent. The group is lodging at the Econo Lodge located at 6523 Midlothian Turnpike, Richmond, VA. KEDEM plans on leaving Richmond on Tuesday 3/13/01, via a flight from Newport News, VA, to Miami, FL. KEDEM will remain in Miami for a few days until returning to Israel via a flight out of New York City. KEDEM said he did not realize that he was soliciting at a U.S. Government office and said that he had no knowledge of the locations of any U.S. Government offices in the area. KEDEM also stated he did not have any knowledge of the addresses of any government employees in the area. KEDEM traveled in a van bearing Florida license plate #M31FHI. KEDEM reported that Kobi BOUZAGLO (his boss) had a cellular phone number of 1-888-321-6213, During the interview, the local ATF, FBI, INS, Henrico County Police Dept., and the Henrico County Business Inspections Dept. were notified. A Henrico County Business Inspections office supervisor responded. The supervisor informed KEDEM that he was in misdemeanor violation of law and that he would have to appear in front of a local magistrate. At the request of the HCBI supervisor, KEDEM was transported to the Henrico County Court where KEDEM was taken before a magistrate. The Richmond D.O. obtained photographs and fingerprints of KEDEM. I&NS verified that KEDEM entered the country as a visitor on 11/25/00 in Miami, Fl, via Mexicana Airlines and that he was allowed to stay until May 24, 2001. However, he had no permission to work or solicit business in. the U.S.


133. The morning of April 10, 2001, at approximately 8:52 a.m. an individual entered Washington, D.C. DEA Field Division building at 801 I Street NW, Washington, DC and inquired as to the agencies and occupants housed in the building. This individual was probing for information. The guard informed the individual that the information was not to be given out. The individual was still insistent about the building occupants, which includes not only DEA, but I&NS and Veteran Affairs. The Justice Protective Guard asked for ID, but the individual refused to show any. He was asked to leave. He appeared ready to write the information in a black portfolio he was carrying. The Federal Protective Service was notified by the guard service at 9:21 a.m. The individual was a white male, approximately 5'4" in height, weighed approximately 185 lbs, had gray hair, with a receding hairline, wearing, a grayish shirt, gray slacks and a black windbreaker.

Special Operations Division

The Office of Investigative Technology has provided the following information:

134. On Monday 3/19/2001 S/A Jeffrey Behrmann’s wife notified ST Unit Chief Louis Palombella of an incident, which occurred at the Behrmann home the previous evening. S/A Palombella and S/A Howard Oberst interviewed Mrs. Behrmann at her home on Monday afternoon regarding the incident. Mrs. Behrmann related the following information to the Agents.

135. On Sunday evening March 18, 2001, about 8:00 PM an individual she described as a White male, 5'6" to 5'7" with medium dark complexion, dark curly hair, dark eyes, and a prominent nose came to her front door. The individual was wearing dark clothing and spoke with an accent, which she believed to be of Middle Eastern origin. The individual purported himself to be an Israeli Art Student, and attempted to sell Mrs. Behrmann pictures or paintings. Mrs. Behrmann noted that he had what appeared to be a small table or object leaning against his side. Mrs. Behrmann had virtually no dialog with the individual except to tell him she was not interested and immediately closed the door. Mrs. Behrmann did not see what if any vehicle the individual was driving, but did see a white van drive by her house, and make a “U’ turn down the street a short time later. Mrs. Behrmann called the Spotsylvania County Sheriff’s office to report the incident on a non-emergency line, and noted that a marked police car made a tour of the neighborhood about 20 minutes after the incident occurred.

136. During the interview the agents showed Mrs. Behrmann the photographs of the individuals who have been included in the Security Alert bulletin. Mrs. Behrmann picked out the picture of Ohad AHARON as possibly being the same person who had come to her front door.

137. Following the interview with Mrs. Behrmann, the agents met with Lt. E. K. Lunsford of the Spotsylvania County Sheriff’s Department. During the meeting the agents informed the Lieutenant of the incident at the residence, and of the DEA security alert issued by the Miami Field Division. The agents requested that the Lieutenant brief the officers assigned to the area where the home was located and to provide extra patrol in that area at least until S/A Behrmann returned home from assignment.


138. On April 11, 2001 at approximately 5:00pm, Senior Inspector Larry Loveless was notified by Deputy Assistant Administrator John Sheridan, ST, that two Israeli art students were at a shopping center in Fredericksburg, Va. The two had visited the store owned by an employee at ST. S/I Loveless contacted Virginia ABC Special Agent Carter Wells who contacted the Fredericksburg Police Department for assistance. S/A Wells and Officer Ed Medina, FPD, responded to the Gateway Village Shopping center, located on Plank Road (Route 3), Fredericksburg, VA. They approached two females who were inside a coffee shop in the shopping center. The females were identified as Yael GAVISH and Meirav BALHAMS. They were carrying a homemade portfolio, with several paintings.

139. GAVISH presented Israeli passport number 5013766, issued 12/03/92. The passport had been renewed twice, with the current expiration shown as March 12, 2002. S/A Wells obtained color photocopies of pertinent pages of her passport, which were provided to S/I Loveless. She was described as a W/F, DOB: October 03, 1978, long dark brown hair. GAVISH spoke very little English. GAVISH was issued a U.S. class B1/B-2 visa at Tel Aviv on July 04, 2000. Visa Control Number 20001818940002, foil number 35995526. The visa page contains two (2) US I&NS entry stamps; one dated Sep. 15, 2000 New York, and the other dated Mar 09, 2001, New York. Other entries reflected in the passport are as follows:

4-12-92 Kenya Immigration (entry) stamp and visa
4-28-92 Kenya Exit Stamp
4-28-92 Israel Entry Stamp
4-31-92 Israel Exit Stamp
8-13-95 Israel Entry Stamp
8-17-95 Taba Border Control entry (Israel)
07-25-96 Haifa Border Control exit (Israel)
07-27-96 ? pireas
08-07-96 ? same as above athina
07-07-97 Cyprus entry as visitor, max stay until 7-21-97
7-12-97 Cyprus exit
7-13-97 Israel entry
7-08-98 Israel Entry Stamp MA
8-28-99 Israel exit
8-28-99 Amsterdam
09-01-99 Amsterdam (?)
09-01-99 Israel entry
199? Arabic ? unknown (2 stamps entry and exit?)
Undated Brazil
03-03-2000 Israel exit
03-10-2000 Amsterdam unknown
03-10-2000 Israel entry
09-15-2000 Israel exit
09-15-2000 U.S. (New York) entry B-1/B-2 Visa issued 7-5-2000
09-20-2000 Mexico entry


10-13-2000 Mexico exit
10-13-2000 Guatemala entry
11-18-2000 Aeropuerto Juan Santamaria Entry Stamp
12-08-2000 Panama entry
12-08-2000 Cosa Rica exit with postage type stamp
12-11-2000 ? Spanish language entry
12-11-2000 Panama exit
12-13-2000 Bogotá, Colombia entry
02-05-2001 Bogotá, Colombia exit
02-05-2001 ? Spanish language visa or immigration stamp
03-09-2001 U.S. (New York) entry

140. BALHAMS presented a New York State identification card, number 140-614-039, issued March 02, 2000. The card lists her DOB as October 31, 1978, with an address of 354 PTERSN PLNK RD I (Paterson Plank Road) Jersey City, NJ 07650. She is described as a W/F 5'03" brown eyes and brown hair. BALHAMS spoke very good English, and was the leader of these two individuals.

141. The girls approached a shopkeeper in the shopping center and stated they were art students from a school in New York, and were traveling across the country selling their artworks. They had several unframed oil paintings, which they were selling for $130 each. The shopkeeper asked if he could contact them later to purchase paintings, and they replied no, and could not provide a telephone number for him to call. They left the shop, and were seen going to other shops in the area.

142. When interviewed by the FPD, the girls stated they had been dropped off at the shopping center, and would be picked up later. FPD obtained Polaroid photos of the two girls. They were then observed going to a local restaurant, where they sat and waited. At approximately 6:30 pm, a W/M, late 20’s, dark hair, wearing bright orange pants met with the girls inside the restaurant. The W/M then left on foot, and was followed several blocks until he entered a maroon colored Ford Van. The shop owner advised that the van circled the shopping center lot for 15 to 20 minutes. The shop owner stated the van had NY tags.

Office of Training

143. There have been no reports of suspicious activities by Israeli art students occurring at DEA facilities or at the residences of any DEA Employee at the Office of Training.

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)

144. There have been no reports of suspicious activities by Israeli art students occurring at DEA facilities or at the residences of any DEA Employee at the El Paso Intelligence Center.


Office of Aviation Operations

145. In September 2000, two males who attempted to sell him artwork approached a Supervisory Special Agent/Pilot at his residence. Approximately two weeks ago, the SSA/P noticed two males selling artwork in his neighborhood. The Special Agent’s residence is located in Plantation, Florida.

146. On February 1, 2001, one male, approximately 21 yoa, sold some artwork to a Special Agent/Pilot at his residence located in San Francisco, California. The SA/P wrote a check to Rony SHLOMO in the amount of $125.00.

147. On February 8, 2001, a male, approximately 25 yoa, attempted to sell a Special Agent some artwork at her residence in Northeast Albuquerque, New Mexico.

148. On February 12, 2001, a Special Agent was approached at his residence by a male, 19-21 yoa that attempted to sell her artwork. The Special Agent’s residence is located in Miami, Florida.

149. In late January or early February 2001, two people attempted to sell some artwork to a Raytheon Aerospace Support Services Contract Employee at his residence. The employee’s residence is located in Arlington, Texas.


North Central Lab - Chicago, Illinois

150. There have been no reports of suspicious activities by Israeli art students occurring at DEA facilities or at the residences of any DEA Employee at the North Central Laboratory.

Mid Atlantic Lab - Washington, D.C.

151. There have been no reports of suspicious activities by Israeli art students occurring at DEA facilities or at the residences of any DEA Employee at the Mid Atlantic Laboratory.

Western Lab - San Francisco, California

152. There have been no reports of suspicious activities by Israeli art students occurring at DEA facilities or at the residences of any DEA Employee at the Western Laboratory.

Southwest Lab - National City, California

153. On September 18, 2000, a female Israeli art student approached a Security Guard. At the same time, the Southwest Laboratory Director was in the lobby speaking with a contractor. The female approached the Lab Director and asked him to look at some


paintings. The Lab Director declined and she proceeded to ask him his opinion of the paintings. The female stated that she is a student and works at a studio in La Jolla, California. A few weeks later a male of Middle Eastern descent visited the Southwest Lab selling artwork and spoke to the same Security Guard. The Security Guard noted that the male spoke with the same accent as the female who had visited the lab previously. The male left the building without speaking to anyone else.

154. The Lab Director also had an encounter at his residence, date unknown. One male and one female with oil paintings visited the Lab Director’s home and wanted to show some paintings. The Lab Director informed the male and female that he was not interested and they left.

155. At approximately 7:40 PM on Thursday, May 31, 2001, an Israeli Art Student came to the residence of Forensic Chemist William R. Dietz. He had a large black portfolio containing artistic pictures. He stated he was from Israel and wanted to know if Dietz would be interested in purchasing some paintings. Dietz asked him to repeat where he was from and he said Israel. When Dietz asked where he went to school, he said it was a school in Israel. When Dietz asked for the name of the school he avoided answering the question by saying he (Dietz) wouldn’t know it.

156. Dietz told him that he didn’t have time to speak with him further because he was busy, but asked him if he could provide a business card. He said he did not have one. It also appeared that he did not possess any other form of identification or permit to sell items door-to-door. Dietz was able to ask the Israeli his name. He stated it was Gar, or something close to that. The man was approximately 5'8"-5'10" tall; short curly brown hair; tan complexion; and wore an orange T-shirt containing some sort of design and/or words.

157. Dietz’s wife stated that she had seen the man coming from the house next door, but the timing of his departure from that house was so quick that there was either no response or he did not even follow through with his visit. Then walked to the other side of the street and away from the house down the street that was perpendicular to the Dietz’s house. This street has many cul-de-sacs off of it, but the man never walked down any of them. He merely walked to the end of the street and turned the corner. He was not seen at that time getting into a car.

158. At approximately 8:15 PM that same evening, Dietz had to drive to the store. As Dietz drove down his street, a small blue car (license plate no. 3WAE681) pulled in front and was being driven by a male that appeared to be similar to the man. The car made several turns within the neighborhood, and eventually picked up a female. The blue car’s sporadic driving lead to believe that the driver did not have a clear understanding of where it was to pick up the female passenger and may have even been searching for her.


Northeast Lab - New York, New York

159. There have been no reports of suspicious activities by Israeli art students occurring at DEA facilities or at the residences of any DEA Employee at the Northeast Laboratory.

Southeast Lab - Miami, Florida

160. Sometime between August and October 2000, a male described as 5'8", black hair, tan complexion, possibly Middle Eastern descent, visited the home of a Forensic Chemist. The male claimed he was an Israeli art student selling art work. The Chemist declined to purchase any of the artwork and the student went on his way.

161. Sometime between August and October 2000, a male described as 5'8", dark complexion, possibly of Middle Eastern descent visited the home of another Forensic Chemist. The young man asked the Chemist if he had ever heard of his art school in Israel (name unknown). The Chemist responded negatively and the student began to show the Chemist some paintings. The student entered the home, used the restroom, and proceeded to discuss the sale of the paintings. The student advised that the paintings were not for sale, but used to generate interest and support for his school. The Chemist asked if there was a show or display somewhere that he could go to look at these paintings. The student said no and then agreed to sell the Chemist the painting he wanted. The student offered a discount price if the Chemist purchased more than one. The Chemist purchased one painting and then showed the student out.

162. On January 21, 2001, a young man carrying a portfolio of paintings visited the home of a Security Specialist. The young man introduced himself as an Israeli art student selling artwork from his school in Israel. The Security Specialist advised the student that he was not interested and the student left.

163. On February 7, 2001, Inbar KOCHAVI, an Israeli National attempted solicitation at the Southeast Laboratory. KOCHAVI was escorted out of the building. KOCHAVI was later located in an adjacent federal occupied building. A Special Agent, Federal Protective Service Officers and the Southeast Lab Security Specialist identified KOCHAVI as an Israeli art student visiting the U.S. for the first time. Apparently, she is staying with her friend Rani DRORE. KOCHAVI also stated DRORE is a 27-year-old male living in the Kendall, Florida area. KOCHAVI initially stated she was selling the artwork and utilizing the monies for scholarships. Later, she revealed that she wasn’t selling the paintings, but presenting them to people and businesses in the U.S. for the purpose of promoting the art students in Israel. KOCHAVI could not spell the name of the school, but wrote out “Bezalel,” located in Jerusalem. KOCHAVI also revealed that she served time in the Israeli military as a secretary (A FPS Officer explained that all Israeli adults serve two years in the military upon reaching the age of 18). She claimed she is currently employed as a waitress at a restaurant called “Yotveta” in the city of “Hertzlia.” KOCHAVI stated that she arrived in Miami, Florida either Friday, February 2, 2001, or Saturday, February 3, 2001. She stated she flew from Ben Gurion Airport in Israel to New York, and then to Miami. KOCHAVI’s passport has a U.S. Immigration


stamp that indicates she landed in New York on December 31, 2000. KOCHAVI was asked about her transportation to and from the area and she stated her friend DRORE was dropping her off and picking her up. DRORE was expected to pick KOCHAVI up in a white van. KOCHAVI was asked about the names of others of fellow students that might be involved in the artwork promotion. She claimed there might be students like herself in the U.S., but she was not aware of this activity in other foreign nations. KOCHAVI provided Israeli passport #7674731. KOCHAVI was released and observed entering a blue van with Florida license plate #IA336J. The registration revealed the van to be owned by Legum YOCHAI of 13753 SW 90th Ave., Miami, Florida 33176.

164. On the evening of February 18, 2001, two subjects visited the residence of a Forensic Chemist. The two subjects were identified as one male, 21-25 yoa, 6'0", 185 lbs., dark hair, close cut, neat appearance, and one female, 21-25 yoa, 5'6", 140 lbs brown hair just past the shoulders with a slight perm, neat appearance. The two subjects politely identified themselves as Israeli art students selling artwork. The Chemist informed the students he was not interested. He did ask them for a business card, but they could not provide one. Upon their departure, the Chemist observed the two subjects visit the other units in his building. The Chemist believes one resident purchased a painting.

South Central Laboratory - Dallas, Texas

165. In December of 2000, an Israeli art student by the name of Cohen MEYTAL was observed by a DEA employee sitting on the western street curb of the Dallas Divisional Office selling artwork. The student claimed that a group of Israeli art students (about 20) would paint works of art and sell them at local places of business. The employee purchased a painting and was offered to have it framed by an acquaintance of the Israeli group. The check was made out to Cohen MEYTAL and mailed to the following address:

Cohen Meytal
c/o Calmanovic
3575 N. Beltline Road
P.O. Box 316
Irving, Texas 75062

166. Another DEA employee purchased a painting from the same Israel art student for $135.00. The employee paid by check and the student informed the employee that a framer would be in touch with him. On December 15, 2000, a man named Rosie SISSO framed the picture from the back of a panel van in a parking lot next to DEA’s property. There were two men in the van; however, the employee only dealt with one. The framer wanted to visit the employee’s home to match the frame to his furnishing, but the employee declined. Later in January, a Forensic Chemist informed the employee that an artist associated with the first incident wanted to talk with him in the DEA from parking lot. The artist wanted to sell more paintings and the employee told him he would canvas the building and let him know around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. At 5:00 p.m., the employee told the artist no one was interested and the artist left.


167. In January 2001, another employee was approached at his home by two Israeli art students, one male and one female. The students stated they were selling their artwork for profit. The employee explained that he was not interested. The employee canvassed his neighbors and found that one of his neighbors purchased a painting from the students. The Lab Security Officer advised the employee to try and obtain a copy of the cancelled check from his neighbor. A copy of the check has not been obtained yet.

168. Sometime in the first part of January, an employee was jogging and noticed two guys selling artwork door to door. The employee approached the two men and asked where they were from. The two men stated they were from Israel. The employee did not make a purchase. The employee observed the two men visit another home.

169. On March 4, 2001, a DEA Chemist was approached at his home by an Israeli art student selling her paintings. The Chemist gave her his phone number and asked her to contact the Security Officer at his office on Monday, March 5, 2001. On March 5,2001, at approximately 3:00 p.m., the same student contacted the Security Officer, via telephone. The student said her name was Elsa, but refused to relinquish her last name. Elsa claimed she is with a group of twenty art students from Israel traveling and promoting their artwork. Elsa produced a tourist visa. The Security Officer asked Elsa for a call back number. Elsa said she was staying with friends and then abruptly hung up the phone.

Tegucigalpa Country Office

170. On February 28, 2001, a couple attempted to sell at the residence of the Tegucigalpa Country Attaché. His neighbors advised the Country Attaché that a man and a woman in a red car were trying to open the CA’s gate. The neighbors asked the couple what they wanted and advised them that no one was home. The couple left the area. No identification information was revealed.

United States Environmental Protection Agency Incident

171. On March 1, 2001, a female went to the residence of an EPA Special Agent. She stated she was showing art painted by international students, which will be for sale soon at an art gallery opening soon, late March or April 2001, at a Cherry Creek location in Denver, CO. The EPA Agent told the female he was not interested in purchasing any artwork and she responded she was not selling the paintings, but trying to generate interest so people would visit the art gallery when it opened. She stood at the agent’s doorway and showed the agent, his wife and daughter approximately ten paintings. The agent asked the female if the gallery would be opening at the Cherry Creek Mall. The female stated she did not think so, but that it would be at a location near the mall. The female was described as 5'4", black hair, dark eyes, wore glasses and a long black wool coat. She appeared to be in her mid 20’s, spoke excellent English with a slight foreign accent. On March 16, 2001, the EPA Agent was informed by EPA-OIG that a security alert where “Israeli” art students are purportedly going to the residences of Federal Law


Enforcement Agents around the country under the ruse of selling art. On the same date, the EPA Agent contacted art galleries, the Cherry Creek Chamber of Commerce, and Cherry Creek North, Inc., to determine if a new art gallery was going to open in the Cherry Creek area. All responded negatively, and said they never heard of a group of international students trying to open a gallery.

172. On March 16, 17, and 18, 2001, the EPA Agent spoke with several of his neighbors and determined the following information: The female described in the above incident and a male, dark skin, mid 20’s contacted neighbor’s houses within two blocks around the agent’s residence. Both of them identified themselves as Israeli art students. No other houses in the neighborhood, or in neighborhoods next to the agent’s were contacted. On March 17, 2001, the EPA Agent spoke with his uncle who was at the agent’s residence in the afternoon on March 1, 2001. The agent’s uncle stated that he was talking to a construction worker next door to the agent’s residence when a female with long black hair and olive colored skin, mid 20’s, drove up to the agent’s residence and took pictures of his house. The female only took photos of the agent’s residence and then left the area in a late model sedan, silver in color. She left quickly and no license plate information was obtained.

173. A neighbor of the EPA Agent was visited by the male and female and bought paintings. The check to the male was made out to Odfd WEISFELNER. The check to the female was made out to Guy KEDEM. The female left a business card stating EAG-Guy Kedem, European Art Group, Oil Paintings; Phone number (720) 581-7076; Fax number (303) 336-7006. On March 19, 2001, the EPA Agent contacted Quest Security to obtain information on these numbers. The (720) number is unlisted and the (303) number is a fax number for Heritage Creek Apartments, 650 South Dahlia Circle, Denver, Colorado.

FPS Incident

174. Santa Ana FPS reported to {sic} that while at the Starbucks drinking coffee after business hours last week, one of them overheard 2 Middle Easterners sitting outside talking in Arabic, making reference to our building and apparently making diagrams of our building and discussing explosives. Local police were notified.

Tinker Air Force Base

175. On April 30,2001, an Air Force alert was issued from Tinker Air Force (TAFB), in Oklahoma City concerning a “possible intelligence collection effort being conducted by Israeli Art Students”. On May 16, 2001, U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), TAFB, and the Midwest City Police Department (MCPD), requested assistance from I&NS Oklahoma City to a location in Midwest City, OK. It was indicated that four (4) individuals from Israel had been encountered by the MCPD attempting to sell art in the Midwest City area.

176. On May 17th, four (4) Israeli art students were reported in the Midwest City, OK area. They stated they were there “to present and promote” Israeli art. MCPD located and detained the 4 individuals, all {of} whom were in violation of their visas. Their vehicle was


obtained also. The four were identified as:
Name          DOB       POB            Israeli Passport #  US Visa #
Yaron OHANA   02-04-78  Haifa, Israel  8421721             42252049
Ronen KALFON  04-13-76  Haifa, Israel  8168262             35966019
Zeev COHEN    03-26-78  Haifa, Israel  5524033             33331965
Naor TOPAZ    06-08-77  Haifa, Israel  8081705             33306515

All 4 were charged with violating the status of their visas -- to wit selling art, and were booked into the Oklahoma City jail by I&NS. All 4 requested voluntary departure. Bond was initially set at $25,000 for each. All 4 had in their possession, pre-purchased return airfare to Bangkok, Thailand. FBI OKC requested that the “Students” be held for debrief/interview.

177. While booking, a personal check was found secreted between the buttocks of Ronen KALFON. Additionally, in the personal effects of Naor TOPAZ a number of uncashed checks were obtained, several post-dated to future dates.

Volk Field Air National Guard Base, Camp Douglas, Wisconsin

178. On Saturday, May 19, 2001, at approximately 3:10 pm, two Israeli Nationals requested permission to visit a museum located at Volk Field, ANG Base. Approximately ten minutes after being allowed on the base, the two were seen on an active runway, taking photographs. The individuals were identified as Tsvi WATERMANN, white male, DOB: June 7, 1979, Address: Pri Megadim 36 Mevaseret Zion, Israel, Israeli Passport 5728101 expiration date July 20, 2002, U.S. visa class B1/B2 expiration date March 20, 2011, and Gal KANTOR, white, male, DOB: Sep 08, 1975, Address: Kibbuts Ellon MP Western Galilee, Israel 22845, Israeli Passport 9 8261507 expiration date of Oct 20, 2004, U.S. B1/B2 visa, control number 19993358160012, expiration date of Nov 30, 2009. WATERMANN was also in possession of an Israeli Ministry of Transport driver’s license, number 7046942, which reflects his first name spelled as “Zvi”.

179. KANTOR was driving a 2001 green Ford Mustang, bearing Illinois tags SEU-760, which was rented from Hertz Car Rental at O’Hare Airport in Chicago, IL. A search of the car revealed cameras and exposed film. The film was developed, and one picture depicted WATERMANN in the car on the runway. There were no photos of any aircraft.

180. WATERMANN, and KANTOR were released to the Juneau County Sheriff’s Department and charged with misdemeanor trespass. They were subsequently released after fine of $210 each.

181. During interviews, they stated that they were traveling from Chicago, IL to Duluth, MN, stopping enroute to visit a friend in Cold Springs, MN. They stated they stopped at Volk Field only to visit the museum. WATERMANN stated he was recently discharged from the Israel military, and was taking a trip around the world, WATERMANN had in his possession airline tickets with the following itinerary:


April 11, 2001 Tel Aviv - Toronto
April 15, 2001 Toronto - Newark
April 19, 2001 Newark - Chicago
Aug 01, 2001 Chicago - Las Vegas
Aug 04, 2001 Las Vegas - San Francisco
Aug 08, 2001 San Francisco - Los Angeles
Aug 10, 2001 Los Angeles - Honolulu
Aug 13, 2001 Honolulu - Sydney, Australia
Jan 10, 2002 Sydney - Hong Kong
Jan 17, 2002 Hong Kong - Frankfurt - Tel Aviv
The ticket was issued by the Sititara Travel Agency in Jerusalem. The cost of the ticket was $2,634 (U.S.).

182. Both were asked if they were involved in the selling of art while in the U.S. KANTOR became very upset over this, and questioned why they were being asked about that. KANTOR stated he had been involved in that a long time ago, and had sold art recently while in Chicago. He stated he was involved in a program called “Shasheem”, (NFI). Sgt. Kurt Moore of Volk Field stated that when asked about the art sales, that KANTOR’s whole demeanor changed, and he then became uncooperative. Each asked to telephone the Israeli Embassy.


1. BLAIN, Gat NADDIS negative, occupation: Israeli art student, sold painting to DEA employee in Dallas, TX on 01/04/2001 (Identified in paragraph 22)

2. FREIDMAN, Shabar NADDIS - Negative. driver’s license (#6728447), ID(#033056433)

3. AVRAHAM, Gerzon Ofir NADDIS - Negative. DOB (08/12177), Israel passport (#6315574), Israeli Ministries of Transport ID (#034193615)

4. L.N.U., Shahar NADDIS - Negative

5. BARAM, Lior NADDIS - Negative. Florida driver’s license (#B650-520-76-047-0), 10733 Cleary Blvd., #206, Plantation, Florida, 33324-0000, (DOB 02/07/76), 5'9", dark eyes and black hair

6, COHEN, Hammutal NADDIS - Negative. DOB (01/29/62), Israeli passport (#6077838), Immigration departure (#41060016307 02/12/01), 5'8", 145 lbs.

7. RUBINSTEIN, Itay NADDIS - Negative. DOB (01/17/79), US, visa (#39127358), date of entry 12/23/00, Israeli passport (#39127358) [sic, see visa], 6'0", 165 lbs.

8. AHARON, Ohad NADDIS - Negative


9. SEGAL, Yafit NADDIS - Negative

10. TOV, Yaniv Sheni NADDIS - Negative. DOE (06/02/74) NADDIS negative

11. DOR, Sahlev NADDIS - Negative. DOB (08/08/77) NADDIS negative

12. GROSS, Hagit NADDIS - Negative. DOB (09/30/78), Israeli passport (#5111696)

13. SHLOMO, Rony NADDIS - Negative. approximately 21 yoa

14. KOCHAVI, Inbar NADDIS - Negative. Israeli passport (#7674731)

15. DRORE, Rani NADDIS - Negative. approximately 27 yoa

16. YOCHAI, Legurn NADDIS - Negative. 13 753 SO 90th Ave., Mami, Florida 33176

17. MEYTAL, Cohen NADDIS - Negative. Address: c/o Calmanovic, 3575 N. Beltline Rd,, P.0, Box 316, Irving, Texas 75062. Addressed used by Michael Calmanovic, identified below

18. SISSO, Rosie NADDIS - Negative.

19. BURKHOLDER, Seth Thomas NADDIS - Negative. 3329 Bartlett i6d., Orlando, Florida, 1995 white Nissan pickup bearing Florida license plate D36-TTQ.

20. L.N.U., Elsa NADDIS - Negative.

21. SMITH, Travis Wayne NADDIS - Negative. white male, DOB (11/09/74), FBI No. 530083DBS (Assault - Domestic Violence) address: 615 S. Hardy, 4210, Tempe, Arizona

22. ESTRADA, Ramon Hispanic male, NADDIS - Negative. DOB (07/26/63), arrested 12/82 “processing marijuana for sale,” 5/95 “transport/sell narcotics,” 7/95 “transport/sell narcotics, adult giving minor narcotics,” 8/95 “domestic violence.” FBI No. 7643 5FAG, CASID No. CA07401218, WASID No. WA17692473

23. GILOR, Yaniv Zacoravich NADDIS - Negative. registered owner of a 1997 Chevy van in San Diego, CA

24. MENDEL, Leviella NADDIS - Negative. 83 77 Tamar Drive, #37, Columbia, Maryland, DOB 10/29/75, Maryland driver’s license #M-534-514-009-032, 5'7", 150 lbs. Additional inquiries revealed MENDEL has a new residential address, 4733 Haskell Ave., #46, Encino, California.

25. SILVER, Danny NADDIS - Negative. (NFI)


The Tampa, Fforida District Office identified the following individuals(#26-942):

26. BENDALAK, Orit: NADDIS negative, DOB 10-28-78, WF, POB Israel, 5'7", 140 lbs., brown hair, brown eyes.

27. BEZALEL ACADEMY OF ARTS AND DESIGN: NADDIS negative, Jerusalem, 011-972-2-589-3333,

28. COHEN, Eli: NADDIS negative, 701 S. 21 Ave. #207, Hollywood, FL 33020, DOB 11/04/1977, FL DL C500-200-77-404-0, State of Israel Ministry of Transport card number 03379722

29. HARARI, Ilana: NADDIS negative, W/F, DOB 4-29-79, 9-29-79, 2-9-79, 14 Jerico itolon Israel, attends University of Jerusalem, 5'3", 90 lbs., brown hair, blue eyes, tattoo of sun on right foot.

30. KENDEL, Rachel: NADDIS negative, White/Female, State of Israel Ministry of Transport card number 7095201 and 034807727, Israeli passport number 6614254.

3 1, KUZNITZ, Keren: NADDIS - Negative. 1818 E. Oakland Park Blvd. #98, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33306, DOB 02/09/1979, 5'5"; FL driver’s license: K253-500-79-549-0, State of Israel Ministry of Transport card number 7121535 and 035721844.

32. L.N.U, Nadav NADDIS - (NFI)

33. L.N.U., Tom NADDIS - Negative. White, male. Address: Hollywood/Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Reportedly sells artwork to Israeli art students.

34. MARZIANO, Assaf or Asaf NADDIS negative, DOB 2-4-78, state of Israel Ministry of Transport # 034086959, passport #552306S, POB Israel, WM, 5'7", 150 lbs, {sic}

35. MATATIA, Keren: NADDIS negative (NFI)

36. OSHRA, Sussie: NADDIS negative. (NFI)

37. SASSOON, Sarah Minna: NADDIS negative, 2916 Pierce St., 94, Hollywood, FL 33020, DOB 11/8/1978, FL DL# S250-793-79-908-0.

38. SELLA, Livnet: NADDIS necgative, DOB 12/24/1978, State of Israel Ministry of Transport number 7023400 and 036208023, International Student Idenitity card number S972-204-776-601.

39. SERFATY, Hanan, aka Hanane SARFATI: NADDIS negative, 4220 Sheridan St., #303, Hollywood, FL 33.021, and 701 S. 21 Ave., Hollywood, FL, DOB 06/03/1977, 6', FL DL S613-320-77-203-0, registered owner of red mini-van FL tag # U71 DLD, phone number (954) 478-1006, cellular phone number (954) 478-0961.


40, SIMON, Michael: NADDIS negative, w/m, 11-23-78, Aliebenliezel 82, Jerusalem, telephone number 97226768256, Israeli passport no. 8660008, POB Jerusalem, 6'1", 180 lbs., black hair, brown eyes.

41. VAKSHI, Inbal: NADDIS negative. aka Bella POLLCSON, State of Israel Ministry of Transport License number 7098663 and 036444842, International Student Identity Card number S972-204-775-487, DOB 02/03/1979.

42. ZAGURI, Oshirt: NADDIS negative, 701 S. 21 Ave., 4205, Hollywood, FL 33020, DOB 07/11/1977, 5'6", FL DL #Z260-640-77-75 1 -0.

43. WEISFELNER, Odfd NADDIS - Negative. (NFI)

44. KEDEM, Guy. NADDIS -Negative. This female left a business card stating EAG-Guy Kedem, European Art Group, Oil Paintings; phone number (720) 581-7076; Fax number (303) 336-7006. The (720) number is unlisted and the (303) number is a fax number for Heritage Creek Apartments, 650 South Dahlia Circle, Denver, Colorado. (NFI)

The following individuals were identified by the Ft. Meyers, Florida Resident Office (#45-48):

45. MEIRAV, Zwaig, NADDIS - Negative. w/f, thin build, short long dark hair, DOB: 2/9/76, US VISA control # 20003205620012, Israeli passport 97831088

46. MACHBUBI, Hilda, NADDIS - Negative. w/f DOB: 5/4/79, US VISA control # 2000397210011, Israeli passport # 6530284, FL ID #M211-320-79-664-0

47. SIMKIN, Nimrod, NADDIS - Negative. w/m, over 6' tall, curly hair, DOB: 9/2/77, FL DL# S525-620-77-3220

48, KEREN, Inbal, NADDIS - Negative. w/f, DOB: 7/17/79, US VISA control # 20001710300009, Israeli passport # 6082073

The following individuals were identified by the Richmond, Virginia District Office (#49-54):

49. KEDEM, Eran, NADDIS - Negative. w/m, Israel, dob 10/15/75, 5'11", 1601bs., 12990 SW 74th St., Pine Crest, FL, Israeli ID 4031820079, Israeli driver’s license #651007

50. PERLAS, Limor NADDIS - Negative. (NFI)

51. ASE, Shiri NADDIS - Negative. (NFI).


52. KEMETCH, Omit, a.k.a. KIMCHY, Ornit, NADDIS - Negative. w/f, dob 02/04/74, passport 96814521

53. MER, Shmrt NADDIS - Negative. (NFI)

54. BOUZAGLO, Kobi, NADDIS - Negative. cellular telephone 1-888-321-6213 (NFI)

The following individuals were identified by the Montgomery, Alabama District Office:

55. VALANSI, Marcelo, NADDIS - Negative. dob 11/24/77, Argentina passport # 26316660, 901 S.E. 1st Ave., #2, Gainesville, FL., 617 E. University Ave., Gainesville, FL., 1436 Washington Ave., Miami, FL., registered owner of 1984 GMC Custom Van, Florida tag T11YZX., Argentina DNI26316660 card 4190961, speaks English and Spanish, Tel # (352)378-1485 (Identified in Paragraph 6)

56. VALANSI, Roberto, NADDIS - Negative. father of Marcelo VALANSI. Salguero 2468, Apartment 15, Buenos Aires (NFI) (Identified in Paragraph 10)

57. VALANSI, Graziela, NADDIS - Negative. mother of Marcelo VALANSI, Salguero 2468, Apartment 15, Buenos Aires (NFI) (Identified in Paragraph 10)

58. SAGES, Ester, NADDIS - Negative. dob 9/30/77, Israeli passport 96470399, Attornet 161, New York City, NY., Hotel Carlton, New York City, NY (Identified in Paragraph 6)

59. SAGES, Elyahu NADDIS - Negative. (deceased), father of Ester SAGES, (NFI) (Identified in Paragraph 9)

60. SAGES, Marjalit, NADDIS - Negative. Mother of Ester SAGES (NFI) (Identified in Paragraph 8)

61. DARDIC, Vanina Erika, NADDIS - Negative. dob 3/5/78, Argentina passport #10581811, 901 S.E. 1st Ave., Gainesville, FL. Argentina DN126473227 card #J8557, speaks English, Hebrew, and Spanish, girlfriend of VALANSI, citizen of Argentina and Israel (Identified in Paragraph 4)

62. DARDIC, Mario, NADDIS Negative. father of Vanina DARDIC (NFI) (Identified in Paragraph 9)

63. COHEN, Judith (maiden name) NADDIS - Negative. mother of Vanina DARDIC (NFI) (Identified in Paragraph 9)

64. GAVISH, Yael NADDIS - Negative. W/F Brown hair, Brown eyes, DOB: Oct 03, 1978. Citz: Israel Passport Number: 5013766 issued 12-03-92, expires 3-12-2002 US Visa number 20001818940002 Class B-1/B-2 issued July 05, 2000 Expires June 28, 2010.


65. BALHAMS, Meirav NADDIS - Negative. W/F Brown hair, Brown eyes, 5'03" DOB: 10-03-78 Citz: Israel. New York ED Card 4 140-614-039. Address: 354 Paterson Plank Road #1, Jersey City, NJ 07650

The following individuals were identified by the Orlando D.O. on May 3, 2001:

66. SEGALOVITZ, Peer - NADDIS Negative, White, male, Nationality: Israeli, DOB: 03-16-1974, POB Israel, Address: 8187 N. University Drive Apt. 4129, Tamarac, FL, entered the U.S. on B-2 class visa on January 17, 2001. Former officer in Israeli Special Forces 605 Battalion. Israeli Military ED # 5087989. Encountered May 3, 2001 at the Orlando D.O. Occupation: Israeli Art Vendor/Student. (Identified in Paragraph 96)

67. SEGALOVITZ, Dror - NADDIS - Negative. White, Male, Brother of Peer Segalovitz. ADD: Address 8187 N. University Drive, Apt. Nationality: Israel. Identified in Paragraph 98)

68. SABGUNDJIAN, Kathy - NADDIS: Negative. (626) 358-6453 (626) 256-1027

69. SAGIV, Akyuz Shmuel - NADDIS: Negative. White, Male, Israeli Passport # 8710426; DOB: 09-27-1976; POB: Maaloot, Israel; Entered US In New York; PN: 954712-2126. Associate of Peer Segalovitz and Dror Segalovitz. (Identified in paragraph #99).

The following were identified at the Volk Field ANG Base, Camp Douglas,Wisconsin:

70. WATERMANN, Tsvi NADDIS - Negative, AKA: Watermann, Zvi; white, male, DOB: June 7, 1979; Address: Pri Megadim 36 Mevaseret Zion, Isreal; Israeli Passport # 5728101 expiration date July 20, 2002; U.S. visa class B1/B2 expiration date March 20, 2011; Israeli Ministry of Transport driver’s license, number 7046942.

71. KANTOR, Gal Kal NADDIS - Negative. white, male, DOB: Sep 08, 1975, Address: Kibbuts Eilon NO Western Galilee, Israel 22845; Israeli Passport 8261507 expiration date of Oct 20, 2004; U.S. B1/B2 visa, control number 19993358160012, expiration date of Nov 30, 2009.

The following were identifed at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma:

72. OHANA, Yaron NADDIS - Negative. DOB: 02-04-78; POB: Haifa, Israel; Passport Number: 8421721 U.S. Visa Number:42252049.

73. KALFON, Ronen NADDIS - Negative. DOB: 04-13-76; POB: Haifa, Israel Passport Number :8168262; U.S. Visa Number: 3 5966019.

74. COHEN, Zeev NADDIS - Negative. DOB: 03-26-78; POB: Haifa, Israel, Passport Number: 5524033: U.S. Visa Number: 33331965.


75. TOPAZ, Naor NADDIS - Negative. DOB: 06-08-77; POB: Haif, Israel Passport Number: 8081705; U.S. Visa Number: 33306515.

The following were identified by the Euless, TX Police Department on January 2nd, 2001, (refer to page 10):

76. LIFSHITZ, Gilad, NADDIS - Negative. W/M, DOB’09/17/1978

77. YANAY, Betzalel, NADDIS - Negative. W/M, DOB 09/04/1978

78. BITON, MoriN Miryam, NADDIS - Negative. W/F; DOB 07/14/1980

79. SASSON, Dana, NADDIS - Negative. W/F, DOB 08/10/1980

80. TOUYZ, Keren, NADDIS - Negative. W/F, DOB 08/20/1978

81. TZOR, Noam, NADDIS - Negative. previous owner of 1GAHG39K5SF112662, a 1995 Chev/Spt owned by Gilad LIFSHITZ of 7535 N. Beltline Rd, APt 316, Irving, Texas 75062.

82. ROTEM, Sharon, NADDIS - Negative. described as a white male, DOB 03 -12-77, Israeli passport number 7948317, street address: 6023 Moshe Dayan, Holon, Israel.

83. MAIMON, Maya, NADDIS - Negative. Nationality: Israel. Israeli passport number as 5467894, US B1/B2 visa, DOB 26Dec1978, Issue Date: 18Oct2000, Expiration Date: 15Oct2010.

84.BADIHI, Nofar, NADDIS - Negative. Nationality Israel. Israeli passport number 5640993, DOB 21/03/1979 (sic), Place of Birth: Israel, date of issue: 05/12/1993, date of expiry (sic): 04/12/1995; US Visa B I/B2, issue date: 05Jul 1996, Expiry Date: 02JUL2006.

85. MARABOTTO, Marco NADDIS - Negative. Airline tickets were found reflecting the travel of Maya MAIMON and Marco MARABOTTO from DFW airport to Albuquerque, NM via Delta flight 2238 on March 24, 2001. Each ticket also reflected Delta flight 1944 from Las Vegas to DFW on April 1, 2001.

86. FERNANDEZS, Marco, NADDIS - Negative. a.k.a. Marco Antonio FERNANDEZ De Castro Marabotto, DOB 13Apr1977, passport number 99390039611, Issuing State: Mexico; place of birth: Mexico, date of issue: 16Jul1999, expiration date: 16Jul2000.

87. REGEV, Gadi, NADDIS - Negative. described as DOB: 17Dec1975, Nationality: Israel, passport number 5454338, visa type: B1/B2, issuing post: Tel Aviv, issue date: 05Nov1998, expiration date: 04Nov2008


88. ARTZI, Eyal, NADDIS - Negative. Texas DL 19554509, and an expiration date of 06-27-07. address: 10334 Sandra Lynn Dr., Dallas, TX 75228. DOB 05-27-1977, commercial database shows that ARTZI is the owner of a 1993 Plymouth Acclaim, Texas plate: J75FYB, date registered 08/21/2000, expiration date: 07/31/2001

89, SUSI, David, NADDIS Negative. DOB 01/09/1975, boyfriend of Maya MAIMON

The following were idefitified by I&NS - Dallas:

90. ELDAD, Dahan, NADDIS - Negative. W/M Israeli, add: Oak IEH Apts. 1913 Estrada Parkway, #228, Irving, TX. Arrested by I&NS March 26 2001. (Identified in paragraph 39)

91. AFRICANO-Leon, Elsa Beatriz, NADDIS - Negative. W/F Nationality: Colombia Add: Oak Hill Apts. 1913 Estrada Parkway, #228, Irving, TX. Arrested by I&NS March 26, 2001. (Identified in paragraph 39)

92. LIVNI, Eran, NADDIS - Negative. W/M Israeli Add: Oak Hill Apts. 1913 Estrada Parkway, #228, Irving, TX Arrested by I&NS March 26, 2001. (Identified in paragraph 40)

93. OFEK, Aran, NADDIS - Negative. W/M Israeli, ADD: Oak Hill Apts. 1913 Estrada Parkway, #259, Irving, TX., father is 2-star general in Israeli Army. Arrested by I&NS March 26, 200 1. (Identified in paragraph 40)

94, GAL, Michal, NADDIS - Negative. W/F, Israeli, DOB 08/10/1979, POB Afula, Israel, INS A 75-894-941, ADD: Oak Hill Apts. 1913 Estrada Parkway, 4259, Irving, TX, Alt add.: 22 Palisade Terrace, Edgewater, NJ 01020 Tel: (201)224-0797 Arrested by I&NS March 26, 2001. (Identified in paragraph 40)

95. GAVRIEL, Noam, NADDIS - Negative. Nationality: Israel (Identified in paraggraph 40)

96. KRITZMAN, Netta, NADDIS - Negative. Nationality: US Citizen (Identified in paragraph 40)

97. BAER, Ophir, NADDIS - Negative. W/K DOB 11/11/1956, Nationality: Israel, employed by AMDOCS, Ltd., add: 7845 La Cabeza Drive, Dallas, TX 75248, former add: 1125 East Campbell Rd., Richardson, TX, Tel: (972) 392-0473 & (214) 576-5741, SSN: 627-70-0979- (Identified in paragraph 42)

98. AMDOCS, Limited., NADDIS - Negative. add: 1390 Timberlake Manor Parkway, Chesterfield, MO, Tel: (314) 821-3242 (Identified in paragraph 43)

99. DOTAN, Boaz, NADDIS - Negative. 23 Abba Hillel, St. Ranat Gan, Israel, TX president of AMDOCS, Ltd. (Identified in paragraph 43)


100. WHITMAN, Beverly A., NADDIS - Negative. SSN: 400-88-4097, Treasurer of AMDOCS, Ltd. (Identified in paragraph 43)

101. CHRISTOFFEL, Gregory, NADDIS - Negative. SSN: 389-52-850, Secretary of AMDOCS, Ltd. (Identified in paragraph 43)

102. MOSHE, Eran, NADDIS - Negative. Israeli, I&NS A 75-894-459, averted by I&N on 03/26/2001, occup. Israeli art student (Identified in paragrph 44)

103. VAINSHTEIN, Julia, NADDIS - Negative. W/F Israeli, DOB 11/12/1978, POB: Russia, arrived DFW on 03/27/2001, Assoc: Michael CALMANOVIC (Identified in paragraph 46)

104. BORENSTEIN, Dilka, NADDIS - Negative. Israeli, DOB 03/15/1979, POB: Israel, former Israeli Military Intelligence Officer, Assoc: Michael CALMANOVIC (Identified in paragraph 46)

105. NAVAR, Ofir, NADDIS - Negative. Israeli, DOB 09/02/1979, POB: Israel, former Israeli Military Demolition/Explosive ordnance specialist (Identified in paragraph 46)

106. CALMANOVIC, Michael, NADDIS - Negative. W/M, Israeli, DOB 09/06/1-975, POB: Israel, registered owner of TX: L44-CVD, add: 3575 N. Beltline Rd., Apt. 316, Irving, TX., alt. add: 312 Rochelle Rd., Irving, TX, alt. add: 1103 Hidden Ridge #3018, Irving, TX alt. Add: 1913 Estrada Parkway, Irving, TX 75061, alt. add: 11012 Ventura Blvd., Studio City, CA 91604 Tel: (214)882-5196, alt, add: 319 S. 177 Place, 4201, Seattle, WA 98148 Tel: (206) 244-7705, Tel: (214) 882-5196 / (214) 837-3574 / (469)446-1248 (214) 837-5996 (214) 876-1235 (217) 837-2056 former Israeli electronic intercept officer. Arrested by I&NS on April 4th, 2001, Posted $50K bond, (Identified in paragraph 46)

107. SIMON, Itay, NADDIS - Negative. W/M, Israeli, DOB 02/27/1978, POB: Israel, former Israeli military, add: 1103 Hidden Ridge #3018, Irving, TX, alt add: California Associate of Michael Calmanovic. Arrested by I&NS April 4, 2001 for violation of status, posted $50,000 bond. (Identified in paragraph 50)

108. LNU, Gilad, NADDIS - Negative. Tel: (214) 882-5196 (214) 876-1235 (Identified in paragraph 50)

109. LNU, Roy, NADDIS - Negative. Tel: (214) 837-3574 (Identified in paragraph 50)

110. LNU, Mosh, NADDIS - Negative. Tel: (469) 446-1248 (Identified in paragraph 50)

111. LNU, Gil, NADDIS - Negative. Tel: (214) 837-5996 (Identified in paragraph 50)

112. LNU, Gasaf, NADDIS - Negative. Tel: (217) 837-2056 (Identified in paragraph 50)


113. ENGEL, Yoni, NADDIS - Negative. W/K DOB 09/14/1979, POB: Israeli Citzen, Israel, former company commader in Israeli military, arrived DFW on 03/28/2001, arrested by I&NS, St. Louis, MO on April 4th, 2001 (Identified in paragraph 51)

114. DAGAI, Yotam, NADDIS - Negative. DOB 04/06/1978, POB: Israeli Citzen, Israel, arrested by I&NS, St. Louis, MO on April 4th, 2001, arrived DFW on 03/28/2001. (Identified in paragraph 51)

115. ALROEI, Or, W/M DOB 08/08/1978, POB: Israeli Citizen, Israel, visited DEA St. Louis on 04/04/2001, Had Tel: (214) 882-5196 in his possession, Associate of Michael CALMANOVIC & Gil LNU. (Identified in paragraph 51)

116. RABINOVITZ, Eli, NADDIS - Negative. W/M, DOB 03/27/1979, U.S. passport E3701329518, 5'6", 175 lbs., brown hair (Identified in paragraph 51)

17. ADESA Golden Gate, NADDIS - Negative. add: 6700 Stevenson Blvd., Fremont, CA, registered owner of CA: 3LVAO1P (Identified in paragraph 51)

118. SADAN, Ben, NADDIS - Negative, W/M Israeli, approx. 24 yoa, Tel: (214) 562-1110, driver of Israeli art students encountered April 4, 2001 in St. Louis, MO.

119. BEN DOR, Tomer, NADDIS - Negative. W/M Israeli,’DOB 08/24/1975, occup: Computer software engineer, employer: NICE, former Israeli military officer for patriot missile defense (Identified in paragraph 55)

120. GLIKMAN, Marina, NADDIS - Negative. W/F Nationality: Israel, DOB 12/15/1972 (Identified in paragraph 53)

121. AKIVA, Ronen, associate of Marina GLIKMAN, occup: computer programmer, employer: RETALIX, former Israeli military officer (Identified in paragraph 55)

122.RETALIX, USA, NADDIS - Negative. add: 8081 Royal Ridge Parkway, Irving, TX, formerly known as Point of Sale, Limited. (Identified in paragraph 55).

123. DOR, Hillel, NADDIS - Negative. W/M Israeli, DOB 04/06/1971. Associate of Marina GLIKMAN (Identified in paragraph 55)

124. MILLER, Zeev, NADDIS - Negative. W/M Israeli, DOB 09/04/1971, occup: student/software engineer, employer: RETALIX Israel (Identified in paragraph 55).

125. SHAKED, Barry, NADDIS - Negative, CEO of RETALIX (Identified in paragraph 55).

{ The following typos have been silently corrected above:   (Background) length, The > length. The  (Background) acencies > agencies  2. twentles > twenties  5. buildling > building  6. identifitd > identified  9. and, Hebrew > and Hebrew  10. nurniber > number  11. inMontgomery > in Montgomery  11. Fcderation > Federation  12.4 clate > date  12.5 Marmi > Miami  12.8 Maini > Miami  14.2 Mami > Miami  15 springbreak > spring break  16 workin > working  (missing 19) No response, > 19. No response.  20. Investigator, The > Investigator. The  25. studerts > students  26. 6fficer > officer  28. Iac > Inc  39. “bong” > “bong.”  40. recognizedby > recognized by  45. embassy,arranged > embassy arranged  46. frorn > from  50. Thev > They  50. dicharged > discharged  51. unlidentified > unidentified  52. ay > as  53. 2001 three > 2001) three  57. einployees > employees  58. rriale > male  59. artwork, > artwork.  61. Ciiy > City  63. detailmig > detailing  63. residenes > residences  63. ofMarch > of March  69. Offlicer > Officer  70. cf his > of his  70. cialmed > claimed  71. Enforcement in > Enforcement is  71. apparently on > apparently one  71. thoughy > thought  72. , The > . The  73. , The > . The  73. card wtih > card with  73. residence, > residence.  74. (1st) intervievv > interview  75. (1st) U.S, > U.S.  75. (2nd) security adviory > security advisory  75. (2nd) lbs, They > lbs. They  76. aii > art  76. theTampa > the Tampa  76. fifthi floor doors > fifth floor doors  76. idwitification > identification  76. fernale > female  76. approxiinately > approximately  77. thern > them  78. wat > was  78. hersclf > herself  80. utitilization > utilization  81. Tamarac, The > Tamarac. The  81. toaled > totaled  82. telephomically > telephonically  83. Police, Dept > Police Dept  84. ftiends > friends  85. Florida, > Florida.  87. Attomey’s > Attorney’s  88. buildina > building  88. IID > ID  88. “boss,” > “boss.”  88. paintings, > paintings.  88. curreatly > currently  89. Intemet > Internet  90. notifiied > notified  90. MACHBUBI > MACHBUBI,  90. ws > was  90. Center, > Center.  94. a several > several  97. needed too > needed to  97. Israel, > Israel.  98. involvment > involvement  99. lookin > looking  (missing #101) A female > 101. A female  100. herse > herself  102. artwork, > artwork.  103. anymore > any more  104. regardmg > regarding  110. theU.S. > the U.S.  112. Residen t > Resident  113. negative, > negative.  113. Nationala > Nationals  116. SMI TH > SMITH  123. Cafforriia > California  127. Specia > Special  131. Ageat > Agent  131. auents > agents  132. area, They > area. They  133. anindividual > an individual  133. approximately. 8:52 > approximately 8:52  135. 5'6 to 5'7 > 5'6" to 5'7"  135. about.8 > about 8  149. residence, > residence.  153. Labokatory > Laboratory  153. prieviously > previously  153. decent > descent  159. it DEA > at DEA  160. decent > descent  161. , The > . The  161. decent > descent  163. 33176 > 33176.  165. Texas75062 > Texas 75062  168. home, > home.  172. let the > left the  173. fax.number > fax number  174. (insert) FPS Incident  175. OK It > OK. It  176. also. dentified > also identified  176. Passort > Passport  181. ticket’ > ticket  182. prograrn > program  182. the were > they were  182.29 29. , > 29.  182.41 Miriistry > Ministry  182.121 programm > programmer,}  182 .2,6,7,10-16,41,75,86-89 negative > negative. }



Members of Israeli Groups and Future Hijackers and FBI Suspects in Key Towns and Areas



Israeli DEA Groups1     Hijackers and FBI Suspects2
Hanan Serfaty         Mohamed Atta
Akyuz Sagiv         Marwan al Shehhi3
Eli Cohen         Khaled al Mihdhar
Sarah Sassoon         Ziad Jarrah
Oshirt Zaguri         Abdulaziz al Omari
Sussie Oshra         Mohand al Shehri
Keren Matatia         Waleed al Shehri
Livnat Sella         Wail al Shehri
Rachel Kendel         Ahmed al Nami
Gilad Lifshitz4         Satam al Suqami

Hollywood Area5

Lior Barram             Nawaf al Hazmi
Peer Segalovitz             Salem al Hazmi
Legum Yochai             Fayez Banihammad
Yaron Shmuel6             Ahmed al Ghamdi

(continued {below})

1 Underscored names of members of Israeli DEA Groups are those who were apparent group leaders or have military intelligence, command responsibility or telecommunications backgrounds.
2 Hijackers are italicized.
3 Marwan al Shehhi (May 2002 FBI Suspect List, p. 7) and apparently Akyut Sagiv (DEA Report, p. 30) also had addresses in Coral Springs.
4 Mr. Lifshitz was stopped in Dallas with a Florida driver’s license listing his residence as Sunny Isles Beach, about 2 miles south of central Hollywood. DEA Report, paragraph 27, p. 9.
5 In addition to Hollywood, members of BOTH the ISRAELI DEA GROUPS and the FUTURE HIJACKERS AND/OR FBI SUSPECTS lived or operated in Miami, Fort Lauderdale, Plantation (two arrested with counterfeit Social Security cards and residences there), Coral Gables and Coral Springs. In addition, the Israelis lived or operated in nearby Tamarac, Sunny Isles Beach and Miami Beach, and the future hijackers and other suspects in nearby Dania and Opa Locka and (16 miles north) Delray Beach (see MAP 1).
6 Mr. Shmuel was a member of the Israeli New Jersey Group.


Hollywood Area (continued)

Dror Segalovitz             Hamza al Ghamdi
Keren Kuznitz             Saeed al
Zwaig Meirav             Ahmed al Haznawi
Hilda Machbubi             Hady Omar
Nimrod Simkin             Abdulwah al Omari
Inbal Keren             Mohamed al Shehri
Eran Kedem             Kamel Daoudi
Limor Perlas 
Shiri Ase 
Omit Kemetch 
Shmrt Mer 
Kobi Bouzaglo 
Ohad Aharon 
Yafit Segal 
Assaf Marziano 
Orit Bendalak 
Michael Simon 
Ilana Harari 
Rani Drore 
Inbar Kochavi 


Hudson and Bergen Counties7

Dominik Suter             Nawaf al Hazmi
Sivan Kurzberg             Khaled al Mihdhar
Paul Kurzberg             Hani Hanjour
Yaron Shmuel             Salem al Hazmi
Oded Ellner             Majed Moqed
Omer Marmari             Mohamed Atta8
Meirav Balhams9             Ahmed al Ghamdi
(continued below)

7 Towns include, for the Israeli New Jersey Group, Jersey City, Weehawken, Fair Lawn, Rutherford, East Rutherford and (Mr. Gal below) Edgewater. For those on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List (other than Mr. Suter) the towns include Jersey City, Hoboken, Paterson, Fort Lee, Elmwood Park, Hackensack, Wayne, North Haledon, Totowa, Harrison and Seacaucus. See MAP 3.
8 Atta, al Omari and the al Ghamdis all lived in or around Hollywood, Florida, but had addresses in the Bergen County area and were frequent visitors there, as noted on page 31 of the Memorandum. See the May 2002 FBI Suspect List and the Hijacker Timeline.
9 Ms. Balhams was stopped in Fredericksburg, Virginia and was a member of the Israeli DEA Groups. She lived in Jersey City, N.J. DEA Report, paragraphs 138-42, pp. 38-40.


Hudson and Bergen Counties (continued)

Michal Gal10             Addulaziz al Omari
              Mohamed al Shehri
              Dominik Suter11
              Mohamed Azmath
              Arshad Chaudry
              Abdul Husuen
              Bassem Hussein
              Ayub Khan
              Arshad Mazher
              Mohamed Nekhily
              Mohamed Pervez
              Mohamed Rahman


Oklahoma City and Norman

Yaron Ohana             Zaccarias Moussaoui12
Ronen Kalfon             Nawaf al Hazmi
Zeev Cohen             Hussein Alattas
Naor Topaz             Mukkaram Ali
Yoni Engel             Khaled Abdulqaa-dir
Yotam Dagai             Mohamed Alshehri
Or Alroei             Mohamed Atta
Ben Sadan             Marwan al Shehhi
              Islamic Science Institute
              Khadija Mohamed
              Elhadj Ndiaye
              Hadjaratou Thiam

10 Mr. Gal was a member of the Israeli DEA Groups, was arrested during the midnight raid in Irving Texas on March 27, 2001, and lived in Edgewater, N.J.
11 As noted in the Memorandum, Mr. Suter was both a leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group and listed in the May 2002 FBI Suspect List.
12 Suspected potential hijacker.



San Diego

Yaniv Gilor                    Khaled al Mihdhar
Five Unnamed Israelis13             Nawaf al Hazmi
              Hani Hanjour
            Omar al Bayoumi (cont’d)
              Hussein Alattas
              15 others (named)

Los Angeles

Michael Calmanovic             Mohamed Atta
Itay Simon             Marwan al Shehhi
Dominik Suter14             Dominik Suter


Dallas -- A Probable Training Area for the Israeli DEA Groups15

Michael Calmanovic             Nusrat Atta
Itay Simon             Amaan al Hallack
Tomer Ben Dor             Mohamed al Hallack
Marina Glikman             Amal al Harbi
Zeev Miller 
Gilad Lifshitz 
Aran Ofek 
Michal Gal 
Gal Blain 
Betzalel Yanay 
Morin Miryam Biton 
Daria Sasson 
Keren Touyz 
Morin Miryara 
Keren Touyz 
Sharon Rotem 
(continued below)

13 DEA Report, paragraphs 118-119, pp. 34-5; paragraphs 153-58, pp. 41-42.
14 Suter lived in Sherman Oaks (as well as in New Jersey), about two miles west of Calmanovic in Studio City.
15 Thirteen of the above members of the Dallas group were expelled from the United States on March 31, 2001. DEA Report, paragraph 48, p. 14. Certain members were detained elsewhere (Engel, Dagai and Alroei in St. Louis after visiting Oklahoma. Michal Gal was also of Edgewater, N.J., and Gilad Lifshitz lived in Sunny Isles Beach, Florida.


Dallas (Continued)

Maya Maimon
Yoni Engel
Yotam Dagai
Or Alroei
Gadi Regev
David Susi
Nofar Badihi
Eval Artzi
Julia Vainshtein
Dilka Borenstein
Ofir Navon
Dahan Eldad
Noham Gavriel
Evan Moshe



{October 2001 FBI Suspect List)
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{May 2002 FBI Suspect List}
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Jt. Committee
Beg. July
Source: All-source reporting over past five months
Daily Tel. of 9/16
Source: Two senior experts with Mossad
LAT of 9/20
Source: Mossad
August 6
Source: Clandestine, foreign Govt, media, repts & recent FBI info
A significant terrorist attackLarge-scale terrorist attacksA major assaultHijackings or other types of attacks
Spectacular, cause mass casualtiesHighly visible targetsA large scale target
single target
Attack preparations have been made. Will be in the coming weeks, with little or no warningAttacks are imminentU.S. will be very vulnerablePatterns of suspicious activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks
 Cell of 200 terrorists200 Islamics with terrorist leanings are slipping into U.S. & planning major attack 
U.S. facilities or interestsOn the American mainlandTarget is in U.S.Above patterns of activity in this country; OBL determined to strike in U.S.
OBL Link the plot to OBLLinked the info back to Afghanistan & OBLOBL & Al Qaeda
 Suspected Iraqi involvement